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ABSTRACT 
 
Interstate Alliances of the Fourth-Century BCE Greek World: A Socio-Cultural Perspective 
by  
Nicholas D. Cross 
 
Adviser: Professor Jennifer Roberts 
 
This dissertation offers a reassessment of interstate alliances (συµµαχία) in the fourth-century 
BCE Greek world from a socio-cultural perspective. Although there are a number of studies of 
ancient and modern alliances that approach the topic from a politico-military perspective, this is 
the first to apply a socio-cultural perspective to classical Greek alliances. By considering the 
subject in its own context, from the primary literary and epigraphic sources rather than modern 
theoretical models, this study aims to identify how contemporaries understood and represented 
their collaborative activities with other poleis. This approach leads to insights that challenge the 
widespread notion that classical Greek alliances were temporary affiliations designed for nothing 
more than political and military objectives. On the contrary, even though alliances materialized 
within the context of warfare, they were reifications of the ideational, cultural, religious, and 
economic interactions between individuals in each polis. The overall endeavor, therefore, can be 
considered a socio-cultural history of Greek alliances in the fourth century BCE. 
Part I shows how the practice of constructing an interstate alliance was a social activity that grew 
out of historical interactions on the interpersonal level. It also examines the constitutive element 
behind the legislative and religious activities in alliance negotiations, which strengthened old ties 
and developed new ones in a common cause and towards a common identity. Part II reviews the 
principal Athenian, Spartan, and Theban bilateral alliances of the fourth century BCE. It 
emphasizes their distinct alliance experiences and practices, while also noting the prevalent 
importance of socio-cultural factors for their success or failure. Part III reexamines the end of 
alliances and offers an alternative interpretation of that phase based upon contemporary 
perceptions. It also highlights the innovative and important contributions which this project 
offers to the wider academic community. Although this study seeks out contemporary 
perceptions, its conclusions engage with the current debates in history, classics, and international 
relations studies.  
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INTRODUCTION TO ANCIENT GREEK ALLIANCE STUDIES 
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Chapter I 
 
Models and Definitions 
 
The practice of constructing formal interstate alliances in the fourth-century BCE Greek 
world was a social activity.1 Alliances emerged out of the historical interactions between the 
parties in the social, ideational, religious, and economic spheres. The shared alliance experience, 
in turn, reinforced these associations and created further common interests, ideas, and goals. The 
alliance process, therefore, was a transformative one for the participants. Although they were 
generally concluded within the context of warfare and defined in political terms, at their core 
alliances were manifestations of the socio-cultural features of the Greek interstate society. This is 
not a typical representation of interstate alliances. International Relations (IR) scholars generally 
approach the topic from a politico-military perspective, seeing alliances as only defense 
mechanisms to obstruct a mutual enemy or as tools to increase geopolitical power. This negative 
characterization has long had an impact on historians of classical Greece, especially those with 
an eye for the military and political narratives. The current project, the first full-length inquiry 
into alliances in classical Greece, challenges the widespread notion that alliances were nothing 
more than isolated affiliations designed for purposes of Realpolitik and offers in its place a 
reassessment of the bilateral alliances of the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans from a socio-
cultural perspective.2  
																																								 																				
1 All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted. 
 
2 Appendix A lists all of the primary Athenian, Spartan, and Theban alliances from 403 to 
338 with their provisions and source references. Multilateral institutions have a different 
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The use of this perspective is the most valuable contribution that this dissertation makes 
to the study of interstate alliances. A socio-cultural perspective considers the topic from a 
horizontal rather than a vertical vantage point. It emphasizes the impact that historical 
interactions and connections on the micro-level had on the larger political decisions of the polis. 
Examples to be discussed at length in this study include the role of interstate personal contacts, 
shared social traditions, ideas and beliefs, and economic interactions – all of which had the 
potential to tie the participants together into a closely aligned network and to create an 
environment for a formal interstate alliance. In other words, alliances were formal manifestations 
of the broader phenomenon of traditional interstate alignments. This is a unique perspective. The 
dominant explanatory IR model today is Realism, which views the world in a condition of 
endemic conflict and competition. Every other state, therefore, is a potential rival and not to be 
trusted. In this atomistic scenario, states, acting according to pragmatism and self-interest, only 
reluctantly enter into interstate alliances and then only for political or military purposes. Realists 
dismiss ideological or moral concerns as irrelevant to the actual operation of international 
affairs.3  
Not seeking so much to completely deny as to modify (and to temper) the traditional 
politico-military account, this study argues that there is a need to devote more attention to the 
non-political and non-military determinants. It seeks answers to questions such as: how useful 
																																								 																				
administrative apparatus from bilateral alliances (Figueira and Jensen 2013, 480-496; Beck and 
Funke 2015), and thus are not discussed at length in this study.  
 
3 Some Realists consider Thucydides to be their intellectual founder (Lebow and Strauss 
1991; Crane 1998; McCann and Strauss 2001; Eckstein 2006, 48-57; Platias and Koliopoulos 
2010; Forde 2012, 178-196), but many others dispute that distinction (Johnson Bagby 1994, 131-
153; Rahe 1996, 105-141; Ober 2001, 273-306; Lebow 2007, 351-378).  
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are modern models for the study of ancient Greek alliances? Would the Greeks confirm today’s 
interpretations of their interstate activity? What did they believe they were doing when they 
entered into an alliance? Were socio-cultural factors as important as the political and military 
ones? How genuine were the justifications which they put forth in their historical records? The 
answers which this study offers to such questions are valuable to the subject of interstate 
alliances as well as to other topics in historical and IR studies. 
The methodology followed here is also distinctive, indeed, completely opposite to that of 
modern scholarship. Because most scholars view ancient Greek IR through the lens of 
generalized theoretical models, the specialized study of alliances has not made much headway in 
academia. Polly Low perhaps speaks for many when she explains why her treatment of classical 
Greek IR ignores this topic: “This book has (deliberately) attempted to avoid many practical 
aspects of interstate relations – the technicalities of specific alliances and treaties, the realities of 
battles, campaigns and wars. . . . A complete picture of interstate relations cannot be achieved by 
focusing only on these details of ‘what really happened.’”4 Low does, in fact, address specific 
alliances at certain points in her work, but it is the larger theoretical issues that are of the most 
concern to her and other likeminded scholars. The current study, however, deliberately focuses 
on alliances – a practical aspect of interstate relations – in the belief that a proper understanding 
of them can generate new material and perspectives for the broader interpretations of interstate 
activity. Seen in this light, anyone in this field who ignores alliances runs a risk. In the words of 
																																								 																				
 
4 Low 2007, 257. 
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George Liska, one of the fathers of modern alliance studies, “it is impossible to speak of 
international relations without reference to alliances; the two merge in all but name.”5  
Applying a socio-cultural perspective specifically to interstate alliances, of course, 
involves a close look at the primary source material. Since this subject lends itself easily to 
interdisciplinary research, it is tempting for historians, lacking any complete IR manual from 
antiquity, to look to modern IR scholars for an interpretive lens through which to explain the 
conduct of the Greek poleis.6 When necessary this study engages with modern IR scholarship, 
but in general the findings come from the contemporary literary, epigraphical, and, at times, 
material record. It seeks primarily to recontextualize the subject and to uncover the motives for 
interstate activity as contemporaries perceived them. The conclusions, therefore, are based as 
closely as possible to an emic interpretation of the alliances. This approach provides an 
important corrective to the popular Realist narrative. As political institutions the Greek poleis 
engaged in power politics; yet, it is important to recognize that the ancients themselves saw their 
political and military activities within a socio-cultural framework.  
But why the fourth century, from 403 to 338, between the end of the Peloponnesian War 
and the intervention of Philip II of Macedon into southern Greek political affairs? Most scholars 
concentrate on the previous century, especially the Peloponnesian War years, or on the 
Hellenistic period afterwards.7 Why, then, choose these relatively overlooked years in between? 
																																								 																				
5 Liska 1962, 3. 
 
6 It is not known for certain that Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a treatise on interstate 
relations at the end of the fourth century. The oldest manual for alliance practices is Book 7 
(“The End of the Six-Fold Policy”) of the late fourth-century Indian philosopher Kautilya’s 
Arthashastra. 
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The data presented later in this chapter and in the appendices on the number of alliances should 
be some justification for these chronological limits. But for now, compare the frequency of 
alliance formation at these different times. The number of known alliances from the first one in 
the epigraphical record in the mid-sixth century down to 404 is only 33. The frequency of 
alliances over this roughly 150-year period is approximately one every four-and-a-half years. But 
over the 66 years (403-338) under review in this study, the number of alliances jumps 
significantly to 78. That is a new alliance approximately every ten months, a 530-percent 
increase in frequency over the previous period. Conversely, after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, 
there is a precipitous reduction in the number of bilateral alliances. Philip’s institutional 
arrangements in the League of Corinth curtailed the practice for the southern Greeks. This 
dramatic decrease indicates that there was also a drastic change in the nature of alliance 
dynamics. The epigraphist Stephen Lambert notes that there were “significant modifications in 
foreign policy objectives in response to the new circumstances and a marked shift of emphasis 
from the interstate level of operation to a focus on achieving those objectives through relations 
with individual foreigners.”8 Because of the lack of evidence and of the change in the character 
of Greek IR, the year 338 is a quite natural terminus. In terms of recorded diplomatic activity, 
therefore, 403 to 338 is a period that is incredibly rich in evidence, and it is ironic that scholars 
																																								 																				
7 Neglect of the fourth century by the leading expert on ancient interstate relations, 
Eckstein 2006, 79 (“if we now turn from the fifth century B.C. to the third century B.C.”), is not 
unique. Tritle 1997, 3-4 comments on earlier scholars’ perceptions of a “decadent” fourth 
century that was in “decline.”  
 
8 Lambert 2012a, 384-385; cf. Tracy 1995, 7-23; Green 2003, 1-7; Chaniotis 2005, 20. 
The continuation of Boeotian, Achaean, and Arcadian Leagues, however, indicates that the 
Macedonians did not require the dissolution of all multilateral organizations.   
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neglect it as much as they do. Furthermore, this decision is dialectical: this period provides many 
and varied examples for the discourse of ancient Greek IR, which has of late stagnated with its 
focus on the political and military activities in the fifth century and Hellenistic period. But a shift 
to the intervening years adds fresh material and reveals more variety in alliance dynamics than 
the conventional approaches often allow.   
With the perspective, methodology, and chronological delimitations established, this 
introductory chapter begins with a review of the modern literature on interstate alliances in IR 
and in historical studies. The traditional view of scholarship in both fields holds to the balance-
of-power (BOP) interpretation, which asserts that ancient Greek alliances, like modern ones, 
were military defense pacts designed to obstruct any one state from acquiring disproportional 
power and to maintain geopolitical stability. But in recent decades the state of alliance studies 
has grown much larger and now includes a variety of alternative models to BOP, few of which 
have gained much currency among scholars of antiquity, who continue to espouse the BOP 
interpretation of alliances. This chapter offers a critique of both traditional and alternative 
models as interpretative lenses for viewing ancient Greek alliances.   
The second half of the chapter looks at the definitions of and motivations for alliances. 
Throughout their history the Greeks made use of different vocabulary to describe their alliances, 
until they settled in the fourth century upon συµµαχία (fighting together). Although a prima facie 
military term, συµµαχία held both practical and ideological connotations. And the primary 
thematic justifications (reciprocity, helping friends, helping the wronged, kinship), which the 
Greeks themselves posed for military action, reinforce the point that they engaged in interstate 
activity on the basis of both political and non-political considerations. Thus, by considering the 
matter in its own context, in the perceptions of contemporaries, a more variable scenario of 
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alliance dynamics emerges than what is traditionally allowed in the politics-only paradigm. This 
chapter closes with a summary of the following chapters which continue to build on these points.  
 
Modern Scholarship on Interstate Alliances 
 
Alliance studies took off in the twentieth century, but one can trace their intellectual 
descent back much earlier to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Early political thinkers, 
such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, conceived of alliances in terms of a balance of 
power (BOP) theory. By BOP they meant that stability in international affairs is dependent upon 
a roughly equal distribution of power (among the larger European states, that is).9 Whenever the 
power of one state grows disproportionately and endangers the existing geopolitical equilibrium, 
then those who are directly threatened will enter into a formal military alliance in order to 
obstruct that state and restore the status quo. The Scottish philosopher David Hume built on these 
ideas in his essay “On the Balance of Power,” which traces the influence of BOP upon interstate 
alliances across Western history. Convinced that BOP represents a natural condition, he began 
with the assumption that the ancient Greeks were also cognizant of its presence – “the maxim of 
preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, 
that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity.”10 Through anecdotal evidence – 
anti-Athenian alliances during the Peloponnesian War and the Athenian-Theban alliances in the 
																																								 																				
 
9 History of BOP: Sheehan 1996, 24-52; Haslam 2002, 89-127. Kaufman, Little, and 
Wohlforth 2007, a product of a World History perspective, challenges BOP’s transcultural 
relevance. 
 
10 Reprinted in Hume 1987, 339-348. 
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fourth century, for example – he determined that the Greeks not only acknowledged BOP but 
actively sought to preserve it through their many interstate alliances. Of course, in writing this 
essay he had his contemporary context in mind and expected that BOP would exert its 
moderating influence upon the European affairs of his day just as it did, so he thought, for a time 
on the Greek world.11  
To jump ahead a couple of centuries, these ideas became guides for early Realist 
scholars. Realism posits that pragmatism and self-interest direct foreign policy decisions. Being 
in a naturally competitive environment, state actors intervene in international affairs only to 
maximize their geopolitical standing (relative to all others) and to ensure their national security – 
which makes one question how, in these zero-sum conditions, true collective action can ever 
come about. Hans Morgenthau, the father of “Classical” Realism, recognized this conceptual 
hurdle and, building upon Hume’s ideas with a greater degree of theoretical refinement and a 
distinct emphasis on power politics, devoted a full chapter in his Politics Among Nations to BOP 
and alliances. BOP, “a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power . . . [serves as] 
a protective device of an alliance of nations, anxious for their independence, against another 
nation’s designs for world domination.”12 This was a view that harmonized with the Cold War 
environment that shaped and was shaped by Morgenthau’s Realist ideas.  
																																								 																				
 
11 Subsequent treatments of Greek alliances (Brougham [reprinted in Forsyth, Keens-
Soper, and Savigear 2008, 260-274]; Philipson 1911, 102-108; Jaeger 1938, 218 n. 2) rested 
more on the authority of Hume than ancient sources.  
 
12 Morgenthau 1948, 137. Morgenthau and Classical Realism: Guilhot 2008, 281-304; 
Scheuerman 2009; Jackson and Sørensen 2016, 62-71. Carr 1946 predates Morgenthau’s Politics 
and was written from a British perspective. History of BOP as political theory: Sheehan 1996; 
Little 2007a.  
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Later Realists perpetuated Morgenthau’s “iron laws” of BOP. George Liska, 
Morgenthau’s associate at the University of Chicago and author of Nations in Alliance, the first 
full-length monograph on this topic, also underscored the regulatory influence of BOP – “an 
alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which 
threatens one’s independence.”13 Although Liska broadened the subject to include the 
management and dissolution phases of the alliance life-cycle, his fundamental hermeneutical 
insight was the same as Morgenthau’s, the influence of power politics on alliance dynamics. 
BOP survived and became more distinct in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, a 
reformulation of Classical Realism which has come to be known as Neorealism (or Structural 
Realism). Because he adds the systemic attribute of anarchy (the absence of any supranational 
regulatory institution to supervise the behavior of individual states), Waltz at the same time 
elevates the indispensability of BOP, a natural, predictable course correction to any destabilizing 
element in the international structure. In this scenario, alliances are nothing more than temporary 
defense mechanisms to preserve BOP and are thus no longer necessary to maintain once the 
mutual threat has passed and balance has been restored.14 This narrative of power dynamics in 
the alliance process is what has permeated modern scholarship of ancient Greece.  
With abundant anecdotal and theoretical support, Realist scholars inextricably 
intertwined the concept of BOP with the study of alliances, until their correlation became 
axiomatic. It was predictable, therefore, that this allegedly ahistorical principle would capture the 
																																								 																				
13 Liska 1962, 26-27; cf. 1998 passim. 
 
14 Waltz 1979, 102-128. Little 2007a critiques Morgenthau’s and Watz’s BOP models. 
Nexon 2009, 330-359 reviews more recent scholarship. 
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imaginations of those studying ancient Greek IR. Piero Treves and Robin Seager, for example, 
make great use of BOP in their respective publications.15 The concept saturates Frank E. Adcock 
and D. J. Mosley’s Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, as reflected in the following excerpt.   
“The defensive treaties which were signed by Athens and Corcyra in 433 and by Athens and 
Boeotia in 395, whilst they mentioned no specific enemy, were conceived specifically to counter 
the activities of Corinth and Sparta respectively and so could not be expected to persist. The great 
Athenian naval alliances of the fifth and fourth centuries were, in origin, specifically directed 
against Persia and Sparta respectively; they were not conceived between friends as alliances 
which were to cover a variety of contingencies, although Athens sought in practice to take 
advantage of the alliances for other purposes.”16 
  
This passage echoes the Realist insistence that alliances are products of unifying threats and 
therefore negative agreements – as in Liska’s famous remark that “alliances are against, and only 
derivatively for, someone or something.”17 Likewise, in two articles devoted specifically to 
classical Greek alliances, the historian Barry Strauss argues that, except in very few cases, the 
Greeks routinely entered into alliances to maintain BOP: 
“On any reading, the vast majority of poleis which sought allies did so for the purpose of 
balancing. In case after case, the sources state that polis A sought an alliance with polis B to 
protect it against the threat of polis C.”18  
 
Similar assessments can be found throughout the works of Philip Harding (“balance-of-power 
politics was Athens’ preferred method of dealing with the Greek states on the mainland”), Arthur 
Eckstein (alliances are results of “shifting and complex balances of power between ferociously 
independent polities”), Peter Hunt (“balance-of-power considerations often required shifts of 
																																								 																				
 
15 Treves 1970; Seager 1974, 36-63. 
 
16 Adcock and Mosley 1975, 137. 
 
17 Liska 1962, 12. 
 
18 Strauss 1991, 196; cf. 1997, 127-140.  
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alignment even at the expense of treaty obligations and the friendships they often formalized”), 
and many others.19 Clearly, there is a general agreement among scholars as to the applicability of 
the BOP concept to classical Greek alliances. 
In spite of this consensus, however, the present study begins by questioning whether the 
theory of BOP, which was never articulated in print before the fifteenth century, is indeed 
appropriate for an emic appreciation of the Greek alliances.20 Did the Greeks, as Hume 
maintained, recognize BOP’s invisible hand in their alliances? Did they, as Realists suppose, 
take into account systemic features and acknowledge the potential of alliances to correct 
imbalances in the international structure? If so, what evidence is there in the ancient sources?  
In response to these questions, many scholars point to a passage in Demosthenes’ For the 
Megalopolitans. Part of the Athenian orator’s case for an anti-Spartan alliance with the 
Megalopolitans in 353 rests on reasoning that comes very close to BOP: 
“Surely then no one would dispute that it is for the advantage of the city that both the Spartans 
and these Thebans are weak. Therefore, if one should judge from the words which you have oft 
spoken, the state of affairs now lies in such an opportunity as this: the Thebans will become weak 
when Orchomenus, Thespiae and Plataea are refounded, but if the Spartans put Arcadia under 
their power and destroy Megalopolis, they will become strong again.”21 
 
οὐκοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἀντείποι ὡς οὐ συµφέρει τῇ πόλει καὶ Λακεδαιµονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ 
Θηβαίους τουτουσί. ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγµατα νῦν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρηµένοις 
πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑµῖν λόγοις τεκµήρασθαι, ὥστε Θηβαίους µὲν Ὀρχοµενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ 
Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, Λακεδαιµονίους δ᾽, εἰ ποιήσονται τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν ὑφ᾽ 
ἑαυτοῖς καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν ἀναιρήσουσι, πάλιν ἰσχυροὺς γενήσεσθαι. 
 
																																								 																				
19 Harding 1995, 108-109 (reiterated in Harding 2015, 36-37); Eckstein 2006, 75-76 (cf. 
Eckstein 2008); Hunt 2010, 162; cf. Christ 2012, 118-125. 
 
20 Lendon 2002, 375-394 reviews the “primitivist vs. modernist” debate over the 
compatibility of modern theory and ancient history. Malchow 2016, 115-122 discusses the “too-
easy application” of anecdotes from classical Greece as “historical ‘evidence’ for many 
conflicting, indeed contradictory, schools of IR thought.”  
 
21 Dem. 16.4. All translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted. 
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This passage contains a complex plan of alliances with multiple small powers in Boeotia and in 
the Peloponnesus, in order to obstruct the encroachment of the larger powers in those same areas. 
This sounds very much like a BOP strategy. Taking the speech as a whole, however, there are 
apparent inconsistencies and incompatible suggestions. Later, Demosthenes, the proxenos of the 
Thebans, reverses his policy with respect to Boeotia and advocates collaboration with the 
Thebans against the Spartans, even recommending that the Athenians abandon their claims to 
Oropus, an old bone of contention with their northern neighbors.22 Then, in the final sentence of 
a case that has been built largely on concerns of Realpolitik, he concludes with an appeal to the 
social norm of helping the weak: 
“Therefore, men of Athens, by the gods, I have spoken, with no affection or hatred in me for 
either side, what I consider advantageous to you; I advise you not to give up the Megalopolitans, 
and besides never to sacrifice any of the lesser to the greater.”23   
 
ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, µὰ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε φιλῶν οὐδετέρους οὔτε µισῶν ἰδίᾳ 
εἴρηκα, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ νοµίζω συµφέρειν ὑµῖν: καὶ παραινῶ µὴ προέσθαι Μεγαλοπολίτας, µηδ᾽ 
ἄλλον ἁπλῶς µηδένα τῶν ἐλαττόνων τῷ µείζονι. 
 
If Demosthenes had any conception of BOP, it was indistinct. Rather than confirming an 
appreciation of the principle, his speech complicates the matter by raising a variety of political 
and non-political issues. The orator advocates paths of competition and collaboration with 
political rivals. At one point he stresses political advantage, at another the justice of supporting 
weak states. And yet, these are not necessarily contradictory policies: helping a weaker polis, for 
																																								 																				
 
22 Lane Fox 1997, 181 smartly calls this a strategy of “balance of weakness.” Trevett 
2011, 276 and Worthington 2013, 101-103 comment on the practical flaws in Dem. 16. Samotta 
2010, 28, 32 employs the imagery of Walt’s balance of threat (see note 28) to interpret 
Demosthenes’ geopolitics. Demosthenes and Thebes: Trevett 1999, 184-202; Mack 2015, 114-
117. 
 
23 Dem. 16.32. 
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example, places the beneficiary in the position of a debtor and thus works to the political 
advantage of the Athenians. In any event, Demosthenes’ case for an alliance with the 
Megalopolitans is not indisputable proof of BOP strategy in ancient Greece and rather confirms 
the bearing which both political and moral concerns had in alliance choices of the fourth century. 
On this point of the possibility of BOP’s operation in ancient history, Herbert Butterfield 
once remarked, “more than most of our basic political formulas, this one seems to come from the 
modern world’s reflections of its own experience.”24 In Balance of Power: History & Theory, 
Michael Sheehan can only concede that “while one can detect behaviour in the ancient Greek 
system which is analogous to balance of power behaviour, it was not self-consciously done for 
that purpose.”25 And historian Andrew Wolpert agrees: “no doubt there is a certain overlap 
between such concerns and the logic of power politics. Yet these internal concerns and 
constraints prevented the Greek cities from creating a system resembling balance of power.”26 As 
a political theory, therefore, BOP, if it existed at all, went unacknowledged in ancient Greece. 
And if the actors themselves were unaware of its presence, then one should question how 
germane it is as one – not to mention the only – interpretative theory for ancient Greek alliances. 
Fortunately, in recent decades there have appeared, even within the Realist (or Neorealist) camp, 
a number of nuanced alternatives to the traditional paradigm.  
																																								 																				
24 In Butterfield, Wight, and Bull 1966, 133.  
 
25 Sheehan 1996, 27. 
 
26 Wolpert 2001, 79. Wight 1973, 86-87 observed the same structural constraints. Little 
2007b, 47-66 disputes the applicability of BOP to fifth-century Greece. Murnane 2002, 101-111 
makes the same objections to BOP in ancient Egypt.  
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In The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt, although a student of Kenneth Waltz, disputes 
BOP and introduces a “balance of threat” model, which sees alliances as responses to perceived 
aggression from other states. “Although power is an important part of the equation,” Walt 
observes of alliances in the Middle East from 1955 to 1979, “it is not the only one. It is more 
accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest 
threat.”27 Since a threat need not have any correlation to actual capabilities and resources, it is on 
the basis of perceptions that threatened states form alliances. Despite this theoretical refinement, 
Walt’s model still supports the Realist reading of interstate behavior according to the concerns of 
national security and relative political advancement. Glen Snyder also challenges BOP and its 
inherent pessimism. Depicting alliances as formal expressions of informal alignments that may 
or may not be military in nature, Snyder’s Alliance Politics makes a case that alliances “are often 
very durable; as relationships they are certainly more durable than the interactions by which they 
‘form and dissolve.’”28 Instead of isolated military defense pacts that are discarded once the 
limited objective has been accomplished, Snyder insists that alliance relationships can persist 
because, through the entire alliance experience, the participating states develop new, common 
interests, which in turn provide a basis for future collaboration.  
More directly opposed to BOP are the models of bandwagoning and chain-ganging. A 
representative of the former is Randall Schweller, who considers an alliance to be an 
opportunistic tool by which states, with no concern for the equal distribution of power, can make 
geopolitical advances. He argues that the act of bandwagoning, aligning with a stronger power, is 
																																								 																				
27 Walt 1987, 21. Weitsman 2003 follows Walt but argues that the threats are more often 
from within the alliances than from without.  
 
28 Snyder 1997, 22. 
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a less expensive way to make those advances – on a stronger power’s coattails, as it were – than 
balancing against that same power and putting the very survival of the state at risk.29 Examples 
of this phenomenon include the eastern European states that joined Nazi Germany in World War 
II, or the many Greek poleis that medized during the Persian Wars. Chain-ganging explains 
situations in which one state’s existing alliance partners determine its foreign policy decisions. 
This happens mostly within multilateral alliances, such as was the case for the alliance choices of 
the European nations in the prelude to World War I or of the Aegean members in the Second 
Athenian Confederacy who agreed to certain alliances based on the example of their hegemon.30 
Although each of these alternative approaches have distinctive emphases, at their most 
fundamental reading, they all share the view that it is political power considerations that 
determine the essential character of alliances. Socio-cultural concerns are of little or no 
importance. 
Outside of the Realist school, however, stand Liberalism (or Liberal Institutionalism) and 
Constructivism. The former criticizes Realism’s inability to explain collective action which takes 
place outside of the realm of conflict. If Waltz’s Neorealism, for example, encompassed all 
aspects of relations between states, Liberal Robert O. Keohane objects, “alliance cooperation 
would be easy to explain as a result of the operation of a balance of power, but system-wide 
patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without being tied to an alliance system 
directed against an adversary would not.”31 Liberals pose that not all alliances arise because of 
																																								 																				
 
29 Schweller 1994, 93.  
 
30 Christensen and Snyder 1990, 137-168. 
 
31 Keohane 1984, 7; cf. Keohane and Nye 1977; 2000.  
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fears of a political or military menace. There are formal alliances which materialize on the basis 
of mutual and absolute (rather than relative) advantages extending from interstate cooperation, 
especially but not exclusively in the economic sphere. In other words, the activity of micro-
actors on the domestic level and of nongovernmental institutions play a large part in determining 
a state’s foreign alignments. This bottom-up approach to IR diminishes BOP’s relevance as a 
comprehensive explanation for alliances.  
Constructivism, on the other hand, sees alliances not in terms of BOP determinism or of 
the potential of mutual advantage but of historical interactions and social relations between 
states.32 Constructivists resist representations of a static international structure (“Anarchy is what 
states make of it” is the title of a well-known article by Constructivist Alexander Wendt) and 
assert that the fundamental nature of international relations is social not material. Dynamic 
networks of informal relationships – in the social as well as the political sphere – and how they 
are represented have the capacity to construct common ideas and identities, which in turn create 
formal alliances.33 Constructivists can agree with Realists that national interests play a role in 
alliance formation, but they add that those interests are malleable and can be transformed from 
individual state interests into collective ones through the alliance process – in the way the 
alliance is represented in words and in images, the performance of traditional rituals, and the 
shared political and military activities.34  
																																								 																				
 
32 Onuf 1989; Fierke and Jorgensen. 2015. Constructivism and classical Greece: Lebow 
2007, 351-378; Zumbrunnen 2015, 296-312. Constructivism and ancient Rome: Burton 2011. 
The peer-polity interaction model, like Constructivism, emphasizes “structural homologies,” 
products of concrete and symbolic interstate interactions (Ma 2003, 9-39; Mack 2015, 190-232). 
 
33 Wendt 1992, 391-425; cf. 1999, 92-138. 
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Recently, a number of scholars of ancient Greece have employed these alternative models 
in their works. In Les relations entre états dans le Grèce antique du temps d'Homère à 
l'intervention romaine (ca. 700-200 av. J.-C.), the Swiss historian Adalberto Giovannini 
downgrades the alleged impact of constant warfare and hegemonic threats, focusing instead on 
the general (social, moral, religious) and practical (diplomatic) aspects of interstate activity. He 
regards these as fundamental contributors to the creation of un système d'Etats pluraliste, a 
complex system of accepted rules and principles governing ancient Greek IR.35 Similarly, Polly 
Low’s Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power places a great deal of 
emphasis on a “normative framework,” which shaped the conduct of interstate activity in the 
classical Greek period. Despite the absence of any straightforward articulations of IR principles 
from any ancient Greek writer, Low still extrapolates from the historical and epigraphical record 
a set of normative guidelines which, she maintains, the Greeks consciously observed. In place of 
a cutthroat environment dominated solely by power grabs, Low highlights the force of social and 
moral considerations, such as reciprocity and justice, on how poleis interacted.36  
Moving away from these attempts to uncover some proto-IR model in ancient Greece, 
Peter Hunt’s War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens examines the surviving speeches 
delivered in the Athenian assembly in the mid-fourth century for indications of what the Greeks 
thought they were doing when they engaged in interstate activity. He avoids the cynical 
																																								 																				
34 Suh 2007 uses the United States-Korean military alliance as a test case to argue that an 
alliance has the power to define the identity of both allies and enemies.  
 
35 Giovannini 2007. Van Wees 2004, 6-18 also employs the concept of a “society of 
states.” 
 
36 Low 2007.  
 
19	
	
methodologies common in modern scholarship that “seek to unmask, to debunk, the stated 
grounds for war . . . and locate the real causes of war elsewhere: for example, in amoral 
calculations of interest, in economic advantage, or in a militaristic culture.”37 Because he accepts 
at face-value the arguments put forth in the contemporary speeches, he is not so absolute in his 
reading of Greek interstate behavior. Instead, he is able to take into account, as the Athenian 
orators did, both moral and political motives for the alliances, the approach closest to the one for 
the current study.  
The bibliographical review of the last few pages illustrates the futility of a one-size-fits-
all approach to alliances. The topic is too extensive for there to be some unified field theory. 
Although each model has its own positive contribution, it is inconceivable that each would be 
universally applicable. The rigid imposition of one theory to the exclusion of all others fails to 
capture the variety from case to case. Nor do the majority of modern models sufficiently 
acknowledge the non-political determinants which the ancient records often highlight. Power 
politics certainly played a part in the fourth-century Greek alliances, but so also did social, 
moral, ideational, and religious features. This study, therefore, seeks rather to problematize (or to 
rectify) the matter by following a more eclectic, Weberian style of inquiry that reintegrates the 
political and non-political aspects of alliance dynamics.38  
 
Defining Alliances 
																																								 																				
37 Hunt 2010, 3. 
 
38 Notice the recent trend to amalgamate theories such as in the Realist-Constructivist 
model of Jackson et al. 2004; Barkin 2010. 
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 But what is an interstate alliance? There should be a relatively simple answer to this 
question. Yet, despite all of the work that has already been done, modern scholars are unable to 
agree on a concise and cogent definition.39 The ancient Greeks, too, it turns out, lacked a 
comprehensive definition or consistent titular designation. In the fourth century, they used almost 
exclusively the military word συµµαχία (fighting together), but earlier they reached for domestic 
and religious metaphors as well. A brief overview of alliance terminology exposes the embedded 
socio-cultural features in the alliances. 
Homer, like his Near Eastern predecessors, characterizes alliances with a variety of terms 
from συνθεσία (covenant) to φιλότης (friendship) or ὁρκία τάµνειν (to cut oaths).40 In the 
epigraphical record, the earliest alliances were designated as φιλία (friendship), such as the one 
from the mid-sixth century between the Anaitoi and the Metapioi, two otherwise unknown 
communities:    
The agreement between the Anaitoi and the Metapioi: friendship for fifty years. And if either side 
violates the compact, let both the protectors and the priests expel them from the altar. If they 
transgress the oath, judgment shall belong to the priest at Olympia.41 
 
Ἀ ϝράτρα τὸς Ἀναίτο[ς] καὶ τὸ[ς] Μεταπίος. φιλίαν πεντάκοντα  
ϝέτεα. κ᾽ ὀπόπαροι µἐνπεδέοιαν ἀπὸ το ̂βοµο ̂ἀποϝελέοιάν κα τοὶ  
																																								 																				
39 Whereas Morgenthau 1948 posed multiple meanings, Liska 1962 proffered not even 
one. Walt 1987, 12-13 follows a broad representation of both “a formal or informal arrangement 
of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” Snyder 1997, 4 limits his 
definition to “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force.” Bergsmann 
2001, 25-26 notes at least thirty-five different definitions. 
 
40 Hom. Od. 16.427 uses ἄρθµιοι (united in friendship; cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 59-60) for the 
union between the Ithacans and Thesprotians. Taillardat 1982, 1-14; Karavites 1992, 48-81; 
Panessa 1999, 23-30; Cohen 2001, 27-30. Zaccagnini 2002, 141-153 and Podany 2010 
investigate the concept of brotherhood among the great powers in the late Bronze Age.  
 
41 IvO 10; cf. Panessa 1999, 102-107.  
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πρόξενοι καὶ τοὶ µάντιερ̣· αἰ τὸ[ν] ὄρκον παρβαίνοιαν, γνοµ̂αν τὸρ  
ἰα[ρ]οµάορ ̣τ᾽ Ὀλυνπίαι.  
 
The articles of this φιλία-alliance, even in their rudimentary form, resemble elements of later, 
fourth-century συµµαχίαι-alliances: a duration (fifty years) and a clause specifying the 
punishment of religious exclusion for any transgressions of the unrecorded terms. Also, the 
treaty was recorded on a bronze tablet and placed at a sacred site (Olympia). Unfortunately, the 
text gives no indication of the responsibilities expected of the allies. 
There is also a contemporary φιλότης-alliance between the Sybarites and their allies 
(σύνµαχοι) with the Serdaioi:   
The Sybarites and their allies and the Serdaioi agreed to friendship faithful and without deceit 
forever. The protectors are Zeus, Apollo, the other gods, and the city of Poseidonia.42 
  
ἀρµόχθεν οἱ Συβαρί- 
ται κ' oἱ σύνµαχοι κ' oἱ  
Σερδαίοι ἐπὶ φιλότατ- 
ι πιστᾶι κ᾽ἀδόλοι ἀε-  
ίδιον· πρόξενοι ὀ Ζε- 
ὺς κ᾽ Ὀπόλον κ᾽ὀλλοι θ-  
εοὶ καὶ πόλις Ποσειδα- 
νία.  
 
This text, also recorded on a bronze tablet and deposited at Olympia, is not quite as detailed as 
the earlier one. There is an explicit mention of the alliance’s duration – in this case, forever 
(ἀείδιον) – and an implicit mention of a religious punishment from the πρόξενοι gods for any 
																																								 																				
42 SdA 120 (= ML10; cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 56-57; Panessa 1999, 92-101; Bolmarcich 
2010, 117-119). Lombardo 2008, 49-60 reviews possible dates for the treaty. Wheeler 1984, 254-
255 (reiterated in 2008, 57-84 and supported by Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 199-201) 
considers the inclusion of ἀδόλως, which he calls an “anti-deceit clause,” to be a reaction to 
sophistic interpretations of the treaties. Gazzano 2002, 12-13; 2005, 1-33, however, 
incorporating literary evidence as well as epigraphical, replies that the Greeks relied on more 
practical measures than oaths to guarantee loyalty. Bolmarcich 2007a, 31-36 thinks the oaths 
were flexible, allowing for unforeseen circumstances that might necessitate noncompliance with 
an alliance. 
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violation of the treaty. This text also fails to mention the expected duties of the new allies, and it 
is impossible to determine how they might be different for the Sybarites’ new φιλότης-ally than 
for their preexisting but unspecified σύνµαχοι.43 As for the latter relationship, the inscription for 
the late sixth-century alliance between the Eleans and Heraeans mentions it for the first time in a 
state document in the lexical form of συνµαχία:  
The agreement of the Eleans and the Heraeans. There will be an alliance for one hundred years. It 
will begin from this year. If there is any need, either in word or in deed, they shall stand together 
in all things, especially in war. If they do not stand together, the wrong-doers shall pay a talent of 
silver to Olympian Zeus for dedication. If anyone does harm to this writing, whether the 
community or an official or private citizen, he shall be liable to the sacred penalty which here is 
written down.44 
  
ἀ ϝράτρα τοῖρ Ϝαλείοις ∶ καὶ τοῖς Ἐρ- 
ϝαό¯ιοις ∶ συνµαχία κ’ ἔα ἐκατὸν ϝέτεα ∶ 
ἄρχοι δέ κα τοΐ ∶ αἰ δέ τι δέοι ∶ αἴτε ϝέπος αἴτε ϝ- 
άργον ∶ συνέαν κ’ ἀλ(λ)άλοις ∶ τά τ’ ἄλ(λ)<α> καὶ πα- 
ρ πολέµο¯ ∶ αἰ δὲ µὰ συνέαν ∶ τάλαντόν κ’ 
ἀργύρο¯ ∶ ἀποτίνοιαν ∶ τοῖ Δὶ Ὀλυνπίοι ∶ τοὶ κα- 
(δ)δαλέ¯µενοι ∶ λατρειό¯µενον ∶ αἰ δέ τιρ τὰ γ- 
ράφεα ∶ ταῒ κα(δ)δαλέοιτο ∶ αἴτε ϝέτας αἴτε τ- 
ελεστὰ ∶ αἴτε δᾶµος ∶ ἐν τἐ¯πιάροι κ’ ἐνέχ- 
οιτο τοἰνταυτ’ ἐγραµ(µ)ένοι. 
 
This agreement retains the earlier clauses designating the duration (100 years), a monetary fine 
for violating the treaty, and a religious punishment for defacing the inscription – which was also 
																																								 																				
43 Bauslaugh 1991, 60-64 suggests that a φιλία, unlike a συµµαχία, did not express clear 
assignments because it was an agreement of neutrality: “as ‘friends’ the parties will not cause 
injury to one another.” Bolmarcich 2010, 125, however, believes the use of φιλία “may suggest a 
growing interest in establishing affective relationships with other states that would support and 
strengthen purely legal relationships like summakhiai or peace treaties.” 
 
44 IvO 9 (= ML 17); cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 58-59; Baltrusch 1994, 9-11; Bolmarcich 2010, 
115. The first appearance of συµµαχία in literature is in Aesch. Ag. 213, and σύµµαχος in 
Archilochus and Sappho (LSJ s.v. σύµµαχος). Hall 2007, 101 suspects that these words 
“probably arose initially within the orbit of the connections that early archaic élites forged with 
one another, indicating an ad hoc arrangement between individuals or groups of individuals 
designed to address a specific military need.”  
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on a bronze tablet, with nail holes for its display on a temple wall at Olympia. But there is a new 
feature that will become a principal element of fourth-century alliance treaties. This is the 
generalized mutual defense clause (“if there is any need, either in word or in deed, they shall 
stand together in all things, especially in war”), which highlights collaboration in war (παρ 
πολέµο¯) but leaves open the possibility for other unspecified cooperative activities (τά τ’ ἄλλα). 
The wide range indicates that the signatories considered their συνµαχία to be more than just a 
military pact and saw it embracing collaboration in any activity – social, economic, religious, or 
otherwise. Although συνµαχία is a noun associated with military imagery, it still evidently 
contained deep socio-cultural meaning.   
Nor did these features disappear from fifth-century records. Herodotus, for example, calls 
the Lydian king Croesus a φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος (or ξένος καὶ σύµµαχος) of the Spartans and the 
Egyptian king Amasis the same of the Cyrenaeans, and adds that these relationships rested on 
traditional practices such as gift-exchange in the former and a marriage alliance in the latter.45 In 
the epigraphical record, φιλία καὶ συµµαχία characterizes Athenian alliances with the Bottiaeans 
(422), Halicyaeans (418), Perdiccas of Macedon (sometime between the 430s and 413), and the 
Carthaginians (406).46 Others are identified as ὅρκος καὶ συµµαχία, as in the Athenian alliances 
with the Rhegians and the Leontinians in 433. Both treaties reflect the strong religious character 
																																								 																				
 
45 Croesus and Spartans: Hdt. 1.69.2-70.1; cf. Panessa 1999, 76-81. Amasis and 
Cyrenaeans: Hdt. 2.181.1; cf. Panessa 1999, 73-75. Alliance terminology: Adcock and Mosley 
1975, 122, 186-193; Bederman 2001, 159-165; Orsi 2002, 71-109; Bolmarcich 2010, 115-125. 
 
46 Bottiaeans: IG I3 76, line 17; cf. Panessa 1999, 257-263. Halicyaeans: 12, line 3; cf. 
Panessa 1999, 237-239. Perdiccas: 89, line 58; cf. Panessa 1999, 250-253. Carthage: 123, line 
11; cf. Panessa 1999, 296-300.  
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of Athenian alliances. The one with the Rhegians, for example, opens with a traditional 
invocation of the gods (θεοἱ) and contains instructions for the swearing of an oath along with 
what looks like the beginning of a mutual defense clause: “as allies we shall be trustworthy and 
just and strong and innocuous forever to the Rhegians and we shall be bound if . . . [χσύµµ ̣αχοι 
ἐσόµεθα πιστοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀβλαβε͂ς ἐς ἀίδιον Ῥεγίνοις καὶ ὀφελέσοµεν ἐάν τ-
].”47 Language such as this highlights the strong association between the new allies. It is hard to 
interpret these alliances as only provisional military pacts. Other fifth-century alliances are called 
χσυνθέκας καὶ χσυµµαχίαν καὶ ℎόρκος (compact and alliance and oath) (Athenian-Halieian 
alliance in 424?) or χσυµµαχίαν καὶ χσυνθέκας (Athenian-Argive alliance in 416).48  
Most alliances prior to the fourth century, therefore, had a dual characterization that 
juxtaposed military and non-military aspects. The obligations, however, if spelled out at all in the 
treaties, were usually ambiguous or unspecified. The one exception to this is ἐπιµαχία, a purely 
defensive alliance. Thucydides writes that in 433 the Athenians felt justified in entering an 
ἐπιµαχία with the Corycraeans because, not requiring joint participation in any Corcyraean 
offensive attack on the Corinthians, it respected their earlier peace treaty (σπονδαί) with the 
Peloponnesians. Under the terms of an ἐπιµαχία, both the Athenians and Corcyraeans would be 
mutually obligated only “to help each other if someone went against Corcyra, Athens, or any of 
their allies [τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴῃ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων 
																																								 																				
47 Rhegians: IG I3 53 (= ML 63). Leontinians: 54 (= ML 64); cf. Egestans: 11 (= ML 37). 
 
48 Halieians: IG I3 75. Argives: 86.  
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ξυµµάχους].”49 A συµµαχία, on the other hand, being an offensive and defensive alliance, would 
have required collaborative action in an ally’s offensive attacks on an enemy.  
This fine distinction became obscure in the fourth century, when even the strictly 
defensive alliances were called συµµαχία.50 No one has explained why this was the case. Perhaps 
the growing standardization of treaty content (see Chapter II) made abundantly clear the precise 
nature of each particular alliance and thus eliminated the need for distinct titular terminology. All 
the same, in most cases συµµαχία, no longer attended by another noun, was the regular 
descriptor. In Hermann Bengtson’s extensive collection of state documents, Die Staatsverträge 
des Altertums (SdA), between 403 and 338 there are sixty-six interstate alliances (Bündnisse). Of 
those sixty-six, fifty-three are συµµαχία, four συνθήκη καὶ συµµαχία, four συνθήκη, three φιλία 
καὶ συµµαχία, one εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία, and one φιλία.51 Philip Harding’s compilation From the End 
of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus includes only one more, the Athenian-Thasian 
συµµαχία of 390. Neither Marcus Tod’s earlier Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, John 
Wickersham and Gerald Verbrugghe’s The Fourth Century B.C., nor Peter J. Rhodes and Robin 
Osborne’s more recent Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC add any other examples.  
These volumes, however, are not exhaustive. To their catalogues others can be added 
from Appendix A: ten more of συµµαχία (A7, A8, A14, A15, S1, S3, S4, S8, S10, and S11) and 
																																								 																				
49 Thuc. 1.44.1; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 328; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 191-193; Karavites 
1982, 30-32; Bederman 2001, 161-165. In Thuc. 5.48.2 the Corinthians say that their ἐπιµαχία 
with the Argives obligated them only “to help one another but not to join in making war 
[ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν, ξυνεπιστρατεύειν δὲ µηδενί].” 
 
50 Only three fourth-century authors mention ἐπιµαχία (Xen. Cyr. 3.2; Arist. Pol. 
3.1280b27; [Dem.] 12.7). 
 
51 Appendix B lists all sixty-six alliances from 403 to 338 recorded in SdA. 
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two of φιλία καὶ συµµαχία (A5, A6). These raise the overall number of known alliances at this 
time to seventy-eight: sixty-three of συµµαχία, five of φιλία καὶ συµµαχία, four of συνθήκη καὶ 
συµµαχία, four of συνθήκη, one of εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία, and one of φιλία. The high relative 
percentage of συµµαχία’s appearance for fourth-century alliances is illustrated in the following 
chart:  
Figure 1: Greek Words for Interstate Alliances (403-338) 
	
Although there was a clear nomenclatural preference, this does not suggest that non-
political aspects were completely absent from how the Greeks in the fourth century understood a 
συµµαχία. Those aspects continued to play a principal role but now they were embedded within 
the word συµµαχία. The word as well as the phenomenon contained nuance. Although prima 
facie συµµαχία is associated as a military term and its English translation, “interstate alliance,” 
raises political imagery, the Greeks understood that it was more than just a temporary politico-
military pact. A closer look in the next few pages at a few of the thematic justifications voiced by 
contemporaries for their συµµαχίαι, in the next chapter at the content of the alliance treaties, and 
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in the remaining chapters at the specific operation of alliance relationships reveals the deep 
appreciation which the Greeks had for the social and cultural factors in their alliances.   
 
Justifying Alliances 
 
Upon what grounds, then, did the poleis justify their alliance choices? Perhaps the most 
pervasive influence was reciprocity, a principle that governed the social and political interactions 
of the Greeks in their domestic and interstate spheres. “The dominant ordering principle of the 
interstate interactions of the classical period,” writes Polly Low, “is bilateral relations formed on 
a basis of reciprocity.”52 This dominant principle, however, was rarely articulated in specific 
terms. Richard Seaford opens the volume Reciprocity in Ancient Greece with a working 
definition: “Reciprocity is the principle and practice of voluntary requital, of benefit for benefit 
(positive reciprocity) or harm for harm (negative reciprocity).”53 The obligations were simple yet 
profound. For this give-and-take practice created tangible as well as sentimental ties between the 
poleis that lasted beyond the initial act of beneficence. The voluntary requital, in the form of gifts 
or services, was not terminal but created further obligations (prestations), thus perpetuating the 
cycle of giving and receiving. That is, an initial good turn placed the receiver in the position of a 
																																								 																				
52 Low 2007, 36-37; cf. Blundell 1989, 26-59; Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford 1998; Hunt 
2010, 185-214. 
 
53 Gill, Postlethwaite, and Seaford 1998, 1. Gould 2001, 283-303 thinks the Greeks 
understood the “grammar” of reciprocity. Braund 1998, 159-180, however, sees reciprocity 
being more problematic and frequently misinterpreted.  
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debtor who was then required by convention to repay that debt with another good turn, and so 
on.  
Nearly every alliance discussed in this study exhibits reciprocity in some form or another. 
For example, when the Athenians accepted an alliance proposal from the Boeotians in 395 (A1), 
the Athenian Thrasybulus of Steiria announced that “they would run the risk to return a favor to 
them greater than the one they received [in 404]. ‘For you,’ he said, ‘did not join in the [Spartan] 
campaign against us [in 403], but we will fight with you against them if they should come 
against you.’ [παρακινδυνεύσοιεν χάριτα αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι µείζονα ἢ ἔλαβον. ὑµεῖς µὲν γάρ, 
ἔφη, οὐ συνεστρατεύσατε ἐφ᾽ ἡµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δέ γε µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν µαχούµεθα ἐκείνοις, ἂν ἴωσιν ἐφ᾽ 
ὑµᾶς].”54 Similar considerations lie behind the two later Athenian-Theban alliances (A12, A23). 
The long Spartan alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse (S1) began and continued with the 
reciprocal exchange of money, manpower, and other services. The Spartan alliance with the 
Persian satrap Ariobarzanes in 366 (S7) operated on the exchange of money (from Ariobarzanes) 
and manpower (from the Spartans). Some treaties (A15, A18, A20) declare that the Athenians 
agreed to an alliance because a certain citizen from the other polis was a “good man” (ἀνὴρ 
ἀγαθὸς) to the Athenians, moral terminology that goes back to Homer – whatever the precise 
nature of that good man’s act, the Athenians considered it worthy of a return in the form of an 
alliance.55 The mutuality of the ubiquitous defense clauses (see Chapter II), moreover, indicates 
																																								 																				
54 Xen. Hell. 3.5.16. A1 refers to the alliance number found in Appendix A. 
 
55 Low 2007, 143-145; Engen 2010, 121-123. Other examples of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς include the 
Second Athenian Confederacy’s joint alliance with the Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and 
Cephallenians in 375 (IG II² 96, line 7-9) and the Athenians’ συµβολαί agreements with Strato of 
Sidon (141, line 6) and the Armenian satrap Orontes (207, line 5). 
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that reciprocity continued to play a primary role in the operation and maintenance of alliances. 
As a result of such exchanges, there existed among the allies a state of equilibrium, a kind of 
balance which the Greeks did recognize and seek to preserve.56 
The traditional system of reciprocity was adapted to the creation of alliances through the 
agency of interpersonal relationships. Unlike modern diplomacy with its professional specialists 
and formal institutions, diplomacy in ancient Greece was a much more personal affair. The 
relationships of friendship (φιλία), guest-friendship (ξένια), and proxenia (προξενία) created 
personal networks between the poleis.57 These in turn could be exploited when there was a need 
for a more binding agreement such as an alliance. In 394, the Athenian Cimon proposed to 
include on an alliance embassy to Syracuse a certain Eunomus, a guest-friend of Dionysius I. 
Callias, the proxenos of the Spartans in Athens, participated in a number of embassies to Sparta. 
Two of the Athenian ambassadors to Thebes in the early 370s, Pyrrhandrus of Anaphlystus and 
Thrasybulus of Collytus, were well-known Theban sympathizers (βοιωτιάζοντες).58 Callistratus 
of Aphidna, a leading laconophile in Athens, was the principal advocate of an alliance with the 
Spartans in 369 (A13). In 339, Demosthenes, a proxenos of the Thebans, was the loudest 
advocate for an alliance with the Thebans against Philip (A23). The Chian ambassadors who 
																																								 																				
56 In his study of the Peloponnesian War, Lendon 2013 argues at length, perhaps to 
excess, that classical Greek poleis kept a running tally of benefits given and received. 
 
 57 Friendship: Konstan 1997; Mitchell 1997; Bolmarcich 2010, 113-136. Guest-
friendship: Finley 1978, 46-108; Herman 1987. Proxenia: Mack 2015. Hagemajer Allen 2002, 
218-224, 239-242 examines the interplay of personal connections, honorific inscriptions, and 
interstate diplomacy. 
 
 58 Eunomus: Lys. 19.19-20. Callias: Xen. Hell. 5.4.22. Pyrrhandrus and Thrasybulus: 
Aeschin. 3.138; cf. APF 239; Steinbock 2013, 257-258. Mitchell 1997, 94 lists all of the known 
Athenian ambassadors with interstate connections. 
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arranged the alliance with the Athenians in 384 (A8) were those who shared the intellectual and 
political principles of the Athenians. The Byzantines chose a certain Cydon, who was close with 
the Athenians, to lead an embassy seeking an alliance with the Athenians (A10).59 The following 
chapters discuss many other examples. 
Because the parties possessed such intimate contacts, there was a level of trust and 
understanding between them that supported the development of their alliances. Demosthenes 
indicates this when he speaks of the individuals who “in a private capacity . . . brought whole 
poleis, their own native cities, into alliance with us in the war against the Spartans [i.e., the 
Corinthian War], both speaking and doing what is in the interest of your polis [ἰδίᾳ . . . οἳ πόλεις 
ὅλας, τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας, συµµάχους ὑµῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς Λακεδαιµονίους πολέµου παρέσχον 
καὶ λέγοντες ἃ συµφέρει τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑµετέρᾳ καὶ πράττοντες].”60 In fact, there are instances, 
albeit few and anomalous, in which prominent individuals concluded alliances without 
submitting them to the proper political channels. In the campaign against the Persians from 396 
to 394, the Spartan king Agesilaus formed alliances with two of his new friends, Spithridates 
(S2) and Otys (S3), without seeking approval from his assembly. In the campaign in northern 
Greece and the Aegean in 390 and 389, the Athenian general Thrasybulus made contact with old 
friends and associates in the region and arranged alliances with them on his own authority (A4-
A7). In 366, the Theban Epaminondas, without consulting the Theban authorities, concluded an 
alliance with the Achaeans (T6). This level of independence was acceptable to a point because of 
the importance of personal diplomacy. Yet, because of factional domestic politics, arranging 
																																								 																				
 59 Chians: IG II2 34, lines 39-41; cf. Dušanić 1999, 6-8. Cydon: IG II2 41, line 23; cf. 
Xen. Hell. 1.3.18. 
 
60 Dem. 20.51. 
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alliances in this manner could be risky business. Thrasybulus’ enemies at home brought him up 
on charges, which, even though not directly related to his alliances, threatened to undo all of his 
diplomatic achievements.61 Agesilaus, too, seems to have met some resistance at home, but there 
is no word of any alliances overturned because of it.62 The Theban assembly overruled 
Epaminondas’ alliance with the Achaeans, but in this case, as argued in Chapter V, the failure 
was due to the fact that it was not built on a strong foundation of personal contacts. Nevertheless, 
the vast majority of Greek alliances passed through the political institutions and thus were 
recognized as communal agreements (see Chapter II).  
Since the conduct of interstate relations was such a personal activity with a deep respect 
for the responsibilities of reciprocity, the Greeks took moral considerations into account much 
more seriously than modern states do. One that appears regularly, and has already been 
mentioned in the context of Demosthenes’ advocacy for an alliance with the Megalopolitans, is 
the obligation to help the wronged (βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις). Some today dismiss the 
possibility of this serving as a genuine motivation for interstate behavior, preferring to view it as 
propaganda or, worse, as jiggery-pokery, like the modern promotion of democratic ideals as a 
justification for interventionism.63 Whether genuine or manipulative, the frequent appearance of 
βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις in the fourth-century record makes it hard to deny that it was a 
																																								 																				
 
61 Roberts 1982, 96-102. After Thrasybulus died the assembly voted on his alliance 
arrangements and inscribed them on stelai for public display. 
 
62 Cartledge 1987, 155-156; Mitchell 1997, 55-65. 
 
63 Low 2007, 175-211 believes that social norms permitted intervention in the domestic 
affairs of others. Hunt 2010, 95-97 argues the opposite. Christ 2012, 118-176 sees “helping the 
wronged” as instrumental only in shaping Athenian civic ideology. 
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recognized consideration for alliances. The orator Andocides, for example, says that the 
Athenians agreed to the Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1) because “we ourselves were both suffering 
a wrong and helping the Boeotians who had been wronged [ἡµεῖς τοίνυν αὐτοί τε ἠδικούµεθα 
Βοιωτοῖς τε ἀδικουµένοις ἐβοηθοῦµεν].”64 Demosthenes says that the Athenian alliances with 
the Thebans in 378 (A12), the Spartans in 369 (A13), the Euboeans in 357 (cf. A22), and the 
Thebans (again) in 339 (A23) were all made with the same object in mind: to save the wronged 
(τοὺς ἀδικουµένους σῴζειν).65 Not all testimony is retrospective. The mutual defense clauses, 
which appear in the contemporary legal inscriptions, are by definition in line with this behavioral 
norm. The clause in the treaty for the Athenian alliance with the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, 
and Phliasians in 362 (A17) even includes the phrase βοηθεῖν . . . ἀδικούµενοι.  
It also appears to have served as a general policy. Andocides indicates that the Athenians 
had the “habitual fault of always setting aside powerful friends and preferring the weak [τὸ 
εἰθισµένον κακόν, ὅτι τοὺς κρείττους φίλους ἀφιέντες ἀεὶ τοὺς ἥττους αἱρούµεθα].”66 In the 
Panegyricus Isocrates says his countrymen routinely followed a policy of helping the weak, even 
when greater alliances were available (µείζους τῶν συµµαχιῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν):     
																																								 																				
 
64 Andoc. 3.13; cf. Missiou 1992, 145-146. 
 
65 Dem. 16.14-15; 18.96-100, 177-178 (cf. Yunis 2001, 161-168). Yunis 2000, 109-110 
stresses the significance of helping the wronged in Dem. 18. Isocrates (4.53, 8.30, 139, 14.1), 
too, was an advocate of alliances to help the wronged. Along these thematic lines, fourth-century 
Athenian writers often mention the legendary examples of burying the Argive dead after the 
attack of the Seven against Thebes and of providing asylum to the sons of Heracles (cf. Tzanetou 
2011, 312-316; Steinbock 2013, 155-210). 
 
66 Andoc. 3.29; cf. Missiou 1992, 109-139. 
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 “But knowing much more precisely than others what comes from such a policy, we nevertheless 
were preferring to help the weaker even against our own advantage rather than to do wrong with 
the stronger for our own advantage.”67 
 
ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβέστερον εἰδότες τὰ συµβαίνοντ᾽ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅµως ᾑρούµεθα 
τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις καὶ παρὰ τὸ συµφέρον βοηθεῖν µᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσι τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος 
ἕνεκα συναδικεῖν. 
 
Plato and Demosthenes make similar observations.68 Of course, it is for rhetorical effect that the 
orators place such stress on this reputation of the Athenians, but the point is not mute: in the 
articulation of their alliances, the Greeks put an accent on moral obligations. The evidence is 
abundant for Athenian alliances but there are also indications that other poleis followed the same 
principle.69 
Claims to kinship (συγγένεια) could also be interpreted as a manipulative device to flatter 
and attract another polis to agree to an alliance. But the fact that one polis would base its petition 
on such a point, authentic or fictive, and that another would accept it is a strong case for the 
significance of kinship diplomacy in alliance choices. “Because there is no parallel for kinship 
between states in the modern world,” writes Hans van Wees, “we too may feel skeptical about it 
as a motive in war, and we may even be tempted to deny kinship any real role at all. But we 
would be wrong.”70 A few examples from the fourth century bear this out. The Chian 
ambassadors appealing to the Athenians for an alliance in 384 made no mention to the assembly 
of a military threat to their island but rather rested part of their case on their belief in a shared 
																																								 																				
 
67 Isoc. 4.53; cf. 8.28. 
 
68 Plat. Menex. 244e; Dem. 20.3. 
 
69 Low 2007, 183-186 discusses examples outside of Athens. 
 
70 Van Wees 2004, 9. Kinship diplomacy: Curty 1995; Jones 1999; Patterson 2010. 
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ancestry. Whatever the truth of the claim, the Athenians agreed to the alliance (A8). Likewise, 
Ephorus (via Diodorus Siculus) says that in 346 the Tarentines sought out an alliance with the 
Spartans (S10) and the latter agreed to it because of their kinship ties (διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν 
προθύµως ἔχοντες συµµαχῆσαι).71 It is noteworthy that the Tarentines sought out assistance from 
their metropolis, even though by midcentury the Spartans had lost a great deal of their political 
and military influence in Greek affairs. The extent of one’s capabilities and resources apparently 
was not always the sole concern in the selection of alliance partners.  
The part which these intersubjective factors (reciprocity, interpersonal relationships, 
helping wronged, kinship) played does not harmonize with the traditional paradigm of power 
politics. Indeed, Realist-inspired interpretations have difficulty explaining how non-rational 
considerations could match or even eclipse rational calculations.72 Of course, it would be a 
mistake to think that every alliance rested on nothing more than such noble purposes. Practical, 
political concerns existed as well – and this study does not intend to expunge them completely 
from the alliance process. But the aggregate of testimony in the contemporary historical 
accounts, speeches, and alliance treaties shows that socio-cultural matters played as much a 
factor in the Greeks’ alliance calculations as power politics did. It is curious, therefore, that many 
today highlight nothing but the political concerns, such as BOP which does not appear in the 
ancient texts, and reject the socio-cultural factors which do. In any attempt to understand the 
perspective of the ancient Greeks, one should be hesitant to dismiss their voices, especially the 
																																								 																				
 
71 Diod. Sic. 16.62.4. 
 
72 Modern scholarship on alliance selectivity: Smith 1995, 405-425; Lai and Reiter 2000, 
203-227; Pressman 2008, 18-41; Gartzke and Weisiger 2012, 25-52. 
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statements that reappear frequently, as disinformation. “Even if we incline to view many of the 
moral pronouncements of the Greeks as propaganda,” cautions Peter Karavites, “we should not 
forget that propaganda need not necessarily be always misleading to historians. . . . If the facts 
and ideas are irrelevant to the traditions and ideals of the people, alert and socially conscious 
people will tend to be wary of them or ignore them, and the effort at persuasion will be doomed 
to failure.” Polly Low, too, reasons that “the truth-value of such claims does not have any 
necessary bearing on their potential impact on the practical conduct of interstate relations.”73 In 
other words, it is important to seek out the perceptions of contemporaries, the method followed 
in this study, rather than continuing on the path of following anachronistic models designed more 
for the modern world.  
The next chapter begins this examination with a review of the general procedures of the 
alliance process from conception to conclusion: the proposal, the negotiation and the articulation 
of the alliance conditions, and the public display of the agreements. Socio-cultural elements 
imbued the legislative procedures involved in creating an alliance. By including the participation 
of all citizens, not just one political faction, the matter became one of communal interest. Being 
an interstate activity, it also brought the communities of the two poleis together. Through the 
work of the ambassadors as well as the performance of ritualistic activities that accompanied the 
political procedures, moreover, creating an alliance became a transformative experience for the 
participants, bringing them into an even closer state of solidarity.  
																																								 																				
 
73 Karavites 1984, 171; Low 2007, 257.  
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Part II covers specific case studies. Since the fourth century saw a great number of 
alliances between so many different poleis across the Greek world, for the sake of interpretive 
coherence these chapters deliberately concentrate on the bilateral alliances of the Athenians, 
Spartans, and Thebans. Although the majority of the epigraphical evidence is from the Athenian 
context and the perspective of the ancient historians is patently Athenocentric, it would be a 
mistake to consider the same practices and considerations to apply universally.74 Therefore, by 
incorporating Spartan and Theban alliances, these chapters present a broader picture of alliance 
activity in Greece than might otherwise have been expected.  
Chapter III examines the Athenian alliances. It is by far the longest chapter and is 
therefore divided into two parts. Part A discusses the alliances from the first one with the 
Boeotians in 395 to the bilateral alliances that eventually came to form the nucleus of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy in 377. Until recently scholars, concentrating on the political and military 
aspects alone, saw this period in a negative light, interpreting these alliances as products of the 
imperialistic ambitions of the Athenians. By shifting the focus onto the socio-cultural aspects of 
those alliances, this part offers a more nuanced perspective that sees the alliances as 
manifestations of deep socio-cultural ties between the Athenians and their allies. Part B considers 
Athenian alliances from the one with the Spartans in 369 to the final one with the Thebans in 
339, a period in which Athenian foreign policy became increasingly defined by opposition to 
Philip II of Macedon. Finding it hard to reject any appeal, the Athenians overextended their 
diplomatic reach, until things fell apart in 338 at the Battle of Chaeronea. Nonetheless, at the 
																																								 																				
 74 Hedrick 1999, 389-408 compares the Athenian epigraphical habit with other poleis. 
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same time the Athenians maintained their practice of constructing alliance relationships on the 
basis of personal interactions between the poleis. 
 Chapter IV looks at Spartan alliances. Because of the paucity of epigraphical evidence for 
the Spartans, this chapter follows a more speculative approach than the others. Nevertheless, 
through a close examination of what is available in the literary record as well as a judicious use 
of comparative analysis, this chapter shows how Spartan alliances functioned along the same 
lines as their interpersonal friendships, in observation of the obligations of reciprocity and in the 
expectation of mutual benefit. The results of this varied whether the alliance was with the Greeks 
or non-Greeks. In the case of the latter, the chapter emphasizes how cross-cultural confusion 
regarding the precise expectations of friendship and reciprocity led to the failure of the alliances. 
 Chapter V covers Theban alliances from 371 to 362. The so-called Theban hegemony 
offers a counterexample to the Athenian and Spartan experiences. They imitated their 
predecessors by constructing a large alliance network, but they did not follow them in all 
particulars. They neglected to clearly define leadership roles, put in place formal institutions for 
the operation of the many alliances, and, most importantly, cultivate any new social connections 
with their allies. Instead, the obsession with matters of Realpolitik blinded them to the need for 
forming relationships that would outlast the temporary politico-military objectives. By 
underscoring the negative example of Theban alliances, this chapter reinforces the importance of 
socio-cultural elements for alliance studies and challenges the effectiveness of a strict Realist 
paradigm for the classical Greek context. 
 Part III, Conclusions, reexamines the dissolution of Athenian alliances and how 
contemporaries may have perceived them. This study does not pretend that Greek allies were 
altruistic and their alliances ideal. The fact is that alliances did come to an end, though not 
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always for nefarious reasons or simply because the immediate military purposes had been 
achieved. There were alliances that persisted. Some were renegotiated at a later date. Still others 
came to an end because of external exigencies. Nevertheless, because of the strong social and 
religious character of those agreements, the Athenians did not construct alliances in the 
anticipation that they would dissolve quickly. Nor did they instantly discard an alliance if there 
was a violation of terms of the agreement. Even after alliances collapsed, their commemorative 
stelai remained standing on the Acropolis. Each stage of the alliance life-cycle, even the 
dissolution, demonstrates the importance of socio-cultural factors.  
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Chapter II 
 
Procedures and Protocols 
 
Having covered the broader theoretical and thematic issues of interstate alliances in the 
first chapter, it is now time to turn to the conventional procedures and protocols in the creation of 
an alliance. This chapter follows the roughly sequential path from the initial proposal and 
negotiations in the political institutions of the participating poleis, to the articulation of the 
alliance provisions in an official decree, and finally to the public display of the agreement in the 
medium of a stone stele. This is not to say that the Greeks made their alliances in a mechanistic, 
inflexible fashion, merely following a template, with the only variation being the identity of the 
new ally, but the examples in this chapter show that in the fourth century there was a general 
path which they followed in carrying an alliance from conception to conclusion.  
There are a number of themes that emerge from this examination. First, the process of 
constructing and legitimizing an interstate alliance was a communal activity. It involved all of 
the citizenry, not just one individual or faction. After passing through the political organs of the 
council and the assembly, the alliance took on a collective persona. This was the case in both 
poleis – which raises the second theme, the social nature of the alliance process. This was an 
interstate activity, incorporating citizens from both sides. The ambassadors were generally ones 
who possessed traditional interpersonal relationships with the new allies. The process was 
conducted through public debate among various groups; negotiating an alliance involved the 
exchange of ideas and compromise. As a result, the experience became transformative in the 
domestic context by bringing all of the polis together, as well as in the interstate context by 
bringing the two poleis closer together. Thirdly, the alliance process was filled with religious 
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practices – sacrifices, prayers, oaths, shared meals, festivals, and the display of the alliance stelai 
in sacred locations – which reinforced its solemn character. These customs also strengthened the 
constitutive aspect of the whole experience. For by working together in the legislative, religious, 
and military activities, the two came into a closer form of solidarity.  
 
Initiating an Alliance 
 
 Bringing an interstate alliance to full term involved the participation of the whole 
community – statesmen and stonemasons, secular and religious authorities, rival political 
factions and social classes – of two different poleis. It was not achieved by one individual’s 
dictate but through public debate and dialogue. The final product was a communal achievement. 
But initiating that process, the moment when an inchoate idea germinated into a concrete 
proposal, was the prerogative of the probouleutic institution of the polis, that which considered 
foreign policy matters in advance of the citizenry at large. In Athens this was the council 
(βουλή), 500 members chosen by lot annually; in Sparta it was the five ephors; and in Thebes the 
seven (or eleven) boeotarchs.1 Whenever these members in session were convinced that 
circumstances required an alliance, they would submit the matter for further discussion in their 
assembly (ἐκκλησία), the larger legislative body composed of all eligible citizens. For this 
preliminary stage there are no surviving records better than Demosthenes’ remarkably detailed 
																																								 																				
 1 Athenian council: Rhodes 1972; Hansen 1991, 246-265. Spartan ephors: Kelly 1981, 
47-61; Cartledge 1987, 125-129; Kennell 2010, 102-109. Theban boeotarchs: Buckler 1980b, 24-
31; Hammond 2000, 80-93. Probouleutic institutions in other Greek poleis: Mitchell 2010, 373-
374; Wallace 2013, 191-204. 
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account of the activities in Athens in November 339, when he proposed to make an alliance with 
the Thebans against Philip II of Macedon.2  
Philip had just moved south into central Greece and seized the Phocian town of Elateia, 
the northern entrance to Boeotia and only a three days’ march from Attica, causing great 
consternation in Athens.3 A messenger (ἄγγελος) carrying news of Philip’s proximate position 
arrived in Athens late at night to find the welcoming party, the fifty presidents of the council 
(πρυτάνεις), eating dinner in the Tholos building on the southwest side of the Agora. 
Recognizing the need for a rapid response, the presidents immediately summoned the other 450 
council members to their meeting place, the Bouleuterion, and disclosed the messenger’s 
intelligence to them.4 Once they came to agreement that action was necessary, they drafted a 
provisional resolution (προβούλευµα) for the assembly’s consideration, but in this case, since 
they could not determine which form that action should take, they merely presented a simple 
introduction of the topic without a specific proposal.5 Meanwhile, the presidents called for fires 
to be lit in the Agora, signals that an emergency meeting of the assembly (ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος) 
would convene at daybreak.  
																																								 																				
2 Dem. 18.160-251. Other testimony is in Aeschin. 3.137-141; Hyp. Against Diondas 
137r/136v (cf. Tchernetska 2005, 1-6; Guth 2014, 151-165); Philoch. FGrH 328 F56b (cf. 
Harding 2006, 225-228); Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic. 16.84-85; Plut. Dem. 17-18. 
 
 3 Roisman 2006, 133-145 analyzes the conflicting accounts by Aeschines and 
Demosthenes for Philip’s advance. 
 
4 The πρυτάνεις: Dem. 18.169; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 43.6; cf. Rhodes 1972, 20-21. 
 
5 Provisional resolutions: ibid., 52-87; Hansen 1987, 35-37; Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 11-
14; Wallace 2013, 201-202.  
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 It was necessary for the matter to be passed through the assembly because, as Aristotle 
says, only that corporate body could authorize actions concerning war, peace, and alliances 
(κύριον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευόµενον περὶ πολέµου καὶ εἰρήνης, καὶ συµµαχίας).6 So, while the 
council drafted its open resolution and selected nine men from among its membership to act as 
presidents (πρόεδροι) of the assembly meeting, the rest of the citizenry, numbering several 
thousand, filed into the Pnyx, the hill south of the Agora. The decisions taken here would be 
from the people as a whole. The participants sat in rows undistinguished by political faction or 
socio-economic class.7 The opening ceremonies reminded all present of their sacred obligation to 
act in accordance with the good of the polis. After the religious officials sacrificed a piglet and 
sprinkled its blood around the area for purification, a herald (κῆρυξ), an office occupied by 
descendants of Hermes and associated with sacred rites, offered a prayer and a curse.8 Alan 
Sommerstein extrapolates the latter’s fundamental elements from a variety of literary references: 
the prayers consisted of an expectation that the members of the assembly would consider what is 
best for the whole community and the curses called for divine retribution on those who might 
work against the communal interests (e.g., by cooperating with the Persians, promoting a 
tyranny, accepting bribes, or debasing the coinage).9 These rituals created a psychological sense 
																																								 																				
 
 6 Aristot. Pol. 4.1298a. 
 
 7 Aristot. Ath. Pol. 44.2-3. The social makeup of the assembly: Ober 1989, 132-138; 
Hansen 1991, 125-127. 
 
 8 Aeschin. 1.23; Dem. 19.70; Din. 2.14, 16. Mythic origins of heralds: Karavites 1987, 
44-47. Blessings and curses: Faraone 2006, 139-156. Strauss 1985, 74-75 emphasizes “the ritual 
and performative elements that served both to legitimate the body’s decisions and to foster a 
sense of group solidarity.” Bonnechere 2013, 366-369 comments on the influence of religion in 
political decisions. 
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of solemnity and solidarity that infused the subsequent political discussion. Additionally, 
because of these pervasive religious features, as the alliance took on a more concrete form, all 
would perceive it having a much deeper significance than just a politico-military agreement.  
 But for the moment the immediate practical matters of national security loomed large 
among the anxious audience. Demosthenes relates the tense atmosphere:   
 “The council arrived and the presidents reported what had been announced to them, and this man 
 [i.e., the messenger], after being introduced, spoke to those present. Then the herald asked, ‘who 
 wishes to speak?’ But no one came forward. Although the herald asked many times, still no one 
 stood up.”10  
 
 ἦλθεν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἀπήγγειλαν οἱ πρυτάνεις τὰ προσηγγελµέν᾽ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὸν ἥκοντα παρήγαγον 
 κἀκεῖνος εἶπεν, ἠρώτα µὲν ὁ κῆρυξ ‘τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται’ παρῄει δ᾽ οὐδείς. πολλάκις δὲ τοῦ 
 κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος οὐδὲν µᾶλλον ἀνίστατ᾽ οὐδείς, 
 
Since this time the council proffered only an open resolution, the herald invited to the speaker’s 
platform (τὸ βῆµα) whomever wished to offer a proposal of his own for how to address Philip’s 
threatening presence. At long last, Demosthenes, alone, stood up and proposed that they station 
the military at Eleusis, closer to Boeotian territory, keeping it in a state of high alert, and dispatch 
ten ambassadors, including himself, to Thebes for the purpose of concluding an alliance.11 When 
he finished, the presidents put his proposal to a vote by a show of hands (χειροτονία), and in this 
way, through the vox populi, it received the force of law. The decision was written up into a 
																																								 																				
 9 In Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 48-49; cf. Rhodes 1972, 37. 
 
 10 Dem. 18.170. A typical Athenian assembly meeting: Hansen 1987, 88-93. A Spartan 
assembly: Kelly 1981, 47-61; Cartledge 1987, 129-131; Kennell 2010, 111-114. A Theban 
assembly: Buckler 1980b, 30-31; Mackil 2013, 338-339. 
 
 11 Dem. 18.177-178; cf. Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic. 16.84.5; Plut. Dem. 18.1. 
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decree (ψήφισµα), of which the original was deposited in the archives (see more below) and a 
copy given to the ambassadors for a reference guide in their negotiations with the other polis.12  
 For this particular embassy to Thebes, Demosthenes mentions some of the ambassadors 
by name (Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesitheides, Democrates, and Callaeschrus) but he does 
not relate upon which criteria they were elected.13 Although there were no pools of 
professionally trained diplomats and, technically, any citizen was eligible to serve as an 
ambassador, the ones elected usually possessed a certain set of characteristics and skills, 
including experience, eloquence, and interstate connections.14 By and large, ambassadors were 
men of a mature age – the original meaning of the Greek word for ambassador (πρέσβις) was 
“old man, elder” – suggesting that they had a great deal of political experience and authority.15 
For an embassy seeking an alliance with the Thebans in 378 (A12), the Athenian assembly chose 
their most highly respected citizens (πρέσβεις τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους). In 339, Demosthenes, 
forty-five years old, had already served on at least five embassies, most concerning the 
																																								 																				
 12 Dem. 18.187 alleges that the assembly’s decree authorized an alliance (συµµαχία), 
rights of intermarriage (ἐπιγαµία), and an oath-swearing ceremony (ὅρκους δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν) 
with the Thebans. Although these were conventional directives (cf. Steinbock 2013, 269), the 
authenticity of Dem. 18.181-187 for this decree is dubious (cf. Yunis 2001, 29-31). 
 
13 Dem. 18.187. Election of ambassadors: Pierart 1974, 130-139; Adcock and Mosley 
1975, 165-166; Wolpert 2001, 75-76; Gillett 2003, 11-16; Rung 2008, 43-44. Briant 1968, 7-31 
discusses cases in which the council chose the ambassadors.  
 
14 The ambassadors in A18 and A22 were selected “from all of the Athenians [ἐξ 
Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων].” The composition of Athenian and Spartan embassies: Mosley 1973, 50-
62; Mitchell 1997, 73-110; Hodkinson 2000, 337-352. 
 
 15 Beekes 2010, 1231-1232 (sv. πρέσβις). Ambassadors in the Homeric world: Karavites 
1987, 79-98. 
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enactment of an alliance.16 Increasingly in the fourth century, the path to political prominence 
was through public speaking. Since the fundamental object of an alliance embassy was to 
convince another polis to conjoin military action, it was of great importance that the ambassadors 
be articulate and persuasive. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the great majority of the 
politically active Greeks in the fourth century were rhetores.17 With experience and eloquence 
being desirable in ambassadors, such posts were largely reserved for those of the privileged 
class, who had the time and money to cultivate those qualities and skills.18 The elite, moreover, 
were already involved in larger Greek affairs through their traditional interstate connections. It 
would be senseless for a petitioning polis not to call upon a citizen with friends and contacts in 
the other polis to act as an ambassador. Many examples of this were given in Chapter I. Be that 
as it may, it was also common for embassies to be mixed, composed of members of competing 
political factions. While this may have served a political check on the ambitions of one 
individual or group, it also ensured that constructing an interstate alliance was larger than one 
individual or political faction; it was a communal endeavor.  
 Considering the centrifugal forces which might inhibit extensive interstate activity, the 
commission to arrange an alliance was one of the most demanding of an embassy. As difficult as 
it was, modern scholarship makes it appear nearly impossible by underestimating the powers of 
the ambassadors, characterizing their role as mere messengers without any authority beyond their 
																																								 																				
16 Ambassadors to Thebes: Diod. Sic. 15.28.2. Demosthenes: Dem. 9.72, 18.79, 178-179. 
  
17 Hansen 1983a, 151-180 lists 368 Athenian rhetores and strategoi from 403 to 322. 
Rhetoric and foreign affairs: Piccirilli 2002; Gillett 2003, 15-16; Amantini 2005; Usher 2010, 
220-235. 
 
 18 Wealth and the choice of ambassadors: Mosley 1973, 44; Hodkinson 2000, 337-352. 
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advocacy for an alliance.19 In defense of this representation, most point to the ambassadors with 
full powers (πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες), who, despite their title, did little more than receive and 
carry back treaties to their home authorities for authorization. But this type of ambassador served 
on peace embassies or on a delegation from a conquered party that had no liberty to negotiate 
terms anyway. By contrast, ambassadors on an alliance embassy had a fair amount of latitude. 
Their assembly’s directives were rather broad. In the early 370s, for example, the Athenian 
assembly charged its three ambassadors to Thebes to obtain “whatever benefits they could [ὅτι 
ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθὸν].” The same instructions were given in 346 to the Athenian ambassadors 
seeking peace and alliance with Philip. In 369, the Thebans directed Pelopidas to arrange affairs 
with the Thessalians “in the interests of the polis [εἰς τὸ συµφέρον].” In 360, when the Spartan 
king Agesilaus asked his assembly for direction concerning an alliance proposal from the 
Egyptian Nectanebo (S8), he was given the vague reply to “act in the interests of Sparta [πράξει 
τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συµφέρον].”20 In these cases the assembly’s orders were not specific. They only 
authorized, in general terms, the representatives to arrange alliances for the good of the whole 
polis. Furthermore, there are examples of ambassadors exercising this authority in the assembly 
of the host polis (see below), no doubt cautiously, since ancient Greek politicians had a penchant 
for prosecuting rivals for any perceived indiscretion or abuse of power.21 All the same, the 
evidence indicates that ambassadors were more than mere messenger boys. 
																																								 																				
 19 Mosley 1973, 36; Missiou-Ladi 1987, 336-345; Pownall 1995, 140-149; Bederman 
2001, 101-103; Wolpert 2001, 76. 
 
 20 Ambassadors to Thebes: IG II2 43, lines 72-77. Ambassadors to Philip: Aeschin. 2.104, 
120. Pelopidas: Diod. Sic. 15.67.3. Agesilaus: Plut. Ages. 37.5. In 379, although angered that the 
enemy Phliasians treated him as one without authority (ἄκυρον) in truce negotiations, Agesilaus 
sent for consultation from the home authorities (Xen. Hell. 5.3.23-24). 
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After the assembly approved the embassy’s composition and made clear its instructions, 
the Treasurer of the Demos (ταµίας τοῦ δήµου) supplied the ambassadors with money (about 
twenty drachmas) for travelling expenses.22 The council reconvened in the Bouleuterion to attend 
to any administrative and logistic matters extending from the assembly’s decisions. The rest of 
the citizenry returned to their daily duties but remained in anticipation of positive news from the 
alliance embassy. 
In 339, when the Athenian delegation reached Thebes, it found that Philip’s ambassadors 
had already arrived. In his account Demosthenes fails to mention any preliminary meeting with 
the boeotarchs and jumps straight to the Theban assembly meeting.23 Since the Thebans and 
Philip were technically still allies from their alliance in 347, the Macedonian delegation spoke 
first. Pytho of Byzantium, a frequent Macedonian representative in interstate negotiations, 
																																								 																				
 21 The condemnation of an Athenian ambassador for agreeing to peace at the Susa 
conference in 367 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-38; Plut. Pel. 30.1-6) shows that ambassadors exercised 
initiative but could also face prosecution at home if they went against the overall policies of the 
polis. Ambassadors were also subject to an audit (εὔθυναι) of their conduct (see note 56). 
 
22 Mosley 1973, 74-77. 
 
23 Dem. 18.213. Other examples of speeches from foreign ambassadors to an assembly 
appear in A1, A13, and S10. Dem. 16.1 refers to the speeches in the Athenian assembly from the 
Megalopolitan ambassadors seeking an alliance against the Spartans. Nep. Ep. 6 mentions a 
debate in the Arcadian assembly between the Athenian Callistratus and the Theban Epaminondas 
in an attempt to sustain (Callistratus) or to reinstate (Epaminondas) an alliance. Ste. Croix 1972, 
128-129 and Kennell 2010, 113-114 note that nearly every account of the Spartan assembly 
contains only the speeches of foreigner ambassadors. Foreigners not directly involved in the 
negotiations might also be present (Dem. 19.53; Aeschin. 2.130). 
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stressed Philip’s good services to Thebes, and asked that the Thebans either join in the attack on 
Attica or at least allow Philip free passage through Boeotia.24  
 Demosthenes spoke on behalf of the Athenians, though surprisingly he does not record 
his speech in On the Crown. Aeschines alleges that Demosthenes sold out Athenian interests in 
order to gain the alliance with the Thebans: he recognized their domination over Boeotia; agreed 
that the Athenians would bear all the costs of naval operations and two-thirds of land campaigns; 
and promised them overall command on land and a joint command on sea.25 D.J. Mosley once 
tried to rationalize these concessions as “not as one-sided as Aeschines alleged” by arguing that 
the terms were not unprecedented and even reasonable for that critical situation.26 Dina Guth, 
however, thinks the proposals were very much one-sided but adds that they may have originated 
with the Thebans, who, forced to decide between Philip and the Athenians, offered them in the 
hope of prolonging the negotiations to the point of a stalemate.27 If Guth is right, then by 
accepting the terms, Demosthenes and the Athenian delegation shocked the Thebans, who could 
do nothing but agree to their own proposals. This harmonizes with the earlier point of this 
chapter that ambassadors were not passive mouthpieces but active agents in the negotiations. In 
																																								 																				
 24 Dem. 18.213; cf. Diod. Sic. 16.85.3; Plut. Dem. 18.2. Buckler 2003, 496 is surprised by 
the Thebans’ refusal to cooperate with Philip who had, in his opinion, “always handsomely 
treated his Theban allies” and “ardently desired their friendship.” 
 
25 Aeschin. 3.142-143. Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328 appears to criticize Demosthenes’ 
performance in the Theban assembly (Flower 1994, 143-145; contra Shrimpton 1991, 175-176). 
 
26 Mosley 1971, 508-510. 
 
27 Guth 2014, 164-165.  
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the case of the 339 alliance, the final provisions were a product of the dialogue between all 
parties.  
 There could be considerable debate in the assemblies as the members engaged with the 
details of prospective alliances. For example, in the negotiations for an alliance with the Spartans 
in 369 (A13), the Athenian assembly rejected its own council’s advice (in a προβούλευµα) for 
equal leadership roles (i.e., Sparta on land and Athens at sea) in favor of one assemblyman’s 
motion for a five-day rotation of leadership.28 In 366, the same assembly nearly rejected an 
alliance with the Arcadian League (A16), but someone raised the option of making it a defensive 
alliance which would not violate any existing treaties. In 353, the assembly turned down a 
proposal to ally with the Megalopolitans, even though Demosthenes advocated fiercely for it.29 
An anecdote from the third century, which Polybius claims followed Spartan custom (τῶν 
εἰθισµένων), shows a sharply divided assembly with its members delivering long speeches for or 
against an alliance with the Aetolians.30 The orations of Demosthenes and Aeschines exhibit 
pugnacious debate and protracted deliberation in the assembly over interstate affairs in the 340s 
and 330s. The famous debate in 346 over the question of whether to accept peace and alliance 
with Philip of Macedon continued over the course of two days.31 The Spartan assembly took 
																																								 																				
28 The Spartan πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες agreed to the revised terms without submitting 
them to the home authorities. 
  
 29 Dem. 16. 
 
 30 Polyb. 4.34. Kelly 1981, 47-61 and Kennell 2010, 111-114 dispute the notion that the 
average Spartan did not engage in debate in the assembly and merely cast his vote according to 
the dictates of his superiors.  
 
31 Aeschin 2.53, 61, 65, 3.68-72. Deliberation over the alliance with Corcyra in 433 also 
took the Athenian assembly two days (Thuc. 1.44.1).  
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three days to calculate its resources before returning a negative response to an appeal from 
Polydamas of Pharsalus.32 These multiday convocations were not the norm, but they illustrate 
that accepting an alliance and determining what shape it would take were issues that had to be 
hammered out at length between the factious political authorities in each polis.33  
 Negotiations, therefore, could be protracted but not to the point of impracticability. 
Although ambassadors in other types of missions might find a great deal of their time taken up in 
shuttling back and forth between their respective poleis, the evidence for alliance embassies 
suggests that negotiations were comparatively rapid.34 The circumstances for an alliance were of 
a different sort from what they would have been for a peace treaty or a postwar settlement; and 
they did not involve unfamiliar parties or even belligerents. Instead, because an alliance was 
constructed on a socio-cultural foundation which produced a level of trust and affection between 
the parties, these types of negotiations could go much more smoothly. Xenophon, for example, 
suggests that the talks for the Athenian-Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1) took only one day and the 
Athenians mustered their army for action immediately on the next day. When the Athenians 
finally made an alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse in 368 (A15), the assembly fixed the 
operative details in just one day, except for the business of Athenian ambassadors swearing oaths 
in Syracuse. In 366, Lycomedes, the leader of the Arcadian League, negotiated an alliance with 
																																								 																				
32 Xen. Hell. 6.1.2-17. 
 
33 Dem. 1.4 and 19.185-186 famously express his jealousy of Philip, who as a monarch 
could direct Macedonian foreign policy more directly and quickly than an assembly, but these 
complaints suit his own political purposes. Pericles, on the other hand, praised the open and 
inclusive process of the democratic assembly (Thuc. 2.39.1). 
 
34 Mosley 1973, 70 hypothesizes that “a minimum of three embassies” were necessary to 
complete an interstate treaty, but his examples exclude alliance embassies. 
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the Athenians in one trip (A16). The Athenian alliance with four Peloponnesian poleis in 362 
(A17) was concluded after one embassy, leaving any overlooked matters for future amendments. 
Debate was ardent and at times drawn out, but the process was still functional and constructive. 
Out of these negotiations came specific terms and conditions on which both sides agreed. 
  
Articulating an Alliance 
 
To facilitate the composition of an alliance treaty, the Greeks could refer to earlier ones 
for inspiration. The King’s Peace in 386, for example, was a pattern for the Athenian-Chian 
alliance in 384 (A8), which in turn was the model for the bilateral alliances that constituted the 
core of the Second Athenian Confederacy. As a result, throughout the fourth century, there were 
many specific articles that appeared again and again in written decrees (ψηφίσµατα). For 
convenience in articulating the preamble and the main body, the Greeks came to devise linguistic 
formulae. P.J. Rhodes and D.M. Lewis enumerate the common elements of the preamble, which 
are summarized as follows.35 
1. An invocation of the gods  
2. A heading announcing the subject matter  
3. A prescript containing the names of the presiding officials involved, the date, and the name of 
the proposer  
4. A motivation clause and an enactment formula  
 
An example of a typical preamble comes from the first nine lines of IG II² 116, the inscription 
recording the alliance between the Athenians and the Thessalian League in 361 (A18).  
																																								 																				
 35 Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 4-5 (reiterated in RO xix-xx). Invocation of the gods: Pounder 
1984, 243-250; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160-167. Henry 1977, 19-34 traces the 
development of headings and prescripts throughout the fourth century, noting “continuing 
refinement of detail.”  
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(1) Gods. 
(2) In the archonship of Nicophemus, the alliance of the Athenians and Thessalians forever.  
(3) It is resolved by the council and by the people. Leontis was the prytanis; Chaerion son of 
Charinautes of Phalerum was secretary; Archippus from Amphitrope was presiding as 
president. On the twelfth day of the prytany, Execestides proposed: 
(4) concerning what the ambassadors of the Thessalians said, let it be decreed by the people: 
    
  θε[ο]ί  
  ἐπὶ Νικοφήµο ἄρχοντος 
  συµµαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ 
  Θετταλῶν εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον. 
  ἔδοξεν τ[ῆ]ι [β]ουλῆι κα[ὶ] τῶι δήµωι· Λ[ε]ωντὶς ἐπρυτάνε- 
  υεν, Χαιρ[ί]ων Χαριναύ[τ]ο Φαληρεὺ[ς] ἐγραµµάτευεν, Ἄρ- 
  χιππος, Ἀµφ[ι]τροπῆθε[ν] ἐπεστάτει· δωδεκάτει τῆς πρ- 
  υτανείας· Ἐ[ξ]ηκεστίδης εἶπεν· [π]ε[ρὶ] ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ π- 
  [ρ]έσβεις τῶν Θετταλῶ[ν], ἐψηφίσθα[ι] τῶι δ[ή]µωι. 
 
 These elements regularly appear in the preambles of fourth-century alliance treaties. 
More significant for this study, however, is what follows in the main body of those treaties. 
Compared to modern international agreements, the articulation of provisions in fourth-century 
alliances is rudimentary. But considering them on their own terms, it is not true, as some have 
asserted, that the Greeks avoided “complicated arrangements” and persisted in making “simple 
documents.”36 Rather, throughout this period there is an observable increase in the sophistication 
and precision of the content and the vocabulary of the treaties. This can be illustrated in Tables 
1.1 and 1.2 which compare the provisions of select Athenian alliances from earlier and later in 
the century. The first table lists those in the Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1), the Locrian alliance in 
the same year (A2), and the Eretrian alliance in 394 (A3). The second compares the provisions in 
A1, A2, and A3 as a unit with those in the joint alliance with four Peloponnesian poleis in 362 
(A17). The defining features of these provisions are discussed afterwards.  
 
																																								 																				
 36 Mosley 1973, 70-71; Wolpert 2001, 77-78. 
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Table 1.1: Athenian Alliance Provisions in 395 and 394 
A1 A2 A3 
Mutual defense  
 
Mutual defense  
Provision for future amendment 
 
Mutual defense  
Provision for future amendment 
Instructions for swearing oaths 
 
 
Table 1.2: Athenian Alliance Provisions from 395 to 362 
A1-A3 A17 
Mutual defense 
Provision for future amendment 
Instructions for swearing oaths 
Mutual defense  
Provision for future amendment 
Specification of leadership roles 
Preservation of domestic constitutions 
Exiles clause 
 
As Table 1.1 shows, the first three treaties are brief and simple in their articulation. But as the 
century advances and more alliances materialize, the expression of the specific articles becomes 
more extensive and more refined. Obviously, not all treaties contained the same provisions; the 
arrangements were context specific. Nevertheless, there were some that appeared regularly, in 
particular those listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.37  
The most recurrent was the mutual defense clause. It first appeared in its fourth-century 
expression in the Athenian-Boeotian alliance of 395 (A1):  
“If any one goes against the Athenians for war either by land or by sea, the Boeotians shall go in 
support with all their strength as the Athenians call on them, as far as possible; and if any one 
goes against the Boeotians for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support with 
all their strength as the Boeotians call on them, as far as possible.”  
 
[ἐάν τ]ις ἴηι ἐπ[ὶ πολέµωι ἐπ Ἀθηναίος ἢ] 
 [κατὰ] γῆν ἢ κατ[ὰ θάλαττ]αν βοηθε̑ν Βοι[ω]- 
[τὸς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει καθ]ότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ- 
[ωσιν] Ἀθηναῖ[οι κατὰ τὸ] δυνατόν· καὶ ἐ[ά]- 
[ν τις ἴ]ηι ἐπὶ [Βοιωτὸς ἐ]πὶ πολέµωι ἢ [κα]- 
[τὰ γῆν ἢ] κατὰ [θάλατταν], βοηθε̑ν Ἀθηνα[ί]- 
 [ος παντὶ σθένει καθότι] ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ω] 
 [σι Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνα]τόν. 
																																								 																				
37 A complete list is in Appendix A. 
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Mutual defense clauses were present in the Athenian alliances with the Locrians (A2) and the 
Eretrians (A3), as noted in Table 1.1, as well as in those with the Chians in 384 (A8), the 
Byzantines in the late 380s (A10), Dionysius I in 368 (A15), the Thessalian League in 361 
(A18), and the Eretrians (again) in 341 (A22).38 Some Theban alliances (T1, T2) contained it. 
There is some epigraphical evidence that the Spartans, too, included such a clause in their 
alliances.39 The frequent inclusion of “as far as possible [κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν]” in these clauses, 
Raphael Sealey presumes, “rendered the obligation nugatory. If the casus foederis arose, a 
reluctant ally could plead impossibility.”40 This reading might be expected, but Sealey offers no 
evidence that the Greeks ever made this sort of sophistic justification for inaction. On the 
contrary, the historical record, as the following chapters reveal, confirms that allies did in fact 
uphold their obligations of mutual defense.41  
 Some Athenian alliance treaties contained a provision for future amendment. The alliance 
with the Boeotians in 395 (A1) permitted additions or deletions according to common 
deliberation (κοινῆι βουλευοµένοις). The same was required in the alliances with the Locrians 
(A2) and Eretrians (A3). The one with the Peloponnesian poleis in 362 (A17) allowed 
																																								 																				
 
38 It is also in the founding document of the Second Athenian Confederacy (IG II2 43, 
lines 46-50) and in the Illyrian-Chalcidian alliance of 357 (SdA 307, lines 4-13). 
 
39 It is in a Spartan alliance with the Aetolians and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461), which 
Bolmarcich 2008, 70-76 uniquely dates to the fourth century. Antonetti 2012, 193-208 reviews 
the possible dates for this alliance and proposes between 420 and 418.  
 
40 Sealey 1993, 17. 
 
41 Cargill 1981, 144 lists a number of Athenian “relief missions” dispatched in 
compliance with their mutual defense obligations. 
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amendments as long as they were according to the oath (εὔορκον) which both sides swore after 
the alliance negotiations. The alliance with three northern kings in 356 (A20) gave the authority 
(κυρίαν) for making amendments to the council. Philip of Macedon’s alliance with the 
Chalcidians in 357 permitted amendments but only within the first three months.42  
 Many treaties assigned specific leadership roles. The final version of the Athenian-
Spartan alliance in 369 (A13) authorized a rotation of supreme leadership every five days. The 
Athenians and their new Peloponnesian allies (A17) agreed in 362 that leadership would pass to 
the one in whose territory was the military campaign ([ἡγεµονίαν δὲ ἔχειν ἐ]ν τῆι αὑτῶν 
ἑκά[στους]). In 339, the Athenians offered the Thebans supreme command of the land forces and 
joint command of naval operations (A23). The Spartans imposed their leadership on the 
Acarnanians (S4) and the Olynthians (S6) with a hegemonic oath: “to consider the same friends 
and enemies as the Spartans, to follow them wherever they lead, and to be allies [τὸν αὐτὸν µὲν 
ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον Λακεδαιµονίοις νοµίζειν, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται καὶ σύµµαχοι 
εἶναι].”43 The Thebans did the same in their alliances with Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (T5), the 
Achaeans (T6), and Alexander of Pherae (T7). 
 In a few instances allies agreed to respect each other’s domestic constitution (πολιτεία). 
This was often inserted into the mutual defense clauses, as in the Athenian alliances with the 
Peloponnesians in 362 (A17) and the Thessalians in 361 (A18). The Thebans permitted their 
																																								 																				
 
42 Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50. Rhodes 1972, 278-279 lists amendments (riders) that 
were attached to other types of Athenian decrees. Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 517 addresses 
provisions for amendment in Greek decrees in general. 
 
 43 Acarnanians: Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1. Olynthians: ibid. 5.3.26.  
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Peloponnesian allies (T2, T3, T6) to retain their oligarchic constitutions. Closely related to this is 
the exiles clause, a prohibition against the deportation or the return of exiles without common 
agreement, which showed up in a number of Athenian and Theban alliances (A7, A17, T3, T4, 
T6). Other provisions called for revenue collection arrangements (A6, A19, A22), the exchange 
of money and manpower (A14, S1, S7, S8, S9, S10, T2), the surrender of hostages (T4, T5), and 
the prohibition against unilateral peace attempts with a mutual enemy (A18, A20, T1, T2).
 Notably, nearly every Athenian alliance in the fourth century was designated to last 
forever (ἀεί χρόνον or ἅπαντα χρόνον), a curious remark if contemporaries considered their 
alliances to be merely temporary expedients.44 Evidently, the opinion of the signatories inclined 
more towards the expectation of a long and productive working relationship.  
 After the assembly voted on the specific terms, someone would make an official 
pronouncement of the new alliance and then the herald would proclaim the proceedings closed.45 
Even so, there was still important work remaining. The alliance now had an “identity,” which 
would only appear sharper in the subsequent joint performance of religious rituals. First, the 
assembly directed chosen representatives to participate in the swearing of an oath (ὅρκος). The 
Athenians generally chose generals, council members, knights, hipparchs, taxiarchs, or phylarchs 
																																								 																				
 
44 Karavites 1982, 91-93. The only fourth-century alliance with a time limit (fifty years) 
is the one between the Macedonian king Amyntas and the Chalcidians (Tod 111 = Harding 21 = 
RO 12). The role of opinions on diplomatic practices: Piccirilli 2002, 51-62; Amantini 2005; 
Herman 2006, 12-13. 
 
45 Andoc. 1.36; Xen. Hell. 3.5.16. Hansen 1983b, 131-138 maintains that a typical 
assembly meeting concluded around noon. 
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to do this.46 Few treaties mention more than the simple command for the swearing of an oath, but 
the inscription for the Athenian alliance with the Thessalian League in 361 (A18) is unique in 
that it publishes the content of the oaths for both parties. The one for the Athenians is as follows:  
“I will help with all my strength as far as possible if any one goes against the Thessalian League 
for war, or overthrows the archon, whom the Thessalians chose, or sets up a tyrant in Thessaly.” 
 
 βοηθήσω π[α]ντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυ- 
 νατόν, ἐάν τι[ς] ἴηι ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Θετταλῶν ἐπὶ πολ- 
 [έµ]ωι ἢ τὸν ἄρχοντα καταλύει, ὃν εἵλοντο Θετταλοί, ἢ 
 [τ]ύραννον καθ[ι]στῆι ἐν Θετταλίαι· 
 
Then there is the oath for which the Thessalian League’s archon, polemarchs, hipparchs, knights, 
religious authorities (ἱεροµνήµονες), and other political officials swore:  
“I will help with all my strength as far as possible if any one goes against the city of the 
Athenians for war or overthrows the Athenian people.”  
 
           βο[η]θ[ήσ]ω παντὶ σθέ- 
νει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐάν τις ἴ[η]ι ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθ- 
[ην]αίων ἐπὶ πολέµωι ἢ τὸν δῆµον καταλύει τὸν Ἀθηνα- 
[ίων]· 
 
These oaths addressed political and military matters by rehearsing the mutual defense clause and 
the provision for the preservation of the domestic constitutions. “Co-ordinating warfare would 
not have required an oath,” writes Andrew Bayliss on oaths in alliances, “but it must have given 
confidence to those involved in the fighting that they would not be let down by their co-
fighters.”47 As Chapter I showed that συµµαχία, a military term, included socio-cultural 
elements, so ὅρκος, a religious practice, integrated the pragmatic considerations of the alliance. It 
																																								 																				
46 Mosley 1961, 59-63; Berti 2006, 193-200; Bolmarcich 2007a, 26-38; Sommerstein and 
Bayliss 2013, 151-240. 
 
 47 Ibid., 186. “Alliances were in many respects,” Bayliss continues, “little more than 
expanded versions of oaths.” 
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is impossible to compartmentalize these features. The oath in the Athenian alliance with three 
northern kings in 356 (A20) reinforces this.  
“I swear by Zeus and Gaia and Helios and Poseidon and Athena and Ares that I will be a friend 
and an ally to Cetriporis and to the brothers of Cetriporis, and that I will wage the war with 
Cetriporis against Philip without deceit and with all my strength as far as possible, and I will not 
end the war against Philip without Cetriporis and his brothers; and the other places which Philip 
controls I will join with Cetriporis and his brothers in subduing, and I shall join in taking 
Crenides with Cetriporis and his brothers; and I will give back . . .” 
 
 [ὀµνύω Δία καὶ Γῆν] καὶ Ἥλιον καὶ Ποσει[δ]ῶ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ 
 [Ἄρην, φίλος ἔσοµαι] Κετριπόρι καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς Κ- 
 [ετριπόριος καὶ σ]ύµµαχος καὶ πολεµή[σ]ω µετὰ Κετριπόρ- 
 [ιος τὸν πόλεµον τ]ὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀδόλως παντὶ σθένε[ι] 
 [κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κ]αὶ οὐ προκαταλύσοµαι τὸν πόλεµον ἄν- 
 [ευ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον κ[αὶ] 
 [τἆλλα χωρία ἃ κατ]έχε[ι] Φίλιππος συνκα[τ]α[σ]τρέψοµαι µ[ε]- 
 [τὰ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ Κρηνίδ[α]ς συνε[ξ]αι- 
 [ρήσω µετὰ Κετριπ]ό[ρ]ιος κα[ὶ τ]ῶν [ἀδ]ελφῶν καὶ ἀποδώσω τὰ 
 
This oath also consists of a summary of the political elements of the treaty within a religious 
framework. It makes mention of the mutual defense clause, a prohibition against unilateral peace 
with a mutual enemy, and the new allies’ specific military objective, to win back areas recently 
conquered by Philip. The naming of the six divinities, moreover, calls for divine witnesses of 
these promises, impressing upon the participants their consecrated responsibility to observe the 
terms of the alliance. Some alliance oaths even contained blessings (ἀγαθὰ) for faithful 
observance and curses (κακά) for noncompliance.48  
Sacrificial offerings followed the oaths. After Philip and the Chalcidians received 
approval from the Delphic Apollo for their alliance in 357, the god directed them to swear oaths 
and offer sacrifices:   
																																								 																				
48 Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50. The oaths in the Athenian Confederacy’s alliance 
treaties with the Corcyraeans in 375 (IG II2 97, lines 25-26) and with the Ceans in 363 (111, lines 
80-82) mention blessings and curses.  
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“Sacrifice and obtain good omens from Zeus Teleos and Hypatos, Apollo Prostaterios, Artemis 
Orthosia, Hermes; and pray that the alliance will be with good fortune; and return thank-offerings 
to Pythian Apollo, and remember your gifts.” 49 
  
 θῦσαι δὲ καὶ καλλιερῆσαι Διὶ Τελέοι καὶ Υπάτωι Ἀπόλλωνι Προστατηρίωι Ἄρτέµιδι 
 Ὀρθωσίαι Ἑρµῆι καὶ κατὰ τύχαν ἀγαθὰν ἐπεύχεσθαι τὰν συµµαχίαν ἐσσεῖσθαι καὶ Πυθῶδε 
 τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι χαριστήρια ἀποδιδόναι, καὶ µνασιδωρεῖν.  
 
The rituals invoked divine sanction and protection. They also accentuated the social signification 
of the alliance. “The language of oaths,” Susan Guettel Cole comments, “provided metaphors of 
unity.”50 The performative aspects of these rituals did the same. Pronouncing oaths, which 
encapsulated the shared political and military goals, over the head of a sacrificial animal, with 
the gods witnessing and acting as guardians of the agreement, brought the participants even 
closer together. Of course, each polis retained its political sovereignty, but the joint performance 
of the religious rituals reinforced the common interests, reminded them of their commitment to 
their mutual welfare, and activated a sense of solidarity, a shared identity. An IR Constructivist 
might interpret the discourse and the drama of the ceremonies as instrumental in transforming 
what had begun as a domestic communal activity into an interstate communal activity.   
In Athens, there was yet another traditional practice that continued this transformative 
aspect. Since in the fourth century there were no permanent diplomatic quarters, ambassadors 
spent the night at the homes of their friends or the proxenos of their polis.51 Then, in the evening 
																																								 																				
 
49 The same four gods appear in a contemporary oath of reconciliation between the 
citizens of Dicea in the Chalcidice (cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 141) and in the 
inscription for the Corinthian League in 338 (RO 76, lines 2-3). Faraone 1993, 60-80 and Steiner 
1994, 61-99 emphasize the magical aspects of oaths and sacrifices. 
 
50 Cole 1996, 240.  
 
 51 Adcock and Mosley 1975, 164.  
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of the next day, they would be entertained to a meal of hospitality (ξένια) served around the 
common hearth in the Prytaneion. This meal, ostensibly a political custom extending back to the 
Mycenaean period, and its location reinforced the social and religious signification of the 
alliance on many levels.52 Entering into the ceremonial hall of the Prytaneion, the symbolic “life 
of the city,” the participants would see the eternal flame of the hearth, a strong reminder of the 
perpetual and sacred nature of the new treaty.53 As they sat down to the meal, the intimacy of 
which was accentuated by the environment and the circumstances, the diners would sense the 
presence of the goddess Hestia, who, being a domestic figure, symbolized the virtual extended 
family status that the two allies now shared. Furthermore, as older Greek literary references point 
out, the hearth was the traditional place of refuge for suppliants and asylum seekers.54 That 
vulnerable condition was, in effect, the same for the petitioning polis, whose representatives now 
sat within that protective enclosure. All involved at the meal would have recalled the normative 
responsibility to come to the assistance of the weak and the wronged. Bringing the alliance to a 
full procedural close at this specific location exemplified the moral obligations incumbent upon 
the Greeks. On a symbolic and even a phenomenological level, therefore, the shared meal was 
celebratory (of the achieved alliance), commemorative (of the moral responsibilities behind 
interstate action), and constitutive (of a shared, familial identity).  
																																								 																				
52 Miller 1978; Engen 2010, 168-173; Cinalli 2015, 35-40. Harrell and Fox 2008, 28-37 
suggests how Mycenaean alliances proceeded from meals around the palatial hearth.  
 
 53 Miller 1978, 13-14; Hedrick 2013, 393. Schmalz 2006, 33-81 thinks the Athenian 
Pyrtaneion was located in the literal center of the city.  
 
54 Hom. Od. 7.153, 14.159; Hom. Hymn Aph.; Hest. 29; cf. Garland 2014, 114-130.  
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At some point after the meal the foreign ambassadors returned home to announce the new 
alliance.55 Accompanying them were representatives of the host polis who would participate in a 
correlating ceremony of oaths and sacrifices. It is not known whether they repeated any other 
rituals (another shared meal perhaps) or how long all of this would have taken. In Athens, 
returning ambassadors were expected to report first to the council, after which they received a 
meal (δεῖπνον) in their honor. They were also subjected at some point to an audit (εὔθυναι) of 
their conduct.56  
With the alliance firmly established, the new allies turned their immediate attention to the 
military tasks for which all of this was intended. They did not, however, neglect to celebrate the 
alliance with festivals. The treaty between the Athenians and the four Peloponnesian poleis in 
362 (A17) called for sacrifices and a procession (θυσίαν καὶ πρόσοδον). Demosthenes notes that 
in 338, after concluding their alliance with the Thebans (A23) and proceeding immediately to 
win two small victories over Philip’s army, the Athenians held festivities in which they made 
sacrifices and a procession for the gods (θυσίαι καὶ ποµπαὶ τοῖς θεοῖς).57 Isocrates mentions the 
custom (ἔθος) of holding festivals after the conclusion of interstate agreements, in which people 
from different poleis offer common prayers and sacrifices (εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας κοινὰς). By 
																																								 																				
 
55 Some ambassadors may have stayed longer in the host city to see that the expedition 
got under way and to serve as advisors. For example, that no Tarentine ambassador sailed with 
the Phocian general Phalaecus to Italy in 346 convinced his soldiers that no alliance existed with 
the Tarentines (Diod. Sic. 16.61.4-62.1). 
  
56 Report to the council: Pl. Leg. 12.941a; Dem. 19.17-18; Aeschin. 2.16, 45. Miller 
1978’s appendix A 86, 88, 95, 96 gives examples of δεῖπνον for returning ambassadors. Audit: 
Dem. 24.150; Aeschin. 3.17; cf. Mosley 1973, 39-42; Hansen 1991, 222-224; Bederman 2001, 
102-103. 
 
57 Dem. 18.215-218. 
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celebrating in this manner, Isocrates continues, “we are reminded of the kinship which originated 
among us, are disposed to be more kindly towards each other in the future and to renew our old 
friendships and to make new ones [ἀναµνησθῆναι µὲν τῆς συγγενείας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
ὑπαρχούσης, εὐµενεστέρως δ᾽ εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡµᾶς αὐτούς, καὶ τάς τε 
παλαιὰς ξενίας ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ καινὰς ἑτέρας ποιήσασθαι].”58 The celebrations connected the 
past and the present, commemorating the long-standing relationships and also encouraging the 
creation of new ones to perpetuate the ties between the two poleis. The Greeks did not expect 
their alliances and the interstate relationships which they represented to dissolve quickly, but 
actively sought to preserve them. They commemorated their alliances because they hoped they 
would last. This is also why they publicly displayed the alliances in marmoreal form.    
 
Displaying an Alliance 
 
 To return to the assembly meetings that authorized alliances, at some point near their end 
someone wrote up the content of the alliances in the form of a decree (ψήφισµα). In Athens, the 
Secretary (ὁ γραµµατεὺς τἤς βουλῆς or γραµµατεὺς ὁ κατὰ πρυτανείαν) was responsible for 
depositing those decrees in the archive, which in the fourth century was in the Metroon, the 
building dedicated to the Mother of the Gods.59 The precise correlation of the documents to that 
																																								 																				
 
 58 Isoc. 4.43. In 422, the Athenians and Spartans agreed to commemorate their new 
alliance by participating in each other’s annual festivals (Thuc. 5.23.4).  
 
59 Arist. Ath. Pol. 54.3; Dem. 19.129; Din. 1.86; Lyc. 1.66. The Secretary and the archive 
staff: Sickinger 1999, 139-147; Henry 2002, 91-94. Metroon: Thomas 1989, 34-94; Sickinger 
1999, 108-113; Munn 2006, 63-64, 328-330; Pébarthe 2006, 147-171.  
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goddess is unknown today, yet because of that it is not necessary to assume that “originally the 
Athenians made no direct association.”60 Each component in the alliance process was deliberate, 
intended for a practical or symbolic purpose. The absence of an acceptable functionalist 
interpretation notwithstanding, it must have been significant that the Athenians and other Greeks 
stored alliance treaties in areas associated with a divinity.61  
 It was also the assembly’s prerogative to publish the treaties on stone and display them in 
public. This was also the responsibility of the Secretary, whom the assembly instructed to “write 
up the decree on a stone stele [ἀναγράψαι τόδε τὸ ψήφισµα ἐν στήληι λιθίνηι].”62 Since not every 
extant inscription, even the ones in good condition, contains all the elements of a standard 
decree, most scholars today deem the stone copies to be only abbreviated versions of the 
assembly’s original decrees.63 If this were the case, however, that would mean that after taking 
so much care to involve the whole community in the process of determining the form which an 
alliance would take, the authorities suddenly decided that it was acceptable to surrender the 
display copy, as it were, to the “editorial hand” of one individual, the Secretary.64 The 
																																								 																				
 60 Sickinger 1999, 111-112.  
 
61 Millender 2001, 127-141 suggests that the Spartans stored their documents in the 
homes of the kings or in local temples. 
  
62 The Poletai (πωληταὶ) farmed out the contracts for stonemasons and inscribers (Arist. 
Ath. Pol. 47.2; cf. Langdon 1991, 62-63; Pébarthe 2006, 280-281), and the Treasurer of the 
Demos (ταµίας τοῦ δήµου) dispersed the payment (usually twenty or thirty drachmas) from a 
designated fund (cf. Henry 1982, 97-112). Loomis 1998, 158-163, responding to Nolan 1981, 
provides an itemized list of expenses in the inscription process. 
 
 63 Osborne 1999, 341-358 (reprinted in 2010, 64-82); Rhodes 2001, 37-40; Davies 2003, 
328; Scafuro 2013, 408-410. 
 
 64 Osborne 2011, 118-120. 
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epigraphist Michael J. Osborne is one who detects the problems in this line of reasoning and 
offers two counterpoints in response: the public inscription reproduced precisely what was 
finalized in the assembly and every decree was inscribed on stone. Osborne goes too far in his 
absolutism, but his general point that there is a close correspondence between the assembly 
decree and the inscription is compelling. “In the case of alliances and treaties,” Osborne stresses, 
“it was obviously important that they be available for public scrutiny and equally obvious that 
the text was authoritative.”65 Since the public inscriptions reflected the work of the whole polis 
and the stone material represented the alliance’s permanence, it was necessary that they be 
authentic. The stelai embodied all of the aspects which this chapter has highlighted – political, 
communal (domestic and interstate), and religious.  
In the fourth century, the Athenians erected nearly all of their alliance stelai on the 
Acropolis, where they came under the supervision of the Treasurers of Athena (ταµίαι τῆς θεο͂). 
The Spartans displayed theirs at the Apollonion at Amyclae; the Thebans in the sanctuary of 
Heracles Promachus.66 The choice of the display sites suggests that the intended audience was 
those who lived in the temples, the gods. On the one hand, the topographical context underscores 
the role of the gods in treaty enforcement: their presence made violations of the alliance terms 
																																								 																				
 65 Osborne 2012, 44, 47-48. 
 
66 Acropolis: Liddel 2003, 79-81. Apollonion: Thuc. 5.18.10, 23.5; cf. Isoc. 12.107, 
14.180. Sanctuary of Heracles Promachus: Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012, 250-251. 
Treasurers of Athena: Aristot. Ath. Pol. 30.2; cf. Ferguson 1932; Pébarthe 2006, 277-280; 
Marcaccini 2015, 515-532. Thuc. 5.47.11 says the Argives used the temple of Apollo, and the 
Mantineans the temple of Zeus. The Chalcidians had the sanctuary of Artemis at Olynthus, and 
Philip II of Macedon the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus at Dion (Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50). 
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less likely.67 Yet, on the other hand, a few scholars have added to this juridical aspect the 
magical powers inherent in these sacred spots. “Divine proximity,” writes Deborah Steiner, “not 
only reinforces the ‘charge’ carried by the inscribed column but also guarantees the preservation 
of the material record by elevating it to the rank of sacred property.”68 Others have stressed the 
stone’s transfiguration in the terms of it assuming a “votive character.”69  
The intended audience was the gods but this does not mean that the public was barred 
from seeing and even reading these display texts. Robin Osborne comments that by placing the 
treaties in sacred locations, “political decisions are taken from the sphere of debate, from the 
political world of the Pnyx and the agora, and replaced set before the eyes of the gods.”70 But his 
depiction of this as a “depoliticizing” act is exaggerated and something the Greeks could not 
have fathomed. A number of scholars have responded that the stelai were not hidden in the 
temple inventory but were available for public viewing and scrutiny.71 Moreover, the political 
authorities did not surrender all supervisory responsibilities and they continued to manage the 
practical affairs of the alliance. The erection of stelai at sacred spots is rather a reiteration of the 
																																								 																				
67 Hunt 2010, 230-232; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 167-175. 
 
68 Steiner 1994, 66. Steiner, who sees the act of inscription as a second “cutting,” after the 
first of the sacrificial animal, emphasizes the symbolic significance of “the words, object, and 
gesture.” Koch-Piettre 2010, 1-11. 
  
69 Lawton 1995, 28; Osborne 1999, 346-347 (reprinted in 2010, 69-70); Hagemajer Allen 
2002, 228.  
 
 70 Osborne 1999, 347 (reprinted in 2010, 70). 
 
71 Stroud 1998, 46-48; Osborne 2012, 43-48. Culasso Gastaldi 2010, 139-155 argues that 
the political authorities considered the completed stele to be a didactic guide which could instruct 
the civic community in Panhellenic social norms. Richardson 2000, 601-615 and Pébarthe 2006, 
254-260 argue that the theme of a stele corresponds to the location for its erection. 
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combined religious and secular nature of the agreements. They now possessed the full authority 
of both the secular and the divine powers of the city. 
Some alliances were also represented pictorially. Reliefs graced a few of the alliance 
stelai in the first half of the fourth century: the Athenian alliances with the Eretrians in 394 (A3), 
the Chians in 384 (A8), the Olynthians in 383 (A9), the four Peloponnesian poleis in 362 (A17), 
the Thessalian League in 361 (A18), the northern kings in 356 (A20), and the Thracian 
Neapolitans in 355.72 The reliefs generally depict the patron deities or other representative 
figures in close proximity and with amicable gestures. In the relief for the joint alliance between 
the Athenians and the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians, for example, Athena, 
representing Athens, stands with Zeus and Hera, popular divinities at Olympia then under Elean 
control. The only example from this period of the dexiosis motif, the intimate act of clasping 
right hands, is in the relief for the Athenian alliance with the Thracian Neapolitans, in which 
Athena extends her right hand to the Neapolitan Parthenos.73 By midcentury, however, as Carol 
Lawton notes, alliance reliefs decrease in importance, “having been replaced by diplomatic 
documents emphasizing honours for foreign dignitaries.”74 
 At the same time, the Greeks began to commemorate the principal agents in the alliances 
with honorific statues. The Thessalians, allies of the Thebans through much of the 360s (T1), 
hired the sculptor Lysippus to make a statue of Pelopidas, which they erected at Dephi. Cornelius 
																																								 																				
72 Lawton 1995, 90-96. 
 
73 Dexiosis: Herman 1987, 50; Lawton 1995, 36-37; Knippschild 2002, 17-54; Low 2007, 
45-46; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 156-158. 
 
74 Lawton 1995, 9. 
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Nepos adds that bronze statues of the Theban general existed throughout Thessaly. Pausanias 
says that the Messenians erected in their new capitol a statue of their patron Epaminondas and 
placed it amongst statues of their divinities. Plutarch claims that in 368 the Athenians erected a 
bronze statue of their benefactor (εὐεργέτης) and ally, Alexander of Pherae (A14). And the 
Tarentines set up statues of the Spartan king Archidamus III at Delphi and at Olympia (S10).75   
 Allies could also express their cooperative agreements through coinage, in shared 
iconography, mints, and weight standards. Examples of “cooperative coinage” are fairly regular 
throughout the fourth century – the famous ΣΥN coinage, Byzantium and Chalcedon, Apollonia 
and Epidamnus, Aspendus and Selge, and the Timoleontic coinage in Sicily are only a few 
examples – but, unfortunately, they are not as prevalent a feature of the alliances for the 
Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans at this time.76 There are only a few examples, discussed in 
Chapter IV, of Phocian generals minting coins that commemorated their alliances with the 
Spartans (S9) and Athenians (A21), and of the Tarentines minting coins with imagery that 
represented their alliance with the Spartans (S10). 
 This chapter outlined the general procedures and protocols through which an alliance 
passed from conception to conclusion. By passing the proposal through the political institutions, 
the entire community came to have a vested interest in the form which it would take. It was a 
communal activity with social connotations. Those principally involved in the process were 
those with preexisting interstate relationships and connections which helped bring the two poleis 
																																								 																				
75 Pelopidas: SEG 35.480; Nep. Pel. 5.5; Plut. Pel. 31.4. Epaminondas: Paus. 4.31.10, 
32.1. Alexander of Pherae: Plut. Pel. 31.4. Archidamus: NM 6156; Paus. 6.4.9, 6.15.7; Ath. 
13.59. Ma 2013, 4-5 mentions other examples unrelated to interstate alliances. 
 
76 Mackil and Van Alfen 2006, 201-247. 
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together. And through the alliance process, with its many religious practices, the two created 
even further ties of camaraderie. The oaths, sacrifices, shared meals, festivals, and display of the 
alliance stelai in sacred locations accentuated the socio-cultural features. The practical and 
symbolic meanings behind these procedures gave a greater purpose to the political and military 
objectives. The following chapters turn to an examination of the Athenian, Spartan, and Theban 
alliances in the fourth century. 
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Chapter III 
 
Athenian Alliances 
 
 
A. From the Corinthian War to the Confederacy 
 
 
 As a result of their final defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404, the Athenians were 
forced to dismantle their vast network of interstate alliances, which had supported their 
hegemony in Greece through much of the fifth century. In the peace treaty, the defeated swore to 
“have the same enemies and friends [as the Spartans have], and to follow the Spartans on land 
and on sea, wherever they should lead [τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νοµίζοντας Λακεδαιµονίοις 
ἕπεσθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται].”1 Henceforth, it would be the 
dictates of the Spartan victors that directed their foreign policies. The Athenians and their allies 
were then incorporated into the Spartan Empire, and nearly a decade would pass before they 
circumvented Sparta’s oversight and entered into a bilateral alliance with the Boeotians, the first 
of at least fifteen Athenian alliances in the ensuing Corinthian War (395 to 387).  
 By what means and for what purposes these alliances materialized is still not fully 
understood. Scholarship today, under the influence of modern political science theories (i.e., 
Realism), is almost unanimous in its acceptance that they were tools of Realpolitik, products of 
the Athenians’ imperial ambitions.2 This conventional representation of alliances, however, is 
																																								 																				
1 Xen. Hell. 2.2.20. Bolmarcich 2008, 65-79 argues that this was the first time that the 
Spartans imposed this form of the oath on an ally. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 212-222 
discusses the so-called oath of the Peloponnesian League.  
 
2 Seager 1967, 95-115; Cawkwell 1976b, 270-277; Badian 1995, 80-86; Buck 1998, 96-
98, 115-118; Harding 2015, 27-30. Exceptions to this perspective include Accame 1951; Griffith 
1978, 127-144; Cargill 1981. 
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reductionistic: it places a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the Athenians’ alleged all-
consuming obsession with reviving their empire and ignores non-political influences. While not 
denying that political factors existed, this chapter focuses on the socio-cultural aspects of the 
new alliances. After a brief look at the interwar years (403 to 396), when the Athenians had to 
come to terms with the loss of their alliance organization, the first half of Part A examines the 
two phases in the revival of Athenian alliances during the Corinthian War: the mainland phase 
from 395 to 394 and the Aegean phase from 390 to 389. In each phase the Athenians, especially 
Thrasybulus of Steiria, built on existing social, religious, and economic connections for the 
politico-military accords. The second half investigates the alliances after the war, from the 
King’s Peace in 386 to the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377. Again, in this 
period it was the long history of socio-economic contacts, as well as shared ideology, kinship, 
and religion that prompted and substantiated these alliances. The conclusion drawn from this 
evidence is that these alliances were more than isolated and temporary expedients; they were also 
manifestations of the various interstate interactions between the Athenians and their allies. In 
short, this chapter rejects the notion of the Athenian empire striking back in the early years of the 
fourth century and supports the existence of a new hope of interstate collaboration through 
alliances. 
 
Alliances on the Mainland (395-394) 
 
In order to understand the revival of Athenian alliances in the beginning of the fourth 
century, it is not enough to only appreciate the geopolitical position (or rather non-position) of 
Athens at the time but also to take notice of the social bonds between individual Athenians and 
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future allies that originated in the dramatic weeks and months after the Peloponnesian War. With 
Athens under the control of the Thirty Tyrants, many of the democrats, now considered persona 
non grata in the city, fled for refuge to Thebes, among other areas.3 The exiles developed 
relationships with their hosts that they would appeal to later in forming alliances. Take, for 
example, the case of Thrasybulus of Steiria, who formed a close friendship with Ismenias, the 
anti-Spartan leader in Thebes. The latter supported Thrasybulus during his stay and provided him 
with arms, money, and a base to oust the Thirty and restore democracy to Athens.4 It is true that 
this assistance was given as a power play – the Thebans, wounded by the Spartans’ disregard for 
their postwar wishes, helped the Athenian democrats only in retaliation against the Spartans – 
but, as an explanation for interstate behavior, human agency need not be discarded entirely in 
favor of the structural factors of geopolitics.5 As will be seen in this chapter, sub-unit level 
interactions from 404 and 403 played just as significant a role in the first alliances of the fourth 
century.   
Against all odds, the Athenian democrats defeated the oligarchs and their Spartan 
defenders, and instituted a peaceful restoration of democracy under Thrasybulus’ supervision. 
Afterwards, the Athenians dedicated in the temple of Heracles at Thebes statues of Athena and 
																																								 																				
 
3 Lys. 16.4; Hell. Oxy. 17.1; Xen. Hell. 2.3.42; Diod. Sic. 14.32.1. Steinbock 2013, 211-
232 looks at how Theban support for the democrats was remembered through the fourth century. 
 
4 Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. Sic. 14.32.1; Plut. Lys. 27.4; Just. Epit. 5.9.8. Buck 1998, 66 and 
2005, 36 suggest that Thrasybulus’ choice of Thebes for his exile was pre-arranged because of a 
guest-friendship with Ismenias.  
 
5 Hell. Oxy. 17.1 dismisses any sentimentality from the Thebans for the Athenian exiles. 
Beresford 2014, 13-27 offers a new translation of Hell. Oxy. 17.1. Historical agency in ancient 
Greece: Ferrario 2014.  
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Heracles, representative deities of each polis and symbols of the new ties between them. They 
also passed a number of honorific decrees on behalf of their benefactors.6 Already in 403, the 
Athenians intended to eventually break from their Spartan overseers and turn to their Theban 
friends, but such a reorientation took a few years to accomplish. On a number of occasions 
between 403 and 396, the Athenians dismissed Sparta’s authority, but they were limited to acts 
of passive resistance or cautious assertions of their autonomy.7 In 396, for example, Thrasybulus 
publicly opposed a plot by the Athenian radicals to dispatch a state ship in support of Conon and 
the Persians who were fighting the Spartans in the Aegean, and convinced the Athenians to 
disavow the action to the Spartans.8 He reasoned that the city, with its present state of defense 
(no walls), would be at risk of Spartan retaliation if they did not renounce the radicals’ scheme. 
Had there been a strong ally, such as Thebes would be in the next year, he would not have been 
averse to hazard a confrontation with Sparta.9 It is worth supposing that he was privy as early as 
																																								 																				
6 Statues of Heracles and Athena: Paus. 9.11.6; cf. Pemberton 1981, 317-320; Steinbock 
2013, 232-235. Honorific decrees: ibid., 235-245. Buck 2005, 37-38 supposes that when the 
Thebans seized Oropus, an Athenian satellite in northeast Attica (Diod. Sic. 14.17.3), 
Thrasybulus restrained any response as a gesture of gratitude to the Thebans. Athenian-Theban 
relations in general in the first decades of the fourth century: Buckler and Beck 2008, 33-43. 
 
7 The Athenians restored proxeny decrees which had been destroyed by the Thirty (cf. 
Culasso Gastaldi 2003, 244-248; Shear 2011, 235-238; Lambert 2012b, 257-259). At the turn of 
the century, they contributed troops to at least two Spartan campaigns, but Xen. Hell. 3.1.4, 2.25 
supposes that this was so that the democrats could rid the city of unwanted oligarchic (pro-
Spartan) elements. In 397 they sent arms and sailors to Conon and made an unsuccessful attempt 
to open diplomatic overtures to the Persian King (Hell. Oxy. 7.1). In 396 they refused to join 
Agesilaus’ Asian expedition (Paus. 3.9.2). Harding 2015, 26 sums up the Athenian condition: 
“The Athenians were not lacking in spirit or overwhelmed by their defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War. . . . They were not cowering in their boots, as has been suggested.”   
 
8 Hell. Oxy. 6.2-3.  
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this to Theban machinations against Sparta. Since the contemporary author of the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia depicts close, almost symbiotic, connections between like-minded factions in 
various poleis, it would be remarkable if Ismenias did not share sensitive information with him. 
His familiarity with and support for current war plans in Thebes, then, explains, ironically, his 
apparent cooperation with Sparta; it can be seen as a tactic to buy time for those preparations.10  
Those plans materialized in early 395. The leading Thebans conspired to start a conflict 
between Locris (a Theban ally) and Phocis (a Spartan ally), in the hopes of it erupting into a 
general war against Sparta. As expected, Phocis appealed to its Spartan protectors, who 
responded, also as expected, by leading an army towards Boeotia. Locris, meanwhile, looked to 
Thebes.11 Rather than face the invaders immediately and with more substantial support, the 
Thebans dispatched ambassadors to Athens regarding an alliance. But this was not a sudden 
reaction to the Spartan invasion – the Thebans had been long hoping and plotting for this war. It 
was a natural appeal to their friends in Athens. 
A1 The Athenians and the Boeotians (395) 
IG II² 14; Xen. Hell. 3.5.7-16 
There is no historical or epigraphical evidence for the reception of the ambassadors by 
the Athenian council; perhaps the circumstances were already known so the council fast-tracked 
																																								 																				
9 His support for the anti-Spartan alliance with the Boeotians in 395 (see below) shows a 
high tolerance for risk. Arist. Rh. 1400b20 says that Conon called him “rash in judgment” 
(θρασύ-βουλος). Tuplin 2001, 317-318 points out times when he was “unwisely immoderate.”  
 
10 Hamilton 1979, 199 acknowledges the possibility that Thrasybulus and Ismenias had 
“conversations about the matter during the winter of 396/95.”  
 
11 Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-4; Hell. Oxy. 18.1-5. Paus. 3.9.11 says that after the Spartans agreed to 
support Phocis, the Athenians tried to convince them to submit the matter to arbitration, but this 
is not confirmed by any earlier source. 
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the matter to the assembly, where the envoys presented their case for alliance. Many scholars 
have already examined in detail this speech, recorded in Xen. Hell. 3.5.8-15, so it is not 
necessary here to mention more than the main points.12 The speakers begin with the moral 
imperative, derived from the social norms of gratitude and reciprocity, which the Athenians have 
to help because the Thebans acted on their behalf in 404 and 403 (8-9). They next argue that in 
order for the Athenians to recover their prominence in Greece they must help the wronged 
(βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις), in this case all the Greeks under Spartan domination (10-13).13 And 
if they accept this charge, to become the “guardians of the wronged [προστῆτε . . . 
ἀδικουµένων],” it is promised that the liberated Greeks will be grateful and loyal to the 
Athenians, who will in turn become “by far the greatest of those that have ever been [πολὺ ἤδη 
µεγίστους τῶν πώποτε γενέσθαι]” (14). The speech ends with a promise of future benefits for 
both sides deriving from the proposed alliance (15).  
It is important to note that this case includes both political (restoration of Athenian rule in 
the Greek world) and moral grounds (reciprocity and helping the wronged). The latter are what 
modern scholars pass over, assuming them to be a mask which needs to be stripped away and 
discarded, to get at the supposed real factors of power and self-interest.14 While it is true that 
much of the speech is concerned with the possibility of a restored Athenian hegemony, that 
																																								 																				
 
12 Seager 1967, 96-99; Gray 1989, 107-112; Tuplin 1993, 60-64; Krentz 1995, 198-200; 
Low 2007, 71-72; Christ 2012, 156-158; Steinbock 2013, 245-253. 
 
13 Reciprocity in this speech: Gray 1989, 107-112; Low 2007, 69-72.  
 
14 Hamilton 1979, 202 labels the ambassadors’ points “rhetorical and tendentious.” 
Cartledge 1987, 292 calls the speech “a heterogeneous cocktail of truths, half-truths and 
demonstrable falsehoods.” Christ 2012, 156 describes the speech as “fundamentally pragmatic in 
its appeal to Athenian interests.”  
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promise is based upon the fulfillment of the moral duties to help the wronged and return services. 
Moral and political considerations are inextricable, therefore, in the formation of this alliance.   
The identity of the speakers is not recorded, but it is reasonable that they would be 
associated somehow with Isemenias and Thrasybulus. Within the (self-)deceptive claims in the 
introduction to the speech – i.e., Thebes did not support the proposal to destroy Athens in 404 
and every Theban contributed to the Athenian democrats’ victory at the Piraeus in 403 – are 
insinuations that the speakers were on intimate terms with Thrasybulus and his faction.15 The 
envoys hold in contempt the city faction (τῶν ἐν ἄστει) of Athens, those who had collaborated 
with the Spartans, saying, “you would certainly have perished, but the commons [ὁ δῆµος] here 
saved you.”16 These words reminded all of that crucial period when the two parties forged close 
ties of friendship, manifested in their support for the return of the Athenian democrats in 403 and 
which now obligated the latter to make return services.  
Thrasybulus may have even met with the envoys before they presented their case to the 
assembly.17 Xenophon, shielding his fellow Athenian from the culpability of the Thebans in 
starting the war against his Spartan friends, presents Thrasybulus only after the envoys finished 
speaking and the assembly voted. The friend of Ismenias should not, however, be seen merely 
reacting to the Theban speech; on the contrary, he was actively involved behind the scenes laying 
																																								 																				
 
15 Xen. Hell. 3.5.8-9. The demand for Athens’ destruction in 404: ibid. 2.2.19 (cf. Plut. 
Lys. 15.2). The Thebans’ refusal to march against Athens in 403: Xen. Hell. 2.4.30.  
 
16 Ibid. 3.5.9. 
 
17 Alcibiades met in advance with the Spartan envoys to Athens in 420 (Thuc. 5.44-45). 
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the groundwork for the alliance.18 During the debate in the assembly, moreover, he and his 
associates must have stressed the strength and resources of the Boeotian forces, as the orator 
Andocides said a few years later, recalling this day: “when we made an alliance with the 
Boeotians, we did this having some opinion. Was it not that it would be sufficient, having the 
power of Boeotia with us, to defend ourselves from all men [ὅτε Βοιωτοῖς τὴν συµµαχίαν 
ἐποιούµεθα, τίνα γνώµην ἔχοντες ταῦτα ἐπράττοµεν. οὐχ ὡς ἱκανὴν οὖσαν τὴν Βοιωτῶν δύναµιν 
µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν γενοµένην κοινῇ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀµύνασθαι;]?”19 With optimism such as this, 
says Xenophon, very many (πάµπολλοι) spoke in support of the alliance and everyone (πάντες) 
cast a vote in its favor. Thrasybulus announced the decision (ψήφισµα) to the Theban envoys 
along with an explanation for its acceptance. He did not respond to the ambassadors’ promises of 
a restored empire; his attention was chiefly on fulfilling the obligations of reciprocity.  
“Thrasybulus, while announcing the decree, was pointing out that, although the Piraeus was 
unwalled, they would nevertheless run the risk to return a favor to them greater than the one they 
received [in 404]. ‘For you,’ he said, ‘did not join in the campaign against us [in 403], but we will 
fight with you against them if they come against you.’”20 
 
Θρασύβουλος δὲ ἀποκρινάµενος τὸ ψήφισµα καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ἀτειχίστου τοῦ Πειραιῶς 
ὄντος ὅµως παρακινδυνεύσοιεν χάριτα αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι µείζονα ἢ ἔλαβον. ὑµεῖς µὲν γάρ, ἔφη, 
οὐ συνεστρατεύσατε ἐφ᾽ ἡµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δέ γε µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν µαχούµεθα ἐκείνοις, ἂν ἴωσιν ἐφ᾽ ὑµᾶς. 
 
Thrasybulus recognized the earlier Theban services and the Athenians’ moral duty to reciprocate. 
His final remark, which Xenophon records in direct speech, a comparison of what Athens is 
about to do (send an army to Boeotia) with what Thebes did not do in 403 (send an army to 
																																								 																				
 18 That Thrasybulus proposed the alliance in the assembly is not implausible (pace 
Cawkwell 1976b, 275; Hansen 1983, 169). 
 
19 Andoc. 3.25.  
 
20 Xen. Hell. 3.5.16.  
 
78	
	
Attica), however acerbic it may appear, harmonized with the practicalities of traditional 
reciprocity. For a return of exact equivalence risked the cancellation of future benefits, but by 
repaying a favor with a greater one, the Athenians guaranteed continued Theban services.   
The two sides came to an agreement on the operative terms of the alliance, which were 
then inscribed on stone and erected on the Acropolis. The extant treaty reads as follows: 
“Alliance of the Boeotians and Athenians for all time. 
If any one goes against the Athenians for war either by land or by sea, the Boeotians shall go in 
support with all their strength as the Athenians call on them, as far as possible; and if any one 
goes against the Boeotians for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support with 
all their strength as the Boeotians call on them, as far as possible.  
And if it is decided to add or subtract anything by the Athenians and Boeotians in common 
deliberation.” 21  
 
[]οι 
vacat  
[συµ]µαχία Βοιω[τῶν καὶ Ἀ]θηναί[ων ἐς τὸ]- 
[ν ἀεὶ] χρόνον vacat 
[ἐάν τ]ις ἴηι ἐπ [Ἀθηναίος] ἐπ[ὶ] πολέµω [ι ἢ] 
 [κατὰ] γῆν ἢ κατ[ὰ θάλαττ]αν βοηθε̑ν Βοι[ω]- 
[τὸς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει καθ]ότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ- 
[ωσιν] Ἀθηναῖ[οι κατὰ τὸ] δυνατόν· καὶ ἐ[ά]- 
[ν τις ἴ]ηι ἐπὶ [Βοιωτὸς ἐ]πὶ πολέµωι ἢ [κα]- 
[τὰ γῆν ἢ] κατὰ [θάλατταν], βοηθε̑ν Ἀθηνα[ί]- 
 [ος παντὶ σθένει καθότι] ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ω] 
 [σι Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνα]τόν. ἐάν δέ τ[ι δ]- 
 οκῆι ἢ προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖ]ν Ἀθην[αίο]- 
[ις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς κοινῆι βουλευοµένο]- 
[ις (?) - - - - -] 
 
 The treaty follows the diplomatic conventions of fourth-century Greece, combining 
political and non-political features. The first line contains only “[]οι,” the typical invocation of 
the gods (θεοί), reinforcing the primary importance which the Greeks gave to the religious 
																																								 																				
21 IG II² 14. The English translation comes from RO 6. Philoch. FGrH 328 F 148 (cf. 
Harding 2008, 142-143) also mentions a “συµµαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν.”  
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elements of political and military accords (see Chapter II).22 The next two lines contain the 
subject-heading and the eternal duration of the alliance (ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον), an indication that, at 
least in its conception, the signatories considered their collaboration to last beyond the immediate 
military objective. Next is the debut of the mutual defense clause that would become a standard 
feature in alliances of the fourth century – the Boeotians will support Athens “with all their 
strength” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) if attacked and vice versa. Finally, provision is made for 
amendment, another common article of interstate documents. In sum, the alliance was an active 
affirmation of the commitment that the new allies had to each other in the context of an 
impending war with Sparta, and a manifestation of their specific socio-cultural connections. 
 But the terms of the ratified alliance were rudimentary. It probably contained some form 
of prohibition against intervening in each other’s domestic affairs, but any other article is 
unrecoverable.23 The authorities, perhaps under pressure from the immediate crisis, overlooked 
some practical matters of alliance management. For example, they did not clarify details of 
leadership roles, which were still unsettled in the next year at the Battle of Nemea.24 They did 
not include a prohibition against making a unilateral peace with the enemy, as the Thebans 
attempted to do in 390.25 There was also no time for the customary meal of hospitality (ξένια) for 
																																								 																				
22 Pounder 1984, 243-250 shows the Near Eastern origin of θεοί in inscription headings. 
The gods in Greek treaties: Bederman 2001, 48-87; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160-167. 
  
23 In 382, after the war, an Athenian attempted to raise a revolution in Thebes, which, 
according to Lys. 26.23, “deprived us of that alliance [τῆς συµµαχίας ἡµᾶς ταύτης 
ἀπεστέρησεν]” (see note 78). 
 
24 Xen. Hell. 4.2.13. 
 
 25 Ibid. 4.5.6; Plut. Ages. 22.1; cf. Buck 1994, 55-56. 
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the envoys. The Thebans returned hastily to Boeotia, where their army defeated the invading 
Spartans. The Athenian army with Thrasybulus at the head arrived soon afterwards; although it 
played no operational part in the battle, its very presence shows commitment to the new 
alliance.26  
A2-A3 The Athenians and the Locrians and the Eretrians (395-394) 
IG II² 15-16 
In the first two years of the Corinthian War, the Athenians concluded other bilateral 
alliances with the Locrians and the Eretrians. The wording of the first treaty is nearly identical to 
the one with the Boeotians that it must have been concluded around the same time. Their 
similarity in vocabulary and their coevality makes sense since it was the Locrians, Theban allies, 
who set off the events leading to the Corinthian War.27 The Eretrian alliance came about very 
early in 394.28 Its inscription survives in two fragments. The first contains the subject-heading 
and the prescript. The second has the familiar clauses for mutual defense, indicated by κατὰ τὸ 
δυνατόν, and for future amendment. There are also features that did not appear in the two earlier 
treaties. This is the first to preserve instructions for the swearing of a general oath for the alliance 
as well as of the customary oath (τὸν νόµιµον ὅρκον), but neither oath’s contents is disclosed.29 
																																								 																				
26 Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-22; Plut. Lys. 28.3; Paus. 3.5.3-4. 
 
27 Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-4 says Opuntian Locris. Hell. Oxy. 18.2 (cf. Paus. 3.9.9) says Ozolian 
Locris.  
 
28 Because the council rather than the assembly plays a prominent role in enacting this 
alliance, Krentz 1979, 398-400 revises its date to 403. Rhodes 1972, 83-84 supposes that the 
decree is misattributed to the council and actually a “probouleumata ratified by the ecclesia.” 
Knoepfler 1980, 462-469 supports the traditional date of 394. 
 
29 A νόµιµος ὅρκος appears also in A15, A18, and A22. Low 2007, 94-95 considers 
νόµιµος ὅρκος in official records to be evidence of the impact of social norms on interstate 
relations. 
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As with the invocation of the gods, this indicates the religious significance which the ancient 
Greeks saw in their secular contracts. The treaty also includes the charge for the Athenian 
council to choose five council members and five common citizens (ἐξ ἰδιωτῶν) to travel to 
Eretria and receive the return oaths from their new allies. The alliance was not the product of one 
man or faction but incorporated participation from a cross-section of society. The ambassadors 
exchanged oaths and put the agreement into operation; accordingly, in the battles of 394 the 
Eretrians contributed forces to the allied side.30 Meanwhile, in addition to their bilateral 
alliances, the Athenians and their new allies (Boeotians, Corinthians, and Argives) established a 
common council (συνέδριον κοινὸν) at Corinth, to ensure efficient management of the alliances 
and of the war. This council dispatched ambassadors (πρέσβεις) to win over more allies at 
Euboea, Leucas, Acarnania, Ambracia, and the Chalcidice.31 As these were multilateral not 
bilateral alliances, this study will not discuss their distinctive features.  
 
Alliances in the Aegean (390-389) 
 
The momentum, however, was short-lived. The allies could not rebound from significant 
defeats at Nemea and Coronea.32 By 392, a faction in Athens, weary of the war, dispatched a 
																																								 																				
 
 30 Xen. Hell. 4.2.17, 3.15; Diod. Sic. 14.82.3. 
 
31 Ibid. 14.82.1-3. The military victories of Conon at Cos, Nisyros, Teos, Mytilene, 
Ephesus, Erythrae and Samos did not create official Athenian alliances. Ibid. 14.84.3-4 says only 
that they were previously allies (σύµµαχοι) of Sparta but changed sides (µετέβαλον).  
 
32 Nemea: Xen. Hell. 4.2.9-23; Dem. 20.52-53; Diod. Sic. 14.82.10-83.2. Coronea: Xen. 
Hell. 4.3.15-21; Ages. 2.6-16; Diod. Sic. 14.84.1-2; Nep. Ages. 4.5; Plut. Ages. 18-19. 
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peace embassy to Sparta, but that effort failed.33 The war continued, as did the practice of 
making alliances, this time in the Aegean. In 391, the Spartans dispatched their navy to help the 
oligarchs on Rhodes seize political control away from the democrats and then set up their own 
base on the island from where they could badger Athenian ships.34 In response, the Athenians 
ordered the construction of forty ships (the largest Athenian fleet thus far in the fourth century) 
for an expedition to Rhodes. The objectives were clear, consisting of military and moral 
objectives: defeat the Spartan enemy and help the Rhodian democrats, friends of the Athenians.  
While the new fleet was under construction, it became apparent that the expedition and 
the continuation of the war would be costly. In a speech delivered c. 388, the orator Lysias 
implies that when Thrasybulus, who, among all Athenians at the time, had the most experience in 
naval command and in raising revenue, campaigned for command of this expedition, he 
promised that he would secure funds to support the fleet and also enrich the home treasury.35 
These financial concerns explain why as soon as the fleet set sail he redirected it to the north 
																																								 																				
33 General discussions of the Peace: Ryder 1965, 27-33; Hamilton 1979, 233-259; 
Roberts 1982, 88-93; Strauss 1987, 138-143. Keen 1995, 1-10 discusses the proposed dates (392 
or 387) for the Peace mentioned in Philoch. FGrH 328 F149a. Seager 1967, 107-108 (cf. Buck 
1998, 111) infers Thrasybulus’ opposition to the Peace from an Aristophanic (Eccl. 356-364) 
comparison of a speech from a certain Thrasybulus to a wild pear that causes constipation; i.e., 
he blocked the Peace.   
 
 34 Lys. 19.21. Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 comments on the irony of a Spartan capture of ten 
Athenian ships on their way to the Cypriote King Evagoras, who had recently revolted from the 
Persian King: “Both were doing these things contrary to themselves: for the Athenians, 
professing to be a friend [φίλῳ] to the King, were sending a force [συµµαχίαν] to Evagoras who 
was making war against the King. But Teleutias, although the Spartans were at war with the 
King, was destroying those sailing to make war against him.”  
 
35 Lys. 28.4. There were feeble attempts to raise money in 392 with property or sales 
taxes at low rates, the πεντακοσιοστή (1/500) and τεσσαρακοστή (1/40) (Aristoph. Eccl. 823-
825, 1006-1007).  
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Aegean.36 Some have interpreted this and Thrasybulus’ subsequent actions as a product of the 
Athenian impulse towards imperialism.37 Xenophon, however, says that in the meantime the 
Rhodian democrats had returned to power and there was nothing more to achieve on the island.38 
But, considering the monthly expense of keeping the ships at sea reaching forty talents and the 
unlikelihood of receiving financial support from home, Thrasybulus needed to find a way to 
quickly raise revenue. His solution was to combine money collection with making (or restoring) 
alliances, a strategy he had employed in the north Aegean in the previous century.  
Diodorus, perhaps confusing activities at the end of the campaign for the beginning, says 
the fleet sailed first to Ionia, “taking money from the allies [χρήµατα λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν 
συµµάχων],” but he does not identify precisely who these allies were. Xenophon, making no 
mention of Ionian allies, says that the Athenians went straight to the Hellespont, where “there 
was no opposition present [οὐδενὸς ἀντιπάλου παρόντος].”39 In fact, there were Spartans in the 
																																								 																				
 
36 Proposed dates for the start of the expedition are 391 (Cawkwell 1976b, 271-275; 
Strauss 1984, 45-47; Howan 2005, 19-20, 29-32), 390 (Seager 1967, 108-110; Funke 1980, 96; 
Buck 1998, 112), or 389 (Hamilton 1979, 294-296; Stylianou 1988, 470-471). 
 
37 Seager 1967, 115: Thrasybulus was “the instrument of the assembly’s imperial design.” 
Cawkwell 1976b, 270: he was “a full-blooded restorer of the fifth-century empire.” Hamilton 
1979, 294: “his real motive was to reconstruct a new maritime empire for Athens.” Cartledge 
1987, 367: “in speaking the language of control . . . he had come suspiciously close to 
commencing the recreation of Athens’ fifth-century Aegean empire.” Buck 1998, 116: he made 
“something close to the old empire.” Harding 2015: 29-30: the Athenians had “the mistaken 
belief” that involved “the recovery of their fifth-century empire.” 
 
38 Xen. Hell. 4.8.25.  
 
39 Ibid. 4.8.26; Diod. Sic. 14.94.2. The Loeb edition translates οὐδενὸς ἀντιπάλου 
παρόντος as “there was no adversary there,” but this does not correspond with the presence of 
Dercylidas at the straits. 
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area – at Lesbos, Thasos and at the straits, at least – but they did not challenge the Athenian 
ships.40 Modern historians make the sensible, prima facie, case that Thrasybulus’ motive in 
sailing here was the security of the Black Sea grain route. With the memory of the fatal 
consequences from the Spartans’ occupation of the Hellespont in 404, it seems impossible that 
such an objective was not in his mind; however, there is no indication in the sources that he 
recognized any threat to the Athenians’ access to the grain route.41 Nor did he attempt to drive 
out the Spartan Dercylidas from Abydus on the Asiatic side of the straights. Instead, the sources 
indicate that the principal advocate of Athenian alliances on mainland Greece had his eyes on 
expanding the alliance network into the north Aegean. 
A4-A5 The Athenians and Seuthes and Amadocus (390) 
IG II2 21-22; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. Sic. 14.94.2 
Xenophon says Thrasybulus went to Thrace because “he thought he might accomplish 
something good for the city [ἐνόµισε καταπρᾶξαι ἄν τι τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν].”42 A rivalry had 
erupted between two Odrysian (Thracian) leaders, Amadocus I and Seuthes II, which had the 
potential of disrupting the security of the Greeks in the region as well as Athenian prospects 
there.43 Thrasybulus was well qualified to effect a rapprochement and “to accomplish something 
																																								 																				
40 Lesbos: Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-29; Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. Thasos: Dem. 20.59. The straits: Xen. 
Hell. 4.8.3-6.  
 
41 Hamilton 1979, 294-295; Burke 1990, 5-7; Sears 2013, 99-100; Sorg 2015, 52. 
Athenian enemies often blockaded the Hellespont: in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.1-10), 388 (ibid. 
5.1.28), 362 ([Dem.] 50.4-6), and 340 (Dem. 18.87, 241; Philoch. FGrH 328 F161-162; 
Theopomp. FGrH 115 F292). Missiou 1992, 76-78 shows that the Athenian oligarchs had little 
interest in the grain route.  
 
42 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26. 
 
43 Archibald 1998, 122-124. 
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good” for Athens. There is a strong possibility that his family had personal connections with elite 
Thracians from the early fifth century, which, if true, he could have exploited when he 
campaigned and engaged in money collection (ἀργυρολόγος) around Thrace between 410 and 
407.44 Thracians, too, may have been one of the foreign groups who fought alongside him at the 
Piraeus in 403.45 In other words, his social contacts with Thracians were as extensive as those 
with the Thebans.  
Therefore, notwithstanding the presence of enemy Spartans, Thrasybulus sailed to the 
Thracian coast to arbitrate first with Seuthes and then with Amadocus. Xenophon says that he 
successfully negotiated a reconciliation between the two rivals and made them both “friends and 
allies [φίλοι καὶ σύµµαχοι]” of Athens.46 The inscription recording the alliance with Seuthes 
(A4) is badly preserved, but it is possible to make out the instructions for the erection of the 
stele; for the swearing of the oath in Athens by the general, hipparch, taxiarch, and phylarch; and 
the customary invitation to Seuthes’ ambassadors for a meal in the Prytaneion. Some form of 
σύµµαχος appears three times in the inscription but without context. Whatever the arrangements 
were, Seuthes was satisfied – Lysias voices the rumor that he offered Thrasybulus his daughter in 
																																								 																				
44 Sears 2013, 104-105 (contra APF 7310) discusses two red-figure vases (ARV2 1595-
1596) with images of Thracians (or of Greeks in Thracian clothing) and the inscription Lykos 
kalos for Thrasybulus’ father or close relative. Thracian campaigns from 410 to 407: Andrewes 
1953, 2-9; Buck 1998, 39-41; Sears 2013, 93-96; Asmonti 2015, 49-55. Athenian-Thracian 
relations from the sixth century: Isaac 1986, 159-197; Archibald 1998, 112-125; Sears 2013; 
2015, 308-320. Alleged kinship between Athens and Thrace: Patterson 2010, 53-59; Fragoulaki 
2013, 262-270. 
 
45 Middleton 1982, 298-303; Sears 2013, 263-273; Asmonti 2015, 59. Thracians and their 
cult of Bendis at the Piraeus: IG I3 143; IG II2 1283; cf. Janouchová 2013, 95-106. Planeaux 
2000, 165-192 (cf. Sears 2013, 151-154) dates the introduction of Bendis to Attica to the first 
years of the Peloponnesian War.  
 
46 Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; cf. Diod. Sic. 14.94.2. 
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marriage – as was Amadocus.47 The two-sided inscription for the alliance with the latter (A5) is 
also fragmentary, only mentioning the Odrysian’s name (twice) on one side; on the other side 
another Thracian is honored as πρόξενος καὶ εὐεργέτης of the Athenians and there are 
instructions for the display of the stele on the Acropolis. Unfortunately, these fragments do not 
disclose the exact terms of the alliances and it is impossible to reconstruct them from any other 
sources. There may have been little more than what is mentioned above along with a 
reaffirmation of earlier Athenian-Thracian alliances.48 Thrasybulus negotiated the terms of these 
alliances quickly: there was no time for the usual procedural interchange between states. Indeed, 
in all of the alliances in this campaign he worked on his own authority. Later, his subordinate 
Chabrias, who also participated in the negotiations in Thrace, brought the provisional agreements 
back to the Athenian assembly, which then ratified them.49  
A6 The Athenians and the Thasians (390) 
IG II² 24; Dem. 20.59 
Thrasybulus chose deliberately to deal first with the situation in Thrace because the 
rapprochement of the rivals and gaining alliances with them could influence others in the region 
																																								 																				
 
47 Lys. 28.5; Archibald 1998, 124. Seuthes also offered Xenophon his daughter in 
marriage in 399 (Xen. An. 7.2.38). 
 
 48 The Athenians made an alliance with Sitalces in 431 (Thuc. 2.29). Archibald 1998, 
120-122 (despite Thuc. 2.101) makes a case for good relations between Athens and Seuthes I (r. 
424-c. 410). 
 
49 Archibald 1998, 124–125. Pritchett 1974, 50-52 thinks the Athenian authorities 
“exercised surveillance over all parts of the expedition,” but the rapidity with which the alliances 
were concluded precludes such oversight. Chabrias’ name shows up three times (lines 2, 21, and 
22) in the inscription for Seuthes. 
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to collaborate with Athens. So from Thrace he sailed to Thasos, another place where he engaged 
in money collection (ἀργυρολογία) during the Peloponnesian War. In 407, after its brief 
defection to the Spartans, he recovered the island for Athens and restored democracy.50 Although 
control of the island changed hands again later, the Athenians maintained friendly relations with 
the islanders in the first decades of the fourth century; there are at least a half-dozen honorific 
decrees for individual Thasians.51 Considering the commercial significance of its natural 
resources and strategic location, the interest in Thasos is not hard to recognize.52 When the 
Athenian fleet reached the island in 390, according to Demosthenes, a certain Ecphantus and his 
followers rose up, expelled the Spartan garrison, and welcomed Thrasybulus.53 The Athenian 
decree most likely associated with the alliance at this time is IG II² 24, a composite inscription of 
four fragments. Fragments B and C describe various awards for individual Thasians, including 
dinner in the Prytaneion, and contain the usual instructions for the erection of the stele.  
Fragment A, although badly preserved, is more important for an understanding of the 
alliance conditions.  
[Ἀρχίππωι καὶ Ἱππάρχωι τοῖς Ἀρχίπ]που Θασίοις.  
[]γ καὶ χ[— — — — — — — — — — — — —]  
[]ας κον ἱκανὰ ε[— — — — — — — — — — —]  
[Θ]ασίοις εἰκοστὴγ κ[— — — — — — — — — —]  
είων εἰκοστὴν ὑποτ[ελ ἐµ] 
πορίων εἰκοστὴν τω[— — — — — — — — — — —]  
																																								 																				
 50 Thasian campaigns in 410 and 409: Thuc. 8.64; Xen. Hell. 1.1.12; Diod. Sic. 13.49.1-3, 
64.3. 407 campaign: Xen. Hell. 1.4.9-10; Diod. Sic. 13.72.1. IG XII, 8 262 (cf. Grandjean and 
Salviat 1988, 249-278; Robinson 2011, 180-181) recounts the restoration of Thasian democracy.  
 
 51 IG II² 6, 17, 24, 25, 33 (cf. Osborne 1981 43-46; 1982 45-57).  
 
52 Archibald 2013, 258-268.  
 
 53 Dem. 20.59. 
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ν ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν — — — — — —  — —] 
[]ιετ[— — — — — — — — — — —] 
[]υλι[— — — — — — — — — — — —] 
[π]ερ[ὶ δὲ] τῶν ἄλλων [ὧν λέγουσιν Θάσιοι τὴν βο]- 
λὴ[ν ἑλ]έ[σ]θαι πέν[τε ἄνδρας οἵτινες µετὰ τῆς] 
πρ[εσ]βέ[ας τῶν Θασίων ] 
ς ἀ[π]δείξοσιν [ τὰς δὲ δί]- 
[κ]ας δο͂ναι κ[α]ὶ δ[έξασθαι — — — — — — —] 
[]α̣[]ι̣επιε[— — — — — — — — — — —] 
 
This fragment refers back to Thrasybulus’ expedition on line 7 (ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν]). It also 
mentions the selection by the council of five ambassadors to Thasos, presumably to swear to 
oaths and confirm the alliance terms. But what is noteworthy are the three references on lines 
four to six to an εἰκοστή (a five percent tax) on goods passing through the island. In 413, as a 
response to a financial crisis, the Athenians had replaced the traditional tribute (φόρος) with an 
εἰκοστή as a means for the allies to meet the financial obligations of their alliances. Thucydides, 
judging it an irrational and hasty measure of the democracy, bleakly assesses the effectiveness of 
the new tax.54 Lisa Kallet, however, underscoring the motivations and expectations of the time, 
views it as a subtle yet significant change in the fundamental nature of the Athenian Empire. The 
old φόρος arrangement drew the Athenians into the internal affairs of the allies, but the εἰκοστή 
reduced their supervision to the collection of funds when necessary. This, Kallet says, was 
“nothing short of a radical reorientation of the arche. . . . The Athenians’ self-interest in their 
empire in the course of the Peloponnesian War has come to have to do with money above all – 
not power over allies per se.” Likewise, Thomas Figueira labels the change as “an evolution of 
hegemonic policy toward a more ideological orientation.”55 The change in Athens’ relationship 
																																								 																				
54 Thuc. 7.28.4. Kallet 2001, 197-226 and Figueira 2005, 83-133 critique previous 
scholarship on the tax.  
 
55 Kallet 2001, 200; Figueira 2005, 120-121; cf. Kellogg 2004/2005, 65-66. 
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to the allies, therefore, was momentous and must have impressed Thrasybulus, who learned the 
fine points of collecting the εἰκοστή when he conducted operations around Thrace and Thasos 
between 410 and 407.56  
When he returned in 390, it was natural for him to revive a familiar method of revenue 
collection. Rather than the φόρος, the symbol of the fifth-century empire, he imposed the 
εἰκοστή, suggesting that this was an economic more than a political measure. Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the literary or epigraphic record of any irritation from the Thasians because of the 
economic burdens of their alliance with Athens. Had it been recognized that Thrasybulus was re-
establishing the Athenian Empire at their expense, there would likely be some indication of 
frustration.57 In any case, as in the Thracian alliances, Thrasybulus arranged the terms on his own 
authority and then sent the provisional treaty to Athens for ratification and public display.58   
Securing Thasos as an ally encouraged others in the region to follow suit. Demosthenes 
says that the islanders, “offering to be a friend to your country [i.e., Athens], were the reason you 
made allies around Thrace [καὶ παρασχόντες φίλην ὑµῖν τὴν αὑτῶν πατρίδα αἴτιοι τοῦ γενέσθαι 
σύµµαχον τὸν περὶ Θρᾴκην τόπον ὑµῖν ἐγένοντο].”59 His next stops were at Samothrace and 
																																								 																				
 
56 The tax’s continuation beyond 413: Kallet 2001, 224-226; Figueira 2005, 95-110. 
 
57 A number of scholars (Griffith 1978, 130-132; Strauss 1984, 47; Figueira 2005, 130) 
see the allies agreeing to bear the taxes as part of the common war effort. 
 
58 Harding 25 discusses the date of the inscription. 
 
59 Dem. 20.59. It is unclear whether this passage is referring to the renewal of relations in 
407 or 391. It could apply to both. A later Athenian honorific decree (IG II² 33), dated to 
sometime in the 380s or 370s (Osborne 1982, 48-57), grants tax exemptions (ἀτέλεια) to 
Ecphantus and his party, presumably the same ones mentioned by Demosthenes (as suggested by 
Harris 2008, 39 n. 85).  
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Tenedos, and then, even though the Spartan Dercylidas was stationed at Sestus and Abydus, he 
sailed unopposed through the straits and on to Byzantium, where he restored democracy and 
reinstated a ten percent tax (δεκάτη) on ships sailing into and out of the Black Sea.60 The δεκάτη 
was another tax from the fifth century: in 410 Alcibiades, Thrasybulus’ associate at the time, set 
up a custom house (δεκατευτήριον) at nearby Chrysopolis to collect this tax.61 Thrasybulus 
followed this example in 390, but he farmed out its collection (ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην). As at 
Thasos, there is no evidence of dissatisfaction with the arrangements; in fact, Xenophon says the 
common people (ὁ δῆµος), at least, were happy to see so many Athenians in their city.62 Later in 
the century, Demosthenes claims that these achievements made the Athenians “masters of the 
Hellespont [κυρίους . . . τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου].”63 Although there is no mention of an official 
alliance at this time, the revenue collection arrangements at Byzantium are significant to this 
study because they were consistent with the overall objectives of this second phase of alliance-
making. And there were later alliances – an official one in the late 380s (A10) and a renewal as 
																																								 																				
60 Samothrace and Tenedos: Xen. Hell. 5.1.7. In 394, Dercylidas had held back the 
attacks of Conon’s forty ships (ibid. 4.8.4-6). Byzantium: Dem. 20.60; cf. Robinson 2011, 146-
149. 
 
61 IG I2 91; IG I3 108; Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Polyb. 4.44.3; cf. Rubel 2001, 39-51. Figueira 
2005, 111-117 sees the legitimacy of Thrasybulus’ tax extending from Alcibiades’ precedent. 
Alcibiades carried on additional money collection (ἀργυρολόγος) ventures in 411 at 
Halicarnassus and Cos (Thuc. 8.108.2; Diod. Sic. 13.42.2-3); in 410 at Cyzicus and Selymbria 
(Xen. Hell. 1.1.20-21); and in 408 at Selymbria, Chalcedon, and elsewhere in the Hellespont 
(ibid. 1.3.3, 8; Diod. Sic. 13.66.3-4; Plut. Alc. 30.1).  
 
62 Xen. Hell. 4.8.27.  
 
63 Dem. 20.60. Demosthenes also says that the δεκάτη supplied Athens with enough 
money to force a peace on the Spartans. Although he has completely reversed the conditions 
under which peace was made, he is expressing the expectations of the time that Thrasybulus 
would successfully establish a means of revenue for the polis.  
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part of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377 – which can be seen as distant results of 
Thrasybulus’ work.64 In 390, he also made the Chalcedonians friends (φιλοῖ) of Athens before 
sailing back out to the Aegean.65 
A7 The Athenians and the Mytileneans (389) 
Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; Diod. Sic. 14.94.3-4 
After encountering a severe storm, less than half of the fleet arrived on the island of 
Lesbos. It landed at Mytilene, the only Lesbian city not under Spartan control. Diodorus claims 
that the Mytileneans became allies (σύµµαχοι) of Thrasybulus. Xenophon seems to support this. 
He says that the Mytileneans offered their strongest fighters (ἐρρωµενεστάτους) for the 
impending battle against the Spartans, and Thrasybulus reciprocated this service with promises 
commonly associated with interstate coalitions: to set up the Mytileneans as the leaders 
(προστάται) of the island, to return the democratic exiles to their various home states on the 
island, and to “add Lesbos as a friend to the city (of Athens) [ὡς φίλην Λέσβον προσποιήσαντες 
τῇ πόλει].”66 With the support of the new Mytilenean allies, the Athenians defeated the Spartans 
at Methymna, after which Thrasybulus brought over more of the cities (τὰς µὲν προσηγάγετο 
τῶν πόλεων) and levied contributions (ἀργυρολόγος) in order to pay for the campaign. Those 
who refused he plundered (λεηλατῶν χρήµατα), an indication of continuing financial need.67 
Diodorus says that after losing twenty-three ships in the earlier storm and enduring other losses 
																																								 																				
64 IG II2 43, line 83; Diod. Sic. 15.28.3. 
 
65 Xen. Hell. 4.8.28.  
 
 66 Ibid.; Diod. Sic. 14.94.3-4. 
 
 67 Xen. Hell. 4.8.30.  
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at Methymna, the Athenians received reinforcements from Chian allies (παρά Χίων συµµάχων), 
which, if true, indicates that Thrasybulus also made an alliance with Chios at this time.68 
Although there are no official alliances recorded with any other Lesbian cities besides Mytilene, 
Diodorus mentions Methymna, along with Chios, Byzantium, and Mytilene (and Rhodes), as 
founding members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.69 This is an outcome of the alliance 
infrastructure set up by Thrasybulus. 
No more alliances materialized after he left Lesbos. Xenophon says that from now on he 
was eager to sail to the original target, Rhodes. But this was misinformation to throw off his 
enemies at home, those who originally voted for the Rhodian expedition and had recently called 
for an audit (εὔθυναι) of the expedition.70 Ignoring calls for his returrn, Thrasybulus led the fleet 
southwards perhaps to Chios; to Clazomenae, where he imposed another five-percent tax 
(εἰκοστή); to Halicarnassus, where the Athenians treated the inhabitants unjustly (ἠδικηµένοι); 
and then to Aspendus, a curious detour of about 150 nautical miles past Rhodes.71 At this last 
stop the army engaged in the same money collecting and plundering activities as before, but to 
an even greater degree of license. One can trace an escalation in coercion from the commercial 
																																								 																				
68 Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. Lys. 28.4 notes the poor condition of the Aegean fleet. If Diod. Sic. 
14.94.2 is correct that Thrasybulus sailed to Ionia before Thrace (see note 39), he could have 
renewed the Chian alliance then. Cimon could have done so after the Battle of Cnidus (ibid. 
14.84.3). 
 
69 Ibid. 15.28.2-3. 
 
70 Xen. Hell. 4.8.30. Audit: Hansen n. 73; Roberts 1982, 96-102. Lys. 28.5 claims that 
Ergocles, Thrasybulus’ subordinate, advised him to occupy Byzantium, keep the ships, and 
marry Seuthes' daughter, but Todd 2010, 286-288 discounts these as false accusations.  
 
71 Clazomenae: IG II2 28, lines 7-8 (= RO 18). Hallicarnassus: Lys. 28.17. Aspendus: 
Xen. Hell. 4.8.30; Diod. Sic. 14.99.4-5; Nep. Thras. 4.4.  
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taxes at Thasos and Byzantium early in the expedition, to money collection and plundering on 
Lesbos in the middle, and finally to unjust and excessive pillaging at Halicarnassus and 
Aspendus. But this was due to the increase in financial pressures, not imperial ambitions. Still, in 
response, the angry Aspendians attacked the Athenians and murdered Thrasybulus in his tent.72  
Thrasybulus left behind alliances from Boeotia to Thrace to Asia Minor. In spite of the 
notoriety of his final days, his successes overall brought him great popularity. Xenophon notes 
on more than one occasion the approval in Athens (and among the new allies) for what he had 
achieved in the Aegean. His enemies, who had tried to stop the expedition and afterwards 
executed his subordinate Ergocles, were not troubled by his alliances and wished to see them 
maintained. The Athenians, Xenophon says, “feared that the things Thrasybulus arranged for 
them in the Hellesponst would be wasted [δεδιότες µὴ φθαρείη σφίσιν ἃ κατεσκεύασεν ἐν τῷ 
Ἑλλησπόντῳ Θρασύβουλος],” so they dispatched to the region first Agyrrhius, a financial 
authority with experience in tax collection, and then Iphicrates, another general familiar with 
revenue collection.73 The Athenians even expanded their alliances to include the king of Egypt.74 
The continuation of Thrasybulus’ policies caught the attention of the Spartans, who finally 
																																								 																				
 
72 Paus. 1.29.3 says his grave was the first (πρῶτος τάφος) in the Kerameikos, next to 
those of Pericles and Phormio. Wolpert 2002, 89 sees his burial spot as a stamp of approval for 
his restoration of democracy in 403, but it can also be a legitimization of his alliance activities.  
 
73 Xen. Hell. 4.8.31, 34. Agyrrhius introduced pay for assembly attendance (Arist. Ath. 
Pol. 41.3), supervised the collection of the two percent import tax (πεντηκοστή) at the Piraeus 
(Andoc. 1.133-134), and was an associate of the banker Pasion (Isoc. 17.31). Xen. Hell. 4.8.35 
says Iphicrates carried on the money collection practices (ἀργυρολογία) “as was his custom 
[ὥσπερ εἰώθει].”  
 
74 Arist. Pl. 178; cf. Carrez-Maratray 2005, 50-53; Perdu 2010, 153-154. 
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capitalized on their position in the Hellespont to block Athenian access to the Black Sea grain 
route. In 387, Athens, faced with starvation, was forced to sue for peace.  
 
Post-war Athens and Alliances (386-385) 
 
Many scholars, those who consider interstate alliances to be instruments of Athenian 
domination and thus violations of autonomy, think that the King’s Peace called for the 
dissolution of alliances.75 Xenophon quotes from the Peace the principles upon which interstate 
relations would henceforth be conducted, but there is no mention of alliances:  
“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should be his, and among the islands, 
Clazomenae and Cyprus, but that the other Greek cities, both small and great, be left autonomous, 
except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these are, as of old, Athenian.”76  
 
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νοµίζει δίκαιον τὰς µὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων 
Κλαζοµενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ µικρὰς καὶ µεγάλας αὐτονόµους 
ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήµνου καὶ Ἴµβρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. 
 
The phantom prohibition against alliances does not harmonize with the evidence presented thus 
far; i.e., alliances were reflections of social, religious, and economic interactions, not of political 
oppression.77 There is positive evidence, moreover, that the alliances continued beyond the 
signing of the Peace. As for the one with the Boeotians, even though the Peace called for the 
																																								 																				
 
75 Ryder 1965, 36; Hamilton 1979, 324; Strauss 1987, 160; Badian 1995, 86; Dmitriev 
2011, 28-31; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 204. 
 
76 Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. Diod. Sic. 14.110.3 gives a truncated version. Isoc. 4.180 and 12.207 
mention the display of the Peace on stelai in Greek temples. Bearzot 2014, 92-93 discusses 
Xenophon’s use of official documents, such as the Peace, in the Hellenica.  
 
77 The Peace expressly permitted Athens to retain control of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros 
(Xen. Hell. 5.1.35; cf. Ampolo 2010, 39-66).  
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dissolution of the Boeotian League and thus should have spelled the end of the alliance with the 
Athenians, Lysias suggests that it lingered on for a few more years, at least in the minds of the 
two parties.78 There are also hints that the taxes instituted in the Aegean continued after the war, 
indicating that they neither contravened autonomy nor were seen as symbols of Athenian 
imperial ambitions.79 That there was no incompatibility between alliances and autonomy is 
furthered demonstrated in the next Athenian alliances which are unambiguously dedicated to the 
principles of the Peace.   
 Nevertheless, there is a noticeable absence of new alliances for the next two years. In 
fact, the Athenians rejected opportunities to ally with the Thracian king Hebryzelmis in 386 and 
with the Mantineans in 385. If this apparent hesitance was not because alliance-making was by 
definition a violation of the Peace, then why did the Athenians put a full stop to their alliance 
practices? The following account argues that the absence of new alliances at this time was the 
same for the creation of alliances at other times. It was determined by the depth of historical ties 
between the parties. Going forward the Athenians were not adverse to new alliances, as long as 
they were based on shared socio-cultural elements and harmonized with the principles of the 
Peace.  
																																								 																				
 
78 Xen. Hell. 5.1.36 records the dissolution of the Boeotian League. Lys. 26.23 claims 
that a conspiracy to raise a revolution in Thebes in 382 by Thrasybulus of Collytus (not 
Thrasybulus of Steiria) “deprived us of that alliance.” Buckler 1980a, 179-185 dismisses the 
alleged Theban-Spartan alliance of 386 (Isoc. 14.27; Plut. Pel. 4.4-5.1; Paus. 9.13.1). 
 
79 Kellogg 2004/2005, 66-68 suggests the Athenian ships sailing around the Thracian 
coast sometime after the Peace (IG II2 31, lines 19-21) were tax-collecting ships. Figueira 2005, 
121-123 discusses the relationship of εἰκοστή to autonomy. Isoc. 14.28 says that after the end of 
the war, at least Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium remained with (συµπαρέµειναν) Athens.  
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In 386, the Athenians received an embassy from King Hebryzelmis, the Odrysian 
successor to Amadocus, concerning the presence of Athenian ships around Thrace.80 Seuthes, 
Amadocus’ rival in the 390s, had renewed his ambitions on central Thrace, and had on his side 
the Athenian Iphicrates, an experienced commander of light-armed soldiers, who had not 
returned home after the Corinthian War.81 When Hebryzelmis saw the Athenian ships, he 
worried they were also on the enemy’s side and immediately dispatched an embassy to the 
Athenians to question their intentions. Since the ships were benign, the two sides came to a quick 
agreement.82 The Athenian assembly passed an honorific inscription (IG II2 31) for the king, but 
there is no mention in it of an alliance. Some suppose that, unlike the earlier alliances with 
Amadocus and Seuthes, an alliance at this time might give the impression that the Athenians 
were transgressing the autonomy clause of the Peace, and thus prompt reprisals from the 
Spartans.83 This is guesswork based on the notion that alliances are only instruments of 
																																								 																				
 
80 IG II2 31 (= Tod 117 = Harding 29).  
 
81 Nep. Iph. 2.1. Archibald 1998, 218-219 reviews the evidence for the conflict between 
Hebryzelmis and Seuthes. Sears 2013, 124-126 focuses on Iphicrates’ part in the Thracian 
conflict. Iphicrates married Seuthes’ granddaughter c. 386 (Isoc. 15.129; Nep. Iph. 3.5; Ath. 
4.131a; cf. APF 249-250). Kellogg 2004-2005, 65 n. 14, 70-71 discounts a rivalry between 
Seuthes and Hebryzelmis.   
 
82 Since Xen. Hell. 5.1.35 says that the Peace called for the demobilization of military 
ships, modern scholars propose that the ships were either the grain escort (Sinclair 1978, 47-49; 
Rutishauser 2012, 155 n. 103) or ships collecting the five percent tax, a continuation of 
Thrasybulus’ policies (Kellogg 2004-2005, 58-71). Archibald 1998, 219 seems to suggest that 
the ships indicate military cooperation. Clark 1990, 56-65 (pace Cawkwell 1973, 52-54; 
reaffirmed in 2005, 193-194) calculates that Athens built four or five triremes a year in the 380s.   
 
83 Sinclair 1978, 47-49; Hagemajer Allen 2002, 232.  
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domination. There is another explanation, one that is rooted in the documentary evidence. Lines 
5 to 9 of the inscription record the praise for Hebryzelmis, “a good man [ἁνὴρ ἀγαθὸς]” towards 
the Athenians, and the pledge that “he himself is to have all the things which his ancestors had 
[ε͂̓ναι αὐτῶι ἅπερ τοῖς π[ρογό]νοι[ς] ἅπα[ν]τ[α]].” This should include an alliance since at least 
two of Hebryzelmis’ immediate ancestors had one with the Athenians.84 If it is true that the new 
Thracian king inherited an alliance, then there is no reason to suppose that the absence of one 
indicates that the Athenians were reluctant to violate the Peace. Instead, it indicates an inherent 
continuity in Athenian relations with the Odrysian rulers.  
In the next year, the Athenians rejected an alliance proposal from the Mantineans, but 
under different circumstances. Diodorus records that after the Spartans attacked and dioecized 
(dispersed into five villages) Mantinea, the victims asked the Athenians to aid them (ἑαυτοῖς 
βοηθῆσαι), but the Athenians refused “preferring not to transgress the common agreement [i.e., 
the King’s Peace] [οὐ προαιρουµένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραβαίνειν τὰς κοινὰς συνθήκας].”85 
Does this not prove that alliances were prohibited, and that the Athenians, humbled in defeat and 
cowering in fear of the Spartans, respected that restriction?86 This does nothing of the sort. It 
often goes unnoticed that the Mantineans never even made an appeal for a formal alliance, to 
																																								 																				
84 Sitalces in 431: Thuc. 2.29. Amadocus in 390 (A5). Kallet-Marx 1985, 148 supports 
this interpretation of IG II2 31. Athenian alliances with monarchs in the fourth century often 
included their descendants: Amyntas of Macedon and his son Alexander in the 370s (IG II2 102), 
Dionysius I of Syracuse and his ἔκγονοι in 368 (A15), and Philip and his ἔκγονοι in 346 (Dem. 
19.56). 
 
85 Diod. Sic. 15.5.5.  
 
86 As stated in various ways in Seager 1974, 40; Sinclair 1978, 38; Stylianou 1998, 175; 
Buckler 2003, 190-194. 
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which the Athenians could refuse; they only made an isolated request for military support. Nor 
did they have a substantial history of socio-cultural interactions with the Athenians that would 
create a sense of moral obligation to intercede.87 No doubt the attack on Mantinea was not 
popular in Athens, but the diplomatic restraint need not be interpreted as evidence of a negation 
of interstate alliances under the Peace.88 In fact, the Athenians were not entirely passive in this 
matter. Although they refused to send an army, since they prided themselves on their reputation 
for helping the weak and the wronged, they granted asylum to sixty democratic leaders from 
Mantinea.89 Apparently unconcerned about Spartan reprisals, the Athenians went beyond what 
was strictly necessary in this treatment of the exiles. This, however, initiated contacts and 
relationships from which would emanate alliances between the Athenians and the Mantineans in 
366 (A16) and in 362 (A17). 
The two different responses to Hebryzelmis and the Mantineans, therefore, were made 
according to the extent of their existing connections with the Athenians. Far from refusing an 
alliance with the Odrysian king, the Athenians reaffirmed the one which his ancestors had. And 
the supposed failure to ally with the Mantineans proves nothing because there was not even a 
request for an alliance. Yet, rather than remain aloof, the Athenians actually exceeded what was 
																																								 																				
 
87 Alcibiades’ arrangement of an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea in 420 (IG I2 
83; Thuc. 5.43-50) is hardly evidence for strong ties between Athens and Mantinea. 
 
88 Nor is fear of Sparta a compelling argument, as Kallet-Marx 1985, 148 says, “that 
Athens did not seize the occasion of Mantinea’s appeal for aid against Sparta in 385 is hardly 
evidence of her acceptance of Spartan hegemony.” 
 
89 IG II2 33, lines 7-8. Dem. 20.54-55 mentions awards also for pro-Athenian Corinthian 
exiles in 386. 
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legally required of them by offering refuge to the anti-Spartan democrats. In these cases the 
guidelines for accepting or rejecting an alliance consisted of social and ideological concerns over 
geopolitics. And this is consistent with the alliance with Chios, the first one since the end of the 
Corinthian War. 
 
From Chios to the Confederacy (384-378) 
 
A8 The Athenians and the Chians (384) 
IG II2 34 
Even if there was some noticeable reticence among the Athenians for making new 
alliances, it was overcome in late summer of 384, when they agreed to ally with the Chians. The 
reconstructed inscription is, although a composite of five fragments (a – e), the fullest one yet 
seen for the fourth century. A viewer’s eyes would likely be drawn first to the relief in the center 
of the top fragment (e), which depicts the body of an indiscernible female figure clothed in a 
chiton and himation.90 This fragment also contains the heading and prescript (lines 1-4) which 
provide a secure date of 384 (the archonship of Dieitrephes) for the alliance. After a lacuna (5-6) 
which will be discussed later, the remaining fragments (a-e) open with the dominant theme of the 
alliance – the King’s Peace (εἰρήνη):  
. . . the common discussion which took place among the Greeks, have remembered to preserve, 
like the Athenians, the peace and the friendship and the oaths and the existing agreement, which 
were sworn by the King and the Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks, and have come 
offering good things to the people of Athens and to all of Greece and to the King; be it decreed by 
the people:  
Praise the people of Chios and the envoys who have come; and there shall remain in force the 
peace and the oaths and the agreement now existing; and make the Chians allies on terms of 
																																								 																				
90 Lawton 1995, 91-92 and Dušanić 2000a, 26 n. 27 are hesitant to attribute this female 
figure to Athena.  
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freedom and autonomy, not contravening any of the things written on the stelai about the peace, 
nor being persuaded if anyone else transgresses, as far as possible.91 
  
τῶν κο]- 
ινῶν λόγων [τῶν γεγενηµένων τοῖς Ἕλλ]- 
ησιν µέµνην[ται διαφυλάξεν καθάπερ] 
Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ε[ἰρήνην καὶ τὴν φιλίαν] 
[κ]αὶ τὸς ὅρκ[ο]ς κα[ὶ τὰς οὔσας συνθῆκας], 
[ἃ]ς ὤµοσεν βασιλ[εὺς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ] 
Λακεδαιµόνιοι κ[αὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες], 
καὶ ἥκοσιν ἀγαθὰ [ἐπαγγελλόµενοι τῶ]- 
ι δήµωι τῶι Ἀθηνα[ίων καὶ ἁπάσηι τῆι Ἑ]- 
λλάδι καὶ βασιλεῖ, [ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δή]µ- 
ωι· ἐπαινέσαι µὲν τ[ὸν δῆµον τὸν] τῶν Χί- 
[ω]ν καὶ τὸς πρέσβες [τὸς ἥκον]τας, ὑπάρχ- 
ε[ν δὲ] τὴν εἰρήνην κα[ὶ τὸ]ς ὅρκος καὶ τὰς 
σ[υνθήκα]ς [τὰς νῦν ὄσας], συµµάχος δὲ ποι- 
εῖσ[θα]ι [Χί]ος ἐπ’ ἐλευ[θε]ρίαι καὶ αὐτον- 
οµί[α]ι µὴ παραβαίνο[ντ]ας τῶν ἐν ταῖς σ- 
τήλαις γεγραµµένων [π]ερὶ τῆς ἐρήνης 
µηδὲν, µηδ’ ἐάν τις ἄλ[λο]ς παραβαίνηι π- 
ειθοµένος κατὰ τὸ δυ[να]τόν· 
 
The Peace (εἰρήνη) appears here three times with the appositives “friendship” (φιλία), “oaths” 
(ὅρκος), and “agreement” (συνθήκη). The Chian envoys raised the prospect of an alliance in 
harmony with those principles – which may be included in the reference to the “good things” 
(ἀγαθὰ) they brought for the Athenians, the Greeks, and the Persian King.92 The Athenian 
assembly listened favorably to the proposition, praised the envoys and the people (δῆµος) of 
Chios, and agreed to make an alliance in line with “freedom and autonomy” (ἐλευθερία καὶ 
																																								 																				
 
91 The English translation is from RO 20.  
 
92 Dušanić 1999, 5 thinks that the absence of the Spartans and the inclusion of the 
Persians as recipients of the ἀγαθὰ from the Chian ambassadors indicates that the proponents of 
the alliance were “Persophile – and indeed anti-Spartan.”  
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αὐτονοµία).93 Thereafter, the inscription records the alliance terms in conventional phraseology 
but in a nonsequential order.94  
Place a stele on the Acropolis in front of the image; and on it write up that, if any one goes  
against the Athenians, the Chians shall go in support with all their strength as far as possible, and 
if any one goes against the Chians, the Athenians shall go in support as far as possible.  
The oath shall be sworn to the Chians who have come by the council and the generals and the 
taxiarchs; and in Chios by the council and the other officials.  
Choose five men who will sail to Chios and administer the oath to the city of Chios.  
The alliance shall remain in force for all time.  
Invite the Chian embassy to hospitality in the Prytaneion tomorrow.  
The following were chosen as envoys: Cephalus of Collytus, -  - of Alopece, Aesimus of -  -, -  -
of Phrearrhii, Democlides of -  -. The following were the Chian envoys: Bryon, Apelles, 
Theocritus, Archelaus. 
 
       στῆσαι δὲ σ- 
τήλην ἐν ἀκροπόλει [πρό]σθεν το ͂ἀγάλµ- 
ατος, ἐς δὲ ταύτην ἀνα[γρ]άφεν, ἐάν τις ἴ- 
ηι ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίος, βοηθε͂[ν] Χίος παντὶ σθέ- 
[νε]ι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, [καὶ ἐ]άν τις ἴηι [ἐπ]- 
[ὶ Χί]ος, βοηθε͂[ν] Ἀθηναίο[ς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει] 
[κατὰ τ]ὸ δυνατόν· ὁµόσα[ι δ]ὲ τοῖς [ἥκοσι]- 
[ν Χίοις] µὲν τὴµ βολὴν κ[αὶ] τὸς [στρατηγ]- 
[ὸς καὶ τα]ξιάρχος, ἐγ Χί[ω]ι δὲ [τὴµ βολὴν] 
[καὶ τὰς ἄλλ]ας ἀρχάς· ἑλ[έ]σ[θαι δὲ πέντε] 
[ἄνδρας, οἵτι]νες πλεύ[σαντες ἐς Χίον ὁρ]- 
[κώσουσι τὴµ] πόλιν [τὴν Χίων· ὑπάρχεν δὲ τ]- 
[ὴν συµµαχίαν ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χ]ρόνο[ν. καλ]- 
[έσαι δὲ τὴν πρεσβείαν τὴ]ν τῶν Χί[ων ἐπὶ] 
[ξένια ἐς τὸ πρυτανε]ῖον ἐς αὔρι[ον. vv] 
[οἵδε ἡιρέθησαν πρ]έσβεις· Κέφαλο[ς Κολ]- 
[λυτεύς, --c.5-- Ἀ]λωπεκῆθεν, Αἴσιµο[ς] 
[----c.10----]ς Φρεάρριος, Δηµοκλε[ίδη]- 
[ς --c.4--. οἵδ]ε ἐπρέσβευον Χίων· Βρύων, Ἀπε- 
[λλῆς Θεόκ]ριτος, Ἀρχέλας. 
 
																																								 																				
93 Bosworth 1993, 136 points out that freedom (ἐλευθερία) is not mentioned in the Peace, 
but it must be remembered that Xen. Hell. 5.1.31 does not record all of that treaty. The Decree of 
Aristoteles also contains the phrase “ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτονοµία” (IG II2 43, lines 10 and 20 = Tod 
123 = Harding 35 = RO 22).  
 
94 RO 20 suggests the lack of editing on the part of the proposer. 
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The mutual defense clauses are nearly identical to those contained in the Athenian alliances with 
the Boeotians (A1) and the Locrians (A2) in 395, including the designation that the alliance was 
intended to remain in force “for all time” (ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον).95 The assembly appointed the 
council, generals, and taxiarchs to swear an unrecorded oath to the Chian envoys; in turn, five 
other Athenian representatives were chosen to sail to Chios to receive the same oath from the 
Chian authorities.96 And there is the customary invitation to the Chian envoys to a meal of 
hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion. The directions for the erection of the stele call for it to be 
placed “in front of the image on the Acropolis [ἐν ἀκροπόλει [πρό]σθεν το͂ ἀγάλµατος],” 
referring to the statue of Athena Promachos, a martial deity – despite the fact that no military 
threat is expressed in the inscription.97 Similar to the earlier alliances that Thrasybulus 
concluded, there is no sense here of an attempt to renew Athenian imperialism.         
Even with all the detail which the inscription supplies, unfortunately, it leaves 
unmentioned the purpose for the alliance. Nevertheless, many scholars propose that it was a 
																																								 																				
95 This mutual defense clause lacks “κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν.” Perhaps this implies the 
irrelevance of land defense between the two naval powers. As an analogy, Bolmarcich 2008, 75 
proposes that the lack of “κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν” in an undated alliance between the 
Spartans and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461) is because “it would seem illogical for the Spartans, the 
land power of ancient Greece, to be concerned with her allies following her by sea.” 
 
96 The identity of the Chian envoys: Dušanić 1999, 6-8. It is noteworthy that Aesimus, a 
former associate of Thrasybulus and rival of Cephalus (Lys. 13.80-82; Hell. Oxy. 6.9), is 
included in the Athenian delegation. Roberts 1982, 101 proposes that over the course of the 
Corinthian War “the distinction between moderates and radicals gradually disappeared and the 
moderates came increasingly to support the idea of fighting Sparta.”  
 
97 Dušanić 2000a, 24-25 and Monaco 2010, 287-289 discuss the stele’s “topographical 
symbolism.”  
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response to renewed threats from the Persians against the Greeks in Asia Minor.98 The Persian 
King had been occupied with revolts in Egypt since c. 404 and on Cyprus since 391, and more 
recently Tiribazus, the satrap of Lydia and a friend of the Spartans, had begun collecting naval 
and infantry forces from Ionia. The Asiatic Greeks must have grown suspicious about when (not 
if) the Persians would intrude in their affairs as well.99 Yet, in spite of all this activity in the 
eastern Mediterranean, there is no evidence of any direct attack on Chios. To use Stephen Walt’s 
terminology, the islanders perceived a threat to their autonomy – which inspired the idea of an 
alliance in harmony with the King’s Peace. 
The Athenians, on the other hand, located away from the action in the east, did not share 
the same sense of danger from the Persians. They rather anticipated a threat coming from the 
recent conduct of the Spartans. I.A.F. Bruce once postulated that in the mid-380s “the Athenians 
may with good reason have sensed a dangerous revival of Spartan ambitions, and it is likely that 
there were already elements in Athens advocating a return to some kind of naval confederacy 
																																								 																				
 
98 Hornblower 1983, 232-23; Seager 1994, 163; Badian 1995, 86-87. Dušanić 2000a, 21-
30 proposes that the specific menace to Chios was Glos, a high-ranking naval commander, who 
revolted from the King at the end of the Cypriot War and concluded alliances with Sparta, 
Evagoras, and Egypt, creating an Aegean-wide disturbance. Diod. Sic. 15.9.3-5 places this revolt 
in 385, but most scholars (Ryder 1963, 105-109; Tuplin 1983, 178-182; Stylianou 1998, 143-
154; Ruzicka 2012, 94-98) suggest instead 381. 
 
99 Tiribazus: Isoc. 4.134-135; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; Diod. Sic. 15.2-4, 8.1-3, 10.2; 
Polyaenus Strat. 7.20; cf. Ruzicka 2012, 87-98. A decree from c. 387 records a plea to the 
Athenians not to allow the Erythraeans to be “handed over to the barbarians [περὶ δὲ τοῦ 
ἐκδίδοσθαι Ἐρυθραίους τοῖς βαρβάροις]” (Harding 28a, lines 12-13; cf. Hornblower 1982, 108-
109). Isoc. 4.163 says that the Persians stationed garrisons at coastal cities near Rhodes, Samos 
and Chios. Constantakopoulou 2007, 178-179 raises the importance for Chios of controlling its 
neighboring islands.  
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[i.e. the Second Athenian Confederacy].”100 While Bruce’s conclusion is accurate, it rests feebly 
on the asserted illegality of the Spartans’ interventions at Mantinea in 385 and at Phlius in 384. It 
is unlikely that these attacks on Peloponnesians were a reasonable justification for the Athenians 
to agree to an alliance with Chios, a power outside of mainland Greece in the opposite direction. 
There are, however, obscure indications that Sparta was involved in the north Aegean and in the 
Cyclades, the Athenians’ traditional sphere of influence.101 Although his details are suspect, it is 
worth mentioning that Diodorus speaks of a number of islands under Spartan control (πολλοὶ τῶν 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοὺς τεταγµένων) in 378, but he does not say whether that control extended back as far as 
the mid-380s.102 A more compelling point is that both Evagoras and Glos, a naval commander in 
rebellion from the Persian King, sought out alliances with the Spartans c. 381, suggesting that 
there were already indications that the Spartans had an interest and the capabilities to intercede in 
																																								 																				
 
100 Bruce 1965, 263-264.  
 
101 Stylianou 1998, 174 suggests that it would not be remarkable (or unprecedented) if 
they instigated or offered promises of support for the anti-democratic uprisings in Byzantium and 
in Thasos in 385. The Athenians granted refuge and immunity from taxation to the exiled 
Byzantine (Dem. 20.59-60) and Thasian (IG II2 33, lines 5-7) democrats. Isoc. 4.136 refers to a 
“wrangle over the Cyclades [τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀµφισβητοῦµεν]” at some time in the 380s 
(cf. Sinclair 1978, 44; Harding 1995, 119 n. 82; Rutishauser 2012, 153-158). Sinclair 1978, 43-
44 and Sealey 1993, 16 suppose that Sparta supported (morally not materially) Delos’ liberation 
from Athens c. 385, but Chanowski 2008, 169-174 has disputed that Athens lost any control of 
the island between 393 and 314. 
 
102 Diod. Sic. 15.28.2-3. Diodorus specifically mentions that Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, 
and Rhodes were under Spartan control, but Isoc. 14.28 says that the first three remained loyal to 
Athens after 387. Although Byzantium came under oligarchic control in 385 (see previous note), 
it did not come under Spartan control. The Spartans occupied Rhodes in 387, but the island is not 
heard of again until its alliance with Athens in 378. No comment can be made on Diodorus’ 
other unspecified islands (τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νησιωτῶν), unless they include Histiaea on Euboea, 
Peparethus, Sciathus and some Cycladic islands which, as he mentions in 15.30.5, were under 
Spartan control (τεταγµένας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιµονίοις).   
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eastern Greek affairs.103 Finally, there is the testimony of Theopompus of Chios, who says that 
“the city of the Athenians tried to abide by the terms of the agreement with the King, but the 
Spartans, being arrogantly minded, transgressed the agreement [καὶ ὡς Ἀθηναίων ἡ πόλις ταῖς 
πρὸς βασιλέα συνθήκαις ἐπειρᾶτο ἐµµένειν, λακεδαιµόνιοι δὲ ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες παρέβαινον 
τὰς συνθήκας].”104 He does not give specific examples, but, being from the region, he could be 
referring to Spartan activities in the Aegean. Overall, then, since the evidence is murky, all that 
can be offered here is the suggestion that prior to the alliance with Chios, the Athenians 
perceived an increase of Spartan influence outside of the Peloponnesus, just as the Chians 
perceived a threat from the Persians.  
This does not, however, explain why the Chian assembly made the decision to send 
ambassadors specifically to Athens? This relied to a great extent on the varied interactions 
between Athens and Chios throughout the classical period. Since the early fifth century their 
relationship had been for the most part friendly and mutually beneficial. The islanders provided 
significant military contributions, for which, Aristotle says, the Athenians held them, of all the 
Delian League allies, in the highest esteem.105 This participation lasted until the Chians 
																																								 																				
103 Sparta’s alliance with Evagoras: Isoc. 4.135; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; Diod. Sic. 
15.2.3, 3.3-4. The alliance with Glos: ibid. 15.9.3-5. Ibid. 15.19.1 claims that during the alliance 
with Glos the Spartans extended their activities into Asia (κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πράξεις). Cawkwell 
1976a, 70 (reprinted in 2011, 253-254) and Buckler 2003, 184 reject the veracity of Glos’ 
alliance with the Spartans. 
 
104 Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; cf. Milns and Ellis 1966, 56-60. Theopompus’ father, 
exiled from Chios for laconism after 384 (Plut. Mor. 837c; cf. Lane Fox 1986, 107-108; Flower 
1994, 3-7), could have made contact with the Spartans at this time. 
 
105 Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.2. Quinn 1981, 39-49 and Piérart 1995, 253-282 see a maintenance 
of good relations between Athens and Chios until the island’s revolt in 412. Blanshard 2007, 
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abandoned Athens for Sparta in 412, but they returned to friendship with Conon and the 
Athenians in 394, and resumed their military cooperation by 389, when they contributed naval 
reinforcements to Thrasybulus at Lesbos.106 There also existed stable economic interactions, 
especially in the export of Chian wine to Athens. Chios, in turn, attracted prominent Athenians, 
who cultivated further economic contacts and were granted honors of proxenia.107 Supporting 
these practical activities were the intimate friendships between leading individuals in each city. 
In the fifth century, the family of the celebrated poet Ion of Chios had close contacts with 
prominent Athenians, especially with Cimon.108 In the early fourth century, Isocrates visited 
Chios and helped set up an Athenian-style government, headed up a school, and made many 
friends with the islanders, with whom he remained in contact later in life.109  
The mutual military assistance and economic and social exchanges were reinforced 
further by shared religious practices, such as common prayers (εὐχαί κοιναί). Aristophanes, for 
																																								 																				
155-175 prefers to see their relations in need of frequent renegotiation. Occhipinti 2010, 27-33 
suggests a more significant role for Chios in geopolitics than there really was. 
 
106 Conon and Chios: Diod. Sic. 14.84.3; cf. Monaco 2010, 287-288. Thrasybulus and 
Chian ships: Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. The Athenians expressed their gratitude in 388 with an honorary 
decree for an unnamed Chian (IG II2 23), who, according to Dušanić 2000a, 24 n. 18, might be 
Theocritus, one of the Chian ambassadors to Athens in 384.  
 
107 Sarikakis 1986, 121-129 presents the archaeological and epigraphic evidence for 
socio-economic interactions. Mac Sweeney 2013, 85-86 looks at the numismatic evidence. 
 
108 Ion and Cimon: Ion FGrH 392 F12-15; Plut. Cim. 9; Jacoby 1947, 4; Geddess 2007, 
110-138. Ion also had relationships with Aeschylus (Plut. Mor. 79d-e; West 1985, 72), Sophocles 
(Ath.13.603e-604d; Dover 1986, 35), and Lamachus (Mattingly 1977, 238-239), but not with 
Pericles (Plut. Per. 5.3; Geddes 2007, 127-132). Ion’s biography: Valerio 2013, 5-9.  
 
109 Plut. Mor. 837b-c; cf. Carlucci 2013, 11. Metrodorus, a Chian student of Isocrates, 
was admired in Athens (Ath. 3.100d; Dušanić 1999, 7). Not all Chian students of Isocrates, 
however, became friends of Athens: the historian Theopompus and his father were laconophiles 
and eventually exiled from Chios for it (see note 104).  
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example, speaks of a prayer for the “health and salvation for the Athenians and the Chians” 
(ὑγιείαν καὶ σωτηρίαν αὐτοῖσι καὶ Χίοισι).110 To return to IG II2 34, the inscription recording the 
alliance, line 6 has a lacuna, which, as Slobodan Dušanić proposes in his reconstruction of ταῦτα 
µε[ν ηὖχθαι ἐπειδὴ δὲ Χῖοι, ἐκ κο]ινῶν λόγων, may have contained a reference to prayers. 
Indeed, there are contemporary analogies in treaties of alliance and other official documents, and 
it would have been entirely expected for the Chians and the Athenians in 384 to participate in a 
ritual consisting of common prayers and sacrifices.111  
Finally, a manifestation of these shared practices can be seen in their belief in a common 
ancestry. Among the many possible legendary founders of Chios, the poet Ion of Chios, 
mentioned earlier for his numerous contacts in Athens, highlights Oinopion. According to 
Plutarch, the poet attributes this prominent wine-drinker’s parentage to Theseus (τήν ποτε 
Θησείδης ἔκτισεν Οἰνοπίων), an Athenian hero, rather than to Dionysus.112 The reason Ion, 
perhaps for the first time in Greek history, did this was to represent the close association of his 
two favorite cities. “The claim [of Ion’s],” writes Naoíse Mac Sweeney, “places Athens and 
Chios in a close relationship of metropolis (mother-city) and colony, bringing the two cities 
																																								 																				
 
110 Ar. Birds 878-880; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F104. Barron 1986, 102-103 and Blanshard 
2007, 159-161 consider the prayers to be an Aristophanic joke about how Athens had no 
remaining allies except Chios for which to pray, but this does not have to detract from the 
Athenians’ high regard for Chios (cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.2). 
 
111 Dušanić 1999, 12; 2000, 26; cf. Bliquez 1979, 237-40.  
 
112 Plut. Thes. 20.2. Chios’ origins were confused even in antiquity (Paus. 7.4.8-10; Mac 
Sweeney 2013, 80-91; Federico 2004, 179-214). Theopompus of Chios preserves Oinopion’s 
Dionysiac descent (FGrH 115 F276). 
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together through the medium of myth.”113 Ion records mythological history as he thought it 
should have been, with the Athenians holding a significant position in Chios’ beginnings. This 
refashioning of the island’s foundation legend appears at a time when the Chians and the 
Athenians had developed an almost symbiotic relationship. After decades of practical military 
cooperation and economic interactions, brought together by interstate friendships, and rarefied 
by mutual prayers and sacrifices, this new version of shared ancestry became popular in Chian 
and Athenian circles. It should be expected, therefore, even without direct evidence, that when 
the Chian ambassadors approached the Athenian assembly in 384, they rehearsed arguments of 
kinship diplomacy, a common diplomatic practice in the classical period.114 For these reasons, in 
addition to the influence of perceived military threats coming from the Persians and the Spartans, 
the Chian assembly dispatched ambassadors specifically to their Athenian friends for an alliance, 
and the Athenians agreed to it.  
It was natural for the Chians to seek help from Athens based upon such factors, just as the 
Boeotians did in 395.115 And so the Athenians revived (again) their alliance activities. Although 
																																								 																				
 
113 Mac Sweeney 2013, 90. A vase by the Lewis Painter (ARV2 972.2) depicts Athena and 
Theseus (...SEUS) on one side, and a woman (Ariadne?) handing her two sons (Oinopion and a 
brother?) to a nymph (NUPHE) on the other (disputed by Olding 2007, 147-148 as evidence of 
Oinopion’s parentage). It is also suggestive that Cimon, with whom Ion’s family was on an 
intimate basis, promoted the cult of Theseus in Athens (Barron 1986, 92; Walker 1995, 55-61). 
 
114 Kinship diplomacy: Jones 1999, 27-35; Bolmarcich 2010, 125-131; Patterson 2010; 
Fragoulaki 2013. Only Dušanić 1999, 11-12; 2000, 26 mentions syngenia in the context of this 
alliance.  
  
115 The Boeotians did not have a common ancestral link with the Athenians, but the 
association of Athena with Heracles served a similar function (Paus. 9.11.6). 
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the inscription recording the Athenian-Chian alliance contains numerous references to the King’s 
Peace, it should not obscure the purpose for the Athenians to agree to it: to counteract potential 
violations of Greek autonomy by the Spartans outside of the Peloponnesus. Indeed, the inclusion 
of Cephalus, a consistent opponent of the Spartans, in the embassy to Chios suggests that there 
was an anti-Spartan component to the alliance.116 And this same feature would continue to play a 
part in the bilateral alliances that grew into the larger Second Athenian Confederacy.117  
A9  The Athenians and the Olynthians (383) 
IG II2 36; Xen. Hell. 5.2.15 
The alliance with the Chians was followed in the next year by an overture for an alliance 
with the Olynthians. Scholars who explain the absence of alliances in 386 and 385 as the result 
of Athenian fear of the Spartans are likewise uncomfortable with the thought of the Athenians 
extending their involvement in northern affairs at this time, belittling the significance of this 
proposed alliance or even revising its date to the mid-370s. The Thebans also approached the 
Olynthians but it is the Athenian embassy that truly bothers scholars.118 R.K. Sinclair, for 
example, considers the Athenians’ only intention in reaching out to the Olynthians to be the 
relatively benign one of securing access to the northern grain route.119 It is worth considering that 
																																								 																				
 116 IG II2 34, lines 39-40. Cephalus supported the dispatch of reinforcements to Conon 
fighting the Spartans in 397 and advocated Demaenetus’ theft of the state trireme in 396 (Hell. 
Oxy. 6.1-7.1). Displeased with the outcome of the Corinthian War, he maligned the Athenian 
generals responsible for the defeat (IG II2 29 = Tod 116 = RO 19). Cephalus’ biography: Nails 
2002, 83. 
 
117 Monaco 2010, 288; Lambert 2012b, 259-260.   
 
118 There is an anonymous source (FGrH 153 F1) that claims Thebes aided Olynthus in 
expelling Amyntas of Macedon, but it is largely considered spurious (Hornblower 1983, 230-
231; Worthington 2004, 69-70).   
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there was more to it. Diodorus says that the Olynthians had recently acquired much (πολλὴν) 
Macedonian territory, which netted them revenue (τὰς προσόδους), perhaps from the mineral or 
timber resources in the region. The Athenians, fresh from their new alliance with the Chians, 
may have considered collaboration with the Olynthians, now with access to Macedonian 
resources, as a practical yet indirect step towards increasing the size of their diminished navy.120 
There is no mention of the individuals behind the exploratory mission to Olynthus, but it would 
come as no surprise if Cephalus, the radical, anti-Spartan previously mentioned, and Ismenias, 
once again in leadership in Thebes, were not intimately involved. The evidence for the Athenian 
alliance comes from a reference in Xenophon to Athenian and Theban ambassadors in Olynthus. 
There is also a fragmentary stele with the heading “συµµαχία Χαλκιδέων” (i.e., Olynthus as head 
of the Chalicidians) and a relief depicting Athena and Apollo, the two respective patron deities of 
Athens and Olynthus. The rest of the inscription contains the names of the ten Athenian envoys 
to Olynthus, an incomplete motivation clause ([ὅπως ἂν ἀπ]ολάβωσ[ι] τ[οὺ]), and a reference to 
oaths (ὅρκους).121 Subsequent events, however, prevented the alliance from becoming operative. 
In response to an appeal from Chalcidian poleis under Olynthian domination, the Spartans sent 
an army northwards, obstructing the arrival of the Athenian envoys and the full implementation 
																																								 																				
 119 Sinclair 1978, 40-42 (followed by Borza 1990, 186 n. 20). 
 
120 Diod. Sic. 15.19.2 (cf. Isoc. 6.46). The backside of the undated (393?) alliance 
between Amyntas and the Chalcidians (Olynthus) regulates the import and re-export of 
Macedonian timber (Tod 111 = Harding 21 = RO 12). 
 
121 Xen. Hell. 5.2.15; IG II2 36. Relief: Lawton 1995, 110. The existence of a similar 
fragmentary inscription leads Stroud 1971, 149-150 to suggest that there were two stelai on the 
Acropolis commemorating this alliance.  
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of the alliance.122 Spartan intervention in the north also provided justification for other Athenian 
alliances that would eventually become the core of a new confederacy – not a revival of the fifth-
century empire, but an organization of poleis committed to defending Greek autonomy from 
Spartan aggression. 
Until recently scholars understood the Confederacy’s commencement in the spring of 378 
to be a sudden, unplanned response to an attempted raid on the Piraeus by the Spartan Sphodrias, 
but many now invert this scenario and consider the formal institution of the Confederacy to have 
predated that raid.123 This latter ordering follows Diodorus who says that before the raid the 
Athenians dispatched embassies into the Aegean to encourage the Greeks there to continue to 
uphold the principles of the King’s Peace and to join in the development of a new confederacy 
for mutual defense against the Spartans. Nearly all of the Greeks who responded positively to 
those embassies – Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Rhodes, and “certain other islanders” (τῶν 
ἄλλων τινὲς νησιωτῶν) – already had previous alliance arrangements with the Athenians.124 In 
other words, although the formal organization of the Confederacy came about in 378, there were 
already preparatory stirrings towards its creation. “In my opinion,” Victor Parker judges, “we 
should perhaps view the League's foundation rather as a process than as an event which took 
																																								 																				
 
122 Xen. Hell. 5.2.36.  
 
123 Sphodrias’ raid: Diod. Sic. 15.29.5-6. The creation of the Confederacy before 
Sphodrias’ raid but still in 378: Burnett 1962, 1-17; Cawkwell 1973, 47-60 (reprinted in 2011, 
192-211); Cargill 1981, 58-59; Stylianou 1998, 249-251. The creation of the Confederacy in 379: 
Pritchett 1972, 164-169; Kallet-Marx 1985, 127-151.  
 
124 Diod. Sic. 15.28.2-3; cf. Plut. Pel. 15.1. Although the Spartans’ recent activities were 
in central and northern Greece, there must have been some activity in the Aegean to lead so 
many to respond positively to the Athenian embassies.  
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place at one point in time: from a certain perspective the League began in 384/3 with the 
swearing of the model treaty with Chios.”125 Even if one is uncomfortable assigning the 
Confederacy’s origins as early as the alliances with Chios and Olynthus, there is obvious interest 
at least as far back as the late 380s. The remainder of this section traces this development by 
examining the previous associations and bilateral alliances of these first Confederacy members.  
After the failed alliance with Olynthus in 383, the next Athenian alliance for which there 
is firm epigraphical evidence is the mention of a συµµαχία with an unknown state in 379 (the 
archonship of Nicon) in an honorific inscription for an otherwise unknown Euryphon.126 The 
date is significant, coming a year before the big push towards confederacy. W.K. Pritchett, who 
first published the inscription in 1972, thinks the reconstruction of προέδρος on line 10 of the 
inscription signifies that the Confederacy’s institutions were already operative in 379, but none 
today accept this supposition. There were no formal allied institutions yet. This was only a 
bilateral συµµαχία. 
The rest of the alliances predating the Confederacy do not have epigraphic testimony. 
One has to piece together the evidence from various sources. Mytilene, for example, became a 
leading Athenian ally in 389, and throughout the 380s, according to Isocrates, it was one of the 
states to remain with (συµπαρέµειναν) Athens. It is no surprise, then, that in 378 Athens would 
send an embassy to Mytilene to solicit its participation in a new confederacy. Individual 
Mytileneans, moreover, played key roles in encouraging other states to join with them.127  
																																								 																				
 
 125 Parker 2007, 13 n.1. 
 
126 EM 13230; Pritchett 1972, 164-169. Knoepfler 1988, 234 raises the possibility that 
Euryphon is a Theban. 
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Little more needs to be said about Chios. After the alliance in 384, the two renewed their 
relationship in a Confederacy alliance in 378, indicated by the erection on the Acropolis of 
another stele (IG II2 35) nearly identical to the original. At least one Chian, Antimachus, received 
Athenian citizenship and helped bring about the Athenian alliance with the Thebans in 378.128  
A10 The Athenians and the Byzantines (380s) 
IG II2 41 
The Byzantines collaborated with Thrasybulus in the Corinthian War and retained a 
democratic government until an oligarchic revolt in 385. The exiled democrats received refuge 
and immunity from taxation from the Athenians.129 At some point the Byzantine democrats made 
an alliance with the Athenians, the extant inscription (IG II2 41) for which can be dated to 
sometime between the one with Chios (line 7: καθάπερ Χίοις) and the institution of the 
Confederacy’s council (συνέδριον) in 377.130 There is no direct evidence, but one might 
conjecture that after observing firsthand the Athenian alliance with Chios come about, the 
Byzantine democrats found a way to return to power at home, and then proposed to the 
																																								 																				
127 Isoc. 14.28; Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-29; Diod. Sic. 14.84.3, 94.3-4. An unknown Mytilenean 
is praised and invited to δεῖπνον in the Prytaneion in IG II2 40, lines 12 and 20, presumably for 
his part in bringing the Thebans into the general alliance. 
 
128 Accame 1941, 9-13. Clark 1990, 53-54 thinks Chios is the unknown state in the 379 
alliance (see note 126). Antimachus: IG II2 40, lines 11-12; cf. Clark 1990, 53-54, 65-66. 
 
129 Isoc. 14.28; Dem. 20.59-60. 
 
130 Harding 34 proposes that the lacuna at the beginning of IG II2 41 contained the same 
phrase (“since the Byzantines continue to be well disposed to the city of the Athenians now, as 
they have been in the past”) as the alliance with Methymna, which also falls between 384 and 
378 (IG II2 42, line 5 = Harding 37).  
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Athenians an alliance similar to the Chian one.131 If this is the case, the Athenian alliance can be 
seen as support for and a confirmation of the restored Byzantine democracy. To return to the 
inscription, it mentions the oath (lines 8-10), an invitation for the Byzantine ambassadors to 
enjoy a meal of hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion (11-14), instructions for the preparation of 
the alliance stele (14-15), and the selection of Athenian ambassadors to go to Byzantium and 
confirm the alliance terms (16-21).  
A11  The Athenians and the Methymnaeans (380s) 
IG II2 41 
The Methymnaeans were also ones who joined Thrasybulus in 389 and seem to have 
maintained contact with his associates, such as Aesimus who was involved in their later alliance 
with the Athenians in 377.132 Although they are included in the first six names inscribed on the 
Decree of Aristoteles (IG II2 43), the Confederacy’s charter, Diodorus does not mention them 
among those who first responded to the Athenian embassies in early 378, unless they are implied 
in his “certain other islanders.”133 Nevertheless, there is evidence that they made an alliance with 
Athens at some time between 384 and 378. The inscription (IG II2 42) recording the 377 alliance 
says that the two already had a preexisting alliance (ἐπειδὴ σύµ<µ>αχοί εἰσιν καὶ εὖνοι τῆι πόληι 
																																								 																				
131 Kallet-Marx 1985, 131 also considers the possibility that the “alliances with 
Byzantion, Mytilene, and Methymna may date to the 380s.” 
 
132 Aesimus and Thrasybulus: Lys. 13.80-82; Hell. Oxy. 6.9. Aesimus was also in the 
embassy to receive the alliance oath from the Chians in 384 (IG II2 34, line 40). Aesimus and the 
377 alliance: IG II2 42, lines 19-20.  
 
 133 Diod. Sic. 15.28.3. Stylianou 1998, 155 does not think Methymna is included in 
“certain other islanders.” Cawkwell 1973, 51 [reprinted in 2011, 196-197] and Kallet-Marx 
1985, 131 do.  
115	
	
τῆι Ἀθηναίων Μηθυµναῖοι).134 Without the documentation for that earlier alliance, there is no 
way to pinpoint precisely when it was concluded, but since the Athenians had already exhibited a 
willingness to make new alliances in 384 and 383 (with Chios, Olynthus, and perhaps 
Byzantium), it is not impossible to situate the first Methymnaean alliance somewhere in the late 
380s.135 As for Rhodes, nothing more is known of it after the Spartans occupied the island in 387 
until its alliance with the Athenians in 378. 
A12 The Athenians and the Thebans (378) 
IG II2 40; Plut. Pel. 15.1 
And, finally, there was another bilateral alliance with the Thebans before the birth of the 
Confederacy. From 382 to 379 there were at least 300 Theban democrats (i.e., Ismenias’ faction) 
living in exile in Athens because the pro-Spartan faction in Thebes had permitted a Spartan army 
to occupy their Cadmeia.136 The presence of the exiles in Athens was a daily reminder of the 
collaboration between the two states in 404 and 403 and in the Corinthian War. Thus, partly out 
of gratitude for those earlier services, in the winter of 379 the Athenians helped the exiles return 
to Thebes. But there are irreconcilable differences in the sources concerning the extent of that 
support: Xenophon denies it was official; Dinarchus and Diodorus insist that it was.137 Only 
																																								 																				
 
134 IG II2 42, line 5.  
 
135 As does Kallet-Marx 1985, 131. Dreher 2001, 153: “Außer mit Chios hat Athen in der 
Folgezeit auch mit Methymna und vielleicht weiteren Städten zweiseitige Bündnisse 
geschlossen, die uns nicht erhalten sind.” Hornblower 1982, 126 supposes that Methymna is the 
unknown state in the 379 alliance (see note 126). 
 
136 Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-31; Diod. Sic. 15.20.1-2; Plut. Pel. 5.2-3. Plut. Mor. 576a says that 
many of the exiles were private friends (ἰδιόξενοι) of the Athenians, friendships likely extending 
back to 404. Plut. Pel. 6.2-4 says that the Athenians received the exiles out of a desire to repay 
(ἀµειβόµενοι) earlier services.  
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Plutarch acknowledges that there was a formal alliance with the new Theban government in early 
378. He says when Spartan king Cleombrotus invaded Boeotia, the Athenians panicked and 
“renounced the alliance with the Thebans [τήν τε συµµαχίαν ἀπείπαντο τοῖς Θηβαίοις].”138 To 
renounce an alliance indicates that one was already in existence. Plutarch, however, confuses the 
official assistance mentioned by Diodorus and Dinarchus for an alliance. The Athenians would 
not have made such a binding agreement, more than an authorized (or unauthorized) dispatch of 
troops, that could be discarded so quickly upon the appearance of a Spartan army. In the next 
chapter Plutarch adds that after (ἐκ τούτου) Sphodrias’ failed raid on the Piraeus, in the spring of 
378, “the Athenians very eagerly made an alliance again with the Thebans [πάλιν προθυµότατα 
Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Θηβαίοις συνεµάχουν].”139 It looks as though the biographer has created a 
doublet. It is this so-called second alliance that is the genuine one, the one that is confirmed in IG 
II² 40. This inscription is badly preserved but the likely restoration contains all the expected 
elements of a fourth-century treaty: an oath (line 1), invitation for the Theban ambassadors to 
enjoy a meal of hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion (2-4), praise and another invitation for 
specific Thebans to a meal (δεῖπνον) in the Prytaneion (5-14), a proboulemata and a decree 
																																								 																				
137 Xen. Hell. 5.4.1-19. Din. 1.39 mentions an official decree (ψήφισµα), proposed by 
Cephalus, to help the Thebans. Diod. Sic. 15.25.4-26.2 says the Athenians sent an official force, 
consisting of 5,000 hoplites and 500 horseman, intending to “repay their obligation for the 
former service [τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀποδιδοὺς τὰς χάριτας].” Roberts 1982, 81-83 looks at the 
conflicting accounts and the trial of the Athenian generals who helped the Thebans. A number of 
scholars (Stylianou 1998, 230-236; Parker 2007, 14-24; Steinbock 2013, 260-267) argue that 
Xenophon suppresses the assembly’s authorization in order to shield the Athenians from blame 
in Thebes’ subsequent ascendancy in Greece. 
 
138 Plut. Pel. 14.1.  
 
139 Ibid. 15.1. The solution of Dmitriev 2011, 382, that Plutarch’s first alliance was the 
one of 395 (A1), does not work because it was an alliance with the Boeotians not the Thebans.  
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passed by the assembly (15-21), and provisions for inscribing the stele (21-23).140 Specific terms 
for the alliance probably appeared on the top half of the stele but it is missing. This was the last 
of the bilateral alliances that rapidly expanded into what is known as the Second Athenian 
Confederacy.141 Table 2 reviews the proposed chronology for these important alliances. 
Table 2: Proposed Chronology of Athenian Alliances Leading to the Confederacy 
Athenian Alliance with:  Date: Reaffirmed in the Confederacy: 
Mytilene 389 (Diod. Sic. 14.94.4) 
378  (IG II2 40, lines 11-12, 20) 
 
377  (IG II2 43, line 80) 
Chios 384  (IG II2 34) 
378  (IG II2 35) 
 
377  (IG II2 43, line 79) 
Olynthus 383*  (IG II2 36) 377  (IG II2 43, line 80) 
Byzantium 383-0†   (IG II2 41) 377  (IG II2 43, line 83) 
Methymna 383-0†  (IG II2 42, line 5) 
  
377  (IG II2 43, line 81) 
377 (IG II2 42) 
Unknown State 379 (Pritchett 1972, 164-169) -- 
Rhodes 378  (Diod. Sic. 15.28.3) 377  (IG II2 43, line 82) 
Thebes 378 (IG II2 40) 377  (IG II2 43, line 79) 
 
* not implemented 
† based on circumstantial evidence  
 
There is no indication that the allies subordinated their policies to Athens. Indeed, the 
alliances followed the model of the Chian alliance by upholding the principles of freedom and 
autonomy and should not be considered tools of Athenian imperialistic recrudescence. Therefore, 
they were also not violations of some phantom prohibition in the Peace against alliance-making. 
Although the alliances were responses to Spartan encroachments on Greek autonomy, these 
																																								 																				
 
140 The substitution by Burnett 1962, 5 n. 5 and Cargill 1981, 53 of Stephanus for 
Cephalus as the mover of the decree eliminates the confusion of this alliance with Cephalus’ 
ψήφισµα in Din. 1.39 (see note 137). Cinalli 2015, 35-40 problematizes the traditional 
distinction of ξένια for non-citizens and δεῖπνον for citizens. 
 
141 Diod. Sic. 15.28.5 says that the Athenians and the first members of the nascent 
confederacy allied (συµµαχούντων) with the Thebans. 
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particular allies were drawn together by their historical ties in the social, religious, and economic 
spheres, and thus follow the same pattern as those in the Corinthian War. When the Spartan army 
invaded Boeotia in 395, the Thebans chose to send envoys to Athens because of their friendships 
and shared objectives. In 390 and 389, when Thrasybulus re-established Athenian alliances in the 
north Aegean, he reached back to his earlier experiences with revenue collection, but he 
deliberately avoided measures associated with the oppressive rule of the fifth-century empire. 
After the war, the Athenians refused to enter alliances with King Hebryzelmis and the 
Mantineans based on the existence or lack of previous interactions. The Athenian alliance with 
the Chians in 384 grew out of very close connections in social, religious, and economic matters 
throughout the classical period. This alliance became the impetus and model in the next five 
years for a number of other bilateral alliances, which, in turn, formed the nucleus of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, an association of Greeks joined together by observance of the principles 
of the King’s Peace and in opposition to Spartan imperialism. As a leader in Greece, Athens had 
to practice a certain amount of power politics; yet the Athenians placed their political and 
military objectives within a socio-cultural framework. It was not the case of the empire striking 
back but rather a new hope for the conduct of interstate relations in the fourth century.  
The new confederacy was in full operation by 377 and continued to expand until there 
were close to seventy members. As a multilateral association, which has been treated at length by 
other scholars, the Confederacy falls outside this study.142 But it should be noted that, as it 
consisted almost entirely of Aegean members, the inclusion of Thebes, a land power, was 
unique. And the Thebans’ particular interests were not at all easy to reconcile with those of the 
																																								 																				
142 Cargill 1981; Dreher 1995; Baron 2006, 379-395. 
119	
	
larger group. As a result, over the course of the 370s, Athenian relations with Thebes soured. The 
latter seized the opportunity to extend its influence throughout Boeotia and neglected its duties as 
a member of the Confederacy. In 369, the Athenians shocked everyone by making a clean break 
with the Thebans and entering into an alliance with the Spartans, the subject of the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
B. From Leuctra to Chaeronea 
 
 
 For much of the first quarter of the fourth century, the Athenians conducted their foreign 
policies in close alignment with the Thebans, bringing about two bilateral alliances with them in 
395 and 378, as well as their incorporation into the Second Athenian Confederacy. During these 
years personal contacts and shared political goals generated and sustained their collaborative 
efforts. In the 370s, however, that dynamic changed. The Thebans withheld their full support for 
the Confederacy’s campaigns against the Spartans and concentrated instead on expanding their 
control over Boeotia and preparing a path for their own place of leadership in the wider Greek 
world (see Chapter V). As for the Athenians, after the Thebans destroyed the Spartan army at the 
Battle of Leuctra in 371, one might have expected them either to join jubilantly with the victors 
and complete the reduction of Spartan power in Greece, or, at the very least, remain neutral and 
distance themselves from the conflict. Neither happened; instead, in 369, they made an alliance 
with the Spartans (A13).  
 As surprising as it is to see these two adversaries come together in one of the most 
momentous alliances of the fourth century, it is even more startling that there is no surviving 
epigraphical evidence for it. Moreover, Xenophon, an Athenian laconophile, gives strikingly 
little information about the alliance conditions, recording only the debate in the Athenian 
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assembly over the question of leadership assignments. But within his record, he mentions a 
comment from one of the delegates that “the other things for the most part have been agreed 
upon [τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα σχεδόν τι συνωµολόγηται].”143 What were τὰ ἄλλα? In order to uncover 
what they might have been, the first half of this section investigates the articles of four political 
agreements between the Athenians and the Spartans from 375 to 370, on the premise that the 
alliance was the end product of a longer diplomatic process. The conclusion drawn from this 
approach challenges the prevailing notion today that the 369 alliance was a knee-jerk reaction to 
the Theban victory at Leuctra, an attempt to restore the unsettled BOP.144 Instead, the influence 
of the ideological connections between individuals in Athens and Sparta over the course of the 
370s created an environment which made palatable an alliance with the enemy. This new 
alignment towards the Spartans and away from the Thebans inspired new alliances in the north 
and in Sicily. But it was not to last; gradually, the Athenians drifted away from their association 
with the Spartans.  
The second half of this section examines the proliferation of alliances in the 
Peloponnesus and in the north from 366 onwards. For much of this period the Athenians 
struggled with the growing presence of Philip II of Macedon in Greek affairs. Although the 
Athenians, especially Demosthenes, continued to arrange alliances according to their historical 
relationships, the politico-military objective (i.e., opposition to Philip) became much more 
																																								 																				
143 Xen. Hell. 7.1.2.  
 
 144 As in Fisher 1994, 350-351; Harding 1995, 109 (reiterated in 2015, 152); Buckler and 
Beck 2008, 159; Christ 2012, 158-162. Jaeger 1938, 218 n. 2 also emphasized the influence of 
BOP on Callistratus but cited a nineteenth-century English politician, Lord Brougham, who in 
turn referred to the philosopher David Hume, not any ancient sources. 
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prominent in these last alliances of the classical period. It turned out to be a losing strategy. After 
the Battle of Chaeronea, where Philip soundly defeated the allied Greek forces, and then the 
subsequent establishment of the League of Corinth under Philip’s direction, the Athenians were 
deprived of their alliances. It was an abject end to a dynamic period of interstate activity. 
 
Alliances with Sparta and Its Allies (369-366) 
 
A13 The Athenians and the Spartans (369) 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.1-14 
 Although the Athenian-Spartan alliance was not formally concluded until the late spring 
of 369, one can see, in retrospect, that for some time there were those in each polis who favored 
closer collaboration. In the early fourth century, despite the military conflict between the two, the 
Athenians were not en bloc anti-Spartan. Even in the midst of the Corinthian War, the orator 
Andocides praised the enemy for past acts of beneficence to Athens and promoted the belief that 
Athenian prosperity was through peace with them.145 Even Callistratus of Aphidna, although he 
motioned for Andocides’ exile, was not ideologically opposed to peace with the Spartans. As 
Jennifer Roberts argues persuasively, he did not prosecute Andocides for proposing peace but for 
failing to achieve a peace that the Athenian people would accept.146 Early in his career, then, 
																																								 																				
 145 Andoc. 3.21. Missiou 1992, 87-108 places Andocides’ characterization of ethical 
Spartans in the context of other contemporary writers. Fisher 1994, 347-400 stresses that 
Athenian laconizers celebrated Sparta’s stable constitution but not its empire. Tigerstedt 1965 
looks at Athenian representations of Sparta in general. 
 
146 Roberts 1982, 92-93. Callistratus and Andocides: Philoch. FGrH 328 F149a. Bearzot 
1978-1979, 8-9 reviews the hypotheses of earlier scholars for Callistratus’ early political 
orientation and concludes that he was “una figura notevole della politica moderata.” Missiou 
1992, 82-84 returns to the position that the lower classes demanded the continuation of war.  
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Callistratus showed a willingness to work with rather than against the traditional enemy, and it 
appears that he maintained a consistent policy later in life. Even though he was one of the first 
generals of the nascent Second Athenian Confederacy in 378, he never led an army against the 
Spartans.147 His participation in the Confederacy may have been due to his association with the 
Spartans, his ability to serve as an intermediary. For example, the congruity of his ideas with 
those of Agesilaus in the 375 and 371 peace conferences makes it hard not to believe that he had 
some sort of acquaintance with the Spartan king.148 At any rate, if he is representative of other 
Athenians, there was a segment of the population with a willingness to cooperate with Sparta 
long before the Battle of Leuctra. 
 Many reject the potency or even existence of these ideological ties in the 370s, preferring 
to see the Athenian turn to Sparta in nothing more than practical terms. They consider the 
aggrandizement of Theban power and the financial burdens of continuing war with Sparta to be 
the only catalysts for the Athenians to adopt, faut de mieux, a pro-Spartan policy.149 These 
concerns undoubtedly played a part in the easing of tensions between the two adversaries, but it 
																																								 																				
 
147 Diod. Sic. 15.29.7; cf. Develin 1989, 223. Many (Strauss 1987, 14; Caven 1990, 23; 
Shrimpton 1991, 141; Dillery 1995, 136) label him “the architect of the Confederacy,” but his 
election to the generalship does not mean that he fully endorsed the anti-Spartan enterprise any 
more than Nicias’ election in 415 is proof that he was the author of the Sicilian Expedition. 
Sealey 1956, 187 suggested that he was elected as general because of the influence of his 
associate Chabrias. 
 
148 Callistratus also had a reputation for corresponding with the pro-Spartan Leontiades in 
Thebes (Plut. Mor. 597d).  
 
149 Sealey 1956, 191-192; Mosley 1973, 59-60; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 159-60; Munn 
1993, 174-179. To be fair, Xen. Hell. 6.2.1 also highlights these practical problems, but the 
historian rarely gives credit to Callistratus for his diplomatic achievements anyway. Bianco 
2011, 44-45 comments on Xenophon’s “ambiguous feelings” towards Callistratus. 
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seems impossible that their growing alignment of policies could have come about without the 
idealogical influences of men such as Callistratus. Both of these components, realism and 
idealism, became conspicuous in the 375 peace conference in Sparta, which, in retrospect, was 
the first discernible step towards the Athenian-Spartan alliance. 
By 375, regular military campaigning had drained the treasuries of the Athenians and the 
Spartans, so the two sides agreed to discuss terms for peace. As someone with influence in 
Sparta, Callistratus was included in the Athenian delegation; likewise, Agesilaus was probably 
the spokesman for the Spartans.150 Unfortunately, Xenophon does not give any details about the 
proceedings. Diodorus, however, discloses the peace terms: “all agreed to peace on the condition 
that all the cities be independent and ungarrisoned [συνέθεντο πάντες τὴν εἰρήνην, ὥστε πάσας 
τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόµους καὶ ἀφρουρήτους εἶναι].”151 The first condition, Greek autonomy, was 
not new – it was the key principle of the King’s Peace. The second, the garrisons clause, was a 
practical implementation of the first. As Martin Jehne stresses, the two clauses were correlative 
and context-specific: in order to deter the Thebans from expanding their influence in Boeotia, 
there was a need to reinforce the principle of autonomy with a prohibition against garrisons.152 
																																								 																				
 
150 Agesilaus and the Athenians: Cawkwell 1976a, 79 (reprinted in 2011, 266-267). 
Philoch. FGrH 328 F151 and Diod. Sic. 15.38.1 place the initiative for the conference with the 
Persian King. Cawkwell 2005, 175-197 explains the suppression of the King in Xenophon’s 
account. 
 
151 Diod. Sic. 15.38.2. The Peace in general: Ryder 1965, 58-59, 124-126; Jehne 1994, 
57-64; Dmitriev 2011, 41-45. 
 
152 Jehne 1994, 60-61. Cawkwell 1981b, 73-74 (reprinted in 2011, 176-177) is alone in 
imagining a garrisons clause in the King’s Peace. There was one in the Decree of Aristoteles in 
377 (IG II2 43, lines 20-22). 
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Furthermore, the new peace isolated the Thebans from any participation in the new leadership 
arrangements in Greece because the other two powers included a nominal provision for dual 
hegemony (Sparta on land and Athens on sea).153 A clear rift between Athens and Thebes was 
now unmistakable; as for Athens and Sparta, although no alliance developed at this time, it was a 
significant first step towards that closer relationship.  
 The new peace was celebrated in Athens with pomp and ceremony.154 But, the state of 
harmony was ephemeral. On his way home from Corcyra, the Athenian Timotheus, perhaps in 
observance (or in violation) of an unrecorded exiles clause in the peace, intervened in the internal 
affairs of Zacynthus by forcibly returning exiles to the island. When the Spartans responded 
positively to an appeal from the Zacynthian oligarchs, their involvement reignited hostilities with 
the Athenians.155 In the next year, after bringing up Timotheus on charges and pressuring him to 
leave the city, Callistratus, along with Iphicrates and Chabrias, was elected general for the 
campaign in the west.156 When they ran out of funds – the same condition as in 375 – Callistratus 
																																								 																				
 
153 Diod. Sic. 15.38.4; cf. Nep. Timoth. 2.2. The non-legality of dual hegemony: Munn 
1993, 229-230. Diod. Sic. 15.38.3 says the Theban Epaminondas objected when Callistratus read 
out the peace terms in the Confederacy’s council (συνέδριον), but the Athenian silenced that 
opposition (Lauffer 1959, 315-348 and Schepens 2001, 84 n.12 dispute the historicity of this 
altercation, but Sealey 1956, 189-190 and Stylianou 1998, 327-328 accept it). 
 
154 Philochor. FGrH 328 F151; Schol. Ar. Peace 1019 (Holwerda 1982, 150); Isoc. 
15.109-110. The Athenians seem to have overlooked Callistratus’ diplomatic achievements with 
the Spartans, and instead awarded Timotheus a statue in the Agora for his military successes 
against the Spartans (Aeschin. 3.243; Nep. Timoth. 2.3; Paus. 1.3.2). 
 
155 Xen. Hell. 6.2.2-3; Diod. Sic. 15.45.2-4. The Zacynthus incident: Tuplin 1984, 537-
538; Parker 2001, 353-368. Possible exiles clause: Cawkwell 1981b, 80-83 (reprinted in 2011, 
188-191). 
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quickly proposed another peace conference with the Spartans.157 Xenophon records the 
proceedings including three speeches from the Athenians, which contained varied arguments in 
favor of the proposed peace. Callias, Sparta’s proxenos, insisted that the legendary kinship ties 
between the two poleis obligated their cooperation. Autocles admonished the Spartans, saying 
that if they intended to unite with the Athenians in friendship, they must honor Greek autonomy. 
And Callistratus made a call for the Athenians to recognize their own history of imperial abuses 
against the Greeks, to forgive the Spartans, and to reconfirm the dual hegemony arrangements.158 
 After listening to these speeches, the Spartans voted to accept the peace with its three 
provisions: the removal of governors (ἁρµοσταί) from the Greek poleis, the dissolution of 
military forces, and the autonomy (αὐτόνοµος) of the Greeks.159 The first provision appeared in 
the 375 peace, assuming the removal of garrisons (ἀφρουρήτους) is roughly synonymous with 
the removal of governors, and so did the third. The demilitarization clause, however, was new.160 
																																								 																				
156 The trial of Timotheus: Hansen n. 80; Roberts 1982, 40-45; Rice 1997, 227-240; 
Hochschulz 2007, 99-111. Although there is no explicit link in the sources connecting Timotheus 
to the pro-Theban faction (βοιωτιάζοντες), some (Plut. Mor. 575e; Roberts 1982, 43-45; Rice 
1997, 232, 236) have noted in him such a political orientation.  
 
157 Xen. Hell. 6.3.3. He also offered to search for available funds but he must have known 
that was futile: an eisphora had recently been exacted from the Athenians ([Dem.] 49.23).  
 
158 Xen. Hell. 6.3.1-17. Callias’ use of kinship diplomacy: Jones 1999, 32; Schepens 
2001, 91-93. Xenophon’s literary handling of the speeches: Gray 1989, 123-131; Tuplin 1993, 
101-110; Dillery 1995, 243-245; Schepens 2001, 81-96. Mosley 1962, 41-46 and Tuplin 1977, 
51-56 propose explanations for why Callistratus’ name is missing from the list of Athenian 
ambassadors in Xen. Hell. 6.3.2. 
 
159 Ibid. 6.3.18; Diod. Sic. 15.50.4. The Sparta peace in general: Ryder 1965, 64-69, 127-
130; Jehne 1994, 65-74; Dmitriev 2011, 45-46. 
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Since the previous peace collapsed so quickly because of military intervention in Zacynthian 
affairs, its inclusion here was as far as the delegates could go legally to increase the likelihood 
that this peace might endure. But if a conflict did break out, there was the further addition of a 
guarantee (or sanctions) clause: “if anyone acts against these things, one who wished could help 
the wronged poleis, but to the one unwilling it is not required by oath to fight as an ally of the 
wronged ones [εἰ δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιοίη, τὸν µὲν βουλόµενον βοηθεῖν ταῖς ἀδικουµέναις 
πόλεσι, τῷ δὲ µὴ βουλοµένῳ µὴ εἶναι ἔνορκον συµµαχεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις].”161 Being 
unprecedented, the voluntary guarantee was ambiguous and impractical. Unlike promises of 
mutual defense, this was virtually unenforceable – a voluntary guarantee is, after all, almost 
tantamount to no guarantee at all. In fact, in the next treaty there is a compulsory guarantee 
clause (see below). There must have been more than what Xenophon records. Aeschines, for 
example, adds that King Amyntas III of Macedon, an Athenian ally for only the past few years, 
sent a representative who recognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis.162 All in all, the treaty 
represents a closer association between the Athenians and Spartans, and, conversely, a rupture of 
																																								 																				
 160 Cawkwell 1981b, 74-76 (reprinted in 2011, 178-182) thinks the King’s Peace 
contained this clause, but Clarke 1990, 57-65 (cf. Stylianou 1998, 166-167) effectively dismisses 
that suggestion.   
 
161 Xen. Hell. 6.3.18. Most scholars (Ryder 1965, 68, 72, 125; Jehne 1994, 68-69; Low 
2007, 109; Rhodes 2008, 23; Dmitriev 2011, 50) think this is the first guarantee clause in a 
Greek interstate treaty, though Cawkwell 1981b, 78-79 (reprinted in 2011, 184-186), as usual, 
thinks one was in the King’s Peace. Bauslaugh 1991, 189-193 calls it a “neutrality clause.”  
 
 162 Aeschin. 2.32-33. 
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all friendly relations with the Thebans.163 The end result of all this was the Battle of Leuctra, 
where the Thebans thrashed the Spartan army.  
 After the battle, the Athenians remained committed to the defeated Spartans, and when 
they saw that many Peloponnesians were too (οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν), 
they made an open call – excluding the Thebans – for a conference in Athens to renew the peace 
yet again.164 Although Xenophon’s account of this conference is terse, lacking any record of 
debate or dissension, what he does report is that the delegates reaffirmed the principle of Greek 
autonomy and swore a new oath with a compulsory guarantee clause: “I will abide by the peace 
which the King sent down and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies. If anyone makes 
war on any polis of those that have sworn this oath, I will help with all my strength [ἐµµενῶ ταῖς 
σπονδαῖς ἃς βασιλεὺς κατέπεµψε καὶ τοῖς ψηφίσµασι τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συµµάχων. ἐὰν δέ 
τις στρατεύῃ ἐπί τινα πόλιν τῶν ὀµοσασῶν τόνδε τὸν ὅρκον, βοηθήσω παντὶ σθένει].”165 By 
stating that the Spartans and their allies accepted the decrees of the Athenians and their allies, 
Xenophon does not have in mind that they became members of the Confederacy but rather that 
they pledged to uphold the principle of autonomy as it was encapsulated in the Confederacy’s 
defining mission statement.166 A sense of cooperation towards a common goal existed among the 
																																								 																				
163 Xen. Hell. 6.3.19-20 (cf. Keen 1996, 115-117; Rhodes 1999, 33-40) records an 
altercation between Agesilaus and Epaminondas after the peace negotiations.  
 
164 Xen. Hell. 6.4.19-20 says that after the battle the Athenians refused to listen to or offer 
the customary meal of hospitality to the Theban messenger announcing the outcome of the battle.  
 
165 Ibid. 6.5.1-3. The Athens peace in general: Ryder 1965, 71-73, 131-133; Jehne 1994, 
74-79; Dmitriev 2011, 48-51.  
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parties and was reflected in the inclusion of βοηθήσω παντὶ σθένει in the guarantee clause. This 
is identical to the wording of mutual defense clauses in official alliances, suggesting that those 
involved in the Athens peace considered their agreement in operation to be akin to a defensive 
alliance against Thebes. They did not, however, go so far as to call it a συµµαχία, perhaps 
because that might be taken as a contradiction of the Confederacy’s original anti-Spartan 
commission, and the allies may look askance upon that. Athenian caution notwithstanding, it is 
clear that an alliance with the Spartans was only a matter of time.  
 That they were determined to make this happen is seen at the end of the next year, when 
the Athenians refused to make an anti-Spartan alliance with the newly constituted Arcadian 
League. Rejected by the Athenians, the Arcadians made an alliance with the Thebans and invited 
them into the Peloponnesus (T2).167 The Athenians, meanwhile, concerned (ἐν φροντίδι) about 
Sparta’s situation, called yet another conference to discuss a plan of action.168 The Spartan 
ambassadors spoke first. After opening with spurious historical instances of Spartan support for 
Athens – help in removing the Pisistratids and approval of the creation of the Delian League – 
they raised their strongest argument (µέγιστον . . . τῶν λεχθέντων): their preservation of Athens 
at the end of the Peloponnesian War. All of this was meant to impress on the Athenians their 
moral obligation to repay past services. The Spartans also pointed to the legal obligation to help 
																																								 																				
 166 Cargill 1981, 76-77; Sealey 1993, 70-71; Tuplin 1993, 115; Badian 1995, 93; Buckler 
2003, 299-301. Lewis 1997, 30 and Dmitriev 2011, 391-398 question that the Spartans accepted 
any semblance of subordination to Athens.  
 
167 Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3.  
 
168 Xen. Hell. 6.5.33.  
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according to the compulsory guarantee clause from the previous peace conference.169 The next 
speakers expanded on the moral line of reasoning: Cleiteles of Corinth called attention to the 
Athenians’ reputation for helping the wronged and Procles of Phlius, a friend of Agesilaus, 
underscored the principles of reciprocity, gratitude, and helping the wronged.170 Xenophon says 
that the Athenians, although initially unaffected, became so moved by these moral arguments 
that they “would not bear to hear those speaking in opposition, but voted to help in full force, and 
chose Iphicrates as general [καὶ τῶν µὲν ἀντιλεγόντων οὐκ ἠνείχοντο ἀκούοντες, ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ 
βοηθεῖν πανδηµεί, καὶ Ἰφικράτην στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο].”171 Diodorus says that, out of their 
largesse (µεγαλόψυχος ὢν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος), the Athenians dispatched 12,000 young men (νέοι) 
to protect the Spartans.172 This military contribution is noteworthy to the development of the 
alliance in the next year. Unlike other alliances in which the dispatch of forces follows the 
ratification of an official alliance treaty, in this case the Athenians and Spartans made promises 
of mutual defense and cooperated in military engagements long before there was a formal 
alliance. 
The Athenian army contributed to Sparta’s defense and the Thebans left the 
Peloponnesus in the spring of 369. Unaware of whether they would return, the Spartans and their 
																																								 																				
169 Ibid. 6.5.36: “the Athenians were obligated to assist according to the oaths [ὡς κατὰ 
τοὺς ὅρκους βοηθεῖν δέοι].” 
 
170 Ibid. 6.5.37-48. Procles’ speech: Gray 1989, 116-117; Dillery 1995, 247-248; Low 
2007, 181-182; Baragwanath 2012, 322-329. Procles and Agesilaus: Xen. Hell. 5.3.13. 
 
171 Ibid. 6.5.49; cf. Paus. 9.14.6. [Dem.] 59.27 says that Callistratus convinced the 
Athenians to help the Spartans. 
 
 172 Diod. Sic. 15.63.1-2. Missiou 1992, 96-100 compares Diodorus’ negative depiction of 
the Spartans with Xenophon’s more positive portrayal. 
130	
	
allies sent ambassadors with full powers (πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες) to Athens to specify more 
fully the terms of an alliance.173 Xenophon records only one topic on the agenda: the leadership 
of the alliance. The Athenian council had advised a leadership on equal terms (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ 
ὁµοίοις), with Sparta in full command of the land campaigns and Athens of the naval, and many 
in the conference spoke in favor of this arrangement.174 Others, however, feared that the alliance 
would not be equal in practice because the naval contribution from the Spartans would be 
composed of helots and non-citizens, while full Athenian citizens would fight under Spartan 
command on land. One of those to object was the Athenian assemblyman Cephisodotus who 
proposed a five-day rotation of overall leadership, a notable modification of Callistratus’ vision 
of dual hegemony but one with contemporary parallels (A17, A23).175 The alliance with 
Cephisodotus’ proposal was what the assembly ratified.  
But there must have been other provisions. One of the representatives to the conference 
noted, “the other things for the most part have been agreed upon [τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα σχεδόν τι 
																																								 																				
 
173 Xen. Hell. 7.1.1; cf. Diod. Sic. 15.67.1. The alliance in general: Accame 1941, 164-
167; Hoschulz 2007, 139-142. Spartan πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες: Mosley 1973, 30-38; Missiou-
Ladi 1987, 336-345; Pownall 1995, 144-146.  
 
174 Xen. Hell. 7.1.2-11. Tuplin 1993, 113 n. 35 points out that ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁµοίοις is 
unique in its application to an alliance, being associated usually with decrees for citizenship or 
for synoecism. 
 
175 Xen. Hell. 7.1.12-14. Buckler 1980b, 90-92 considers Cephisodotus’ proposal to be 
sensible politically but foolish militarily. Xen. Hell. 7.1.19, however, recounts how immediately 
after the conference the new allies successfully defended Corinth from Theban attacks, so that 
“the allies of the Spartans were revived [ἀνεψύχθησαν οἱ τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων σύµµαχοι].”  
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συνωµολόγηται].”176 No ancient writer specifies what τὰ ἄλλα were and no inscription for the 
alliance survives. This chapter has proceeded on the proposition that the alliance was a 
culmination of the earlier peace conferences and that, in all probability, τὰ ἄλλα refers to some of 
the items from the earlier agreements. Here are those provisions in review: 
Table 3: Provisions in Athenian-Spartan Treaties (375-369) 
375 Sparta Conference  Greek autonomy 
Garrisons clause 
Exiles clause (?) 
371 Sparta Conference  Removal of governors 
Demilitarization 
Greek autonomy 
Voluntary guarantee clause 
Athenian claims on Amphipolis 
371 Athens Conference  Greek autonomy 
Compulsory guarantee clause 
370 Athens Conference  Dispatch of military forces 
369 Spartan-Athenian Alliance  Leadership on five-day rotation 
τὰ ἄλλα 
 
Without further evidence it is impossible to specify whether none, some, or all of these 
provisions were included in the 369 alliance. But taking into consideration the earlier 
agreements, the analogous conditions of contemporary alliances (see Chapter II), and the strong 
ideological ties between individuals within each polis, it is not unreasonable to suspect that, in 
addition to the specification of the leadership arrangements, the alliance included provisions for 
autonomy, removal of garrisons, mutual defense, or any of the other provisions that appeared in 
the previous conferences. Whatever the specific content of the alliance, the two sides gave their 
approval, most certainly exchanged oaths and participated in a ceremony of sacrifices and shared 
meals before marching to the Peloponnesus for another showdown with the Thebans. The 
alliance was now fully operational.  
																																								 																				
176 Ibid. 7.1.2. 
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John Buckler believes the alliance was “short-sighted, wasteful, and potentially 
dangerous, and from it Athens gained nothing but some regrets.”177 This assessment is too harsh. 
The earlier Theban policy had not worked out and became in fact detrimental to Athenian 
interests and morale. Aligning with the Spartans was the best option open to them under the 
circumstances. Indeed, fourth-century Athenian orators referred with pride to how they saved the 
Spartans in their time of need.178 The Athenians had great concern for the rapid rise of Theban 
power, but the alliance with the Spartans was, at its foundation, a product of a long process that 
covered a number of personal contacts and collaborative commitments. And the next alliances 
were extensions of that policy.  
The rapprochement of these two adversaries changed the nature of geopolitics in the 
Greek world. The Second Athenian Confederacy had been established to oppose Sparta, but now 
the Athenians had agreed to ally with that very enemy. Unsurprisingly, some of the Confederacy 
allies questioned the sagacity of this move. A fragmentary inscription from 368, for example, 
preserves a request from Mytilene for an explanation. In the reply Callistratus reminds the 
Mytileneans that the Athenians began the war (and the Confederacy) against Sparta to preserve 
the principle of Greek freedom ([ὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερία]ς τῶν Ἑλλήνων). But he also announces that 
although their devotion to that objective has not diminished, the war with Sparta has now passed 
(τὸµ πόλεµον τὸν παρελθό[ντα]). Unfortunately, the inscription then becomes too incomplete to 
																																								 																				
177 Buckler 2003, 310. 
 
178 Isoc. 5.44, 7.69, 8.105; Dem. 16.12, 18.98, 19.75; Aeschin. 2.164; Din. 1.76; Callisth. 
FGrH 124 F8. 
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reconstruct any further his justification for the new alliance.179 The complete reply apparently 
satisfied the allies since there is no other evidence of scepticism or dissension for several years. 
 With the new Peloponnesian policy firmly in place, the Athenians turned their attention 
to making alliances elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, they had succeeded – in either 375 
(Chabrias’ campaign) or 373 (Timotheus’ campaign) – in gaining a bilateral alliance with King 
Amyntas III of Macedon, a former Spartan ally. Nothing can be said with certainty about its 
conditions, although there may have been something in it about Amyntas supplying Athens with 
timber and supporting Athenian claims to Amphipolis.180 The alliance held until the king’s death 
c. 370, after which his son Alexander II turned from the Athenians and allied with the Thebans 
(T4). In 365, the Athenians made another alliance with Amyntas’ second son, Perdiccas, but that 
too did not last long.181  
A14 The Athenians and Alexander of Pherae (368) 
IG II² 116, lines 39-40; Dem. 23.120; Diod. Sic. 15.71.3; Plut. Pel. 31.4; Mor. 193d 
In 368, the Athenians accepted an alliance proposal from Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae. 
His uncle Jason, a friend of the Athenian Timotheus, had made a brief alliance with the 
Athenians in the mid-370s, which seems to have lapsed after Timotheus’ voluntary exile in 
																																								 																				
 
179 IG II² 107, lines 41-45 (Tod 131 = Harding 53 = RO 31); cf. Alfieri Tonini 1989, 47-
61; Dreher 1995, 27-29; Hochschulz 2007, 142-147. 
 
180 IG II² 102. Cargill 1981, 85-86 follows Accame 1941, 130 in allowing a date for the 
alliance as late as 370. Macedonian timber to Athens: Xen. Hell. 6.1.11; [Dem.] 49.26. Similar 
conditions existed in Amyntas’ earlier alliance with the Chalcidians (Tod 111 = Harding 21 = 
RO 12; cf. Borza 1987, 39, 45).  
 
 181 Aeschin. 2.29-30; cf. Heskel 1997, 31. 
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373.182 The increase in anti-Theban sentiment amongst the Athenians after Leuctra, however, 
encouraged Alexander to think that he might revive his uncle’s alliance. In 368, when he was 
confronted by an invading Theban army, he dispatched ambassadors to Athens for assistance 
against their mutual enemy, and the Athenians agreed with alacrity. The stele recording the 
alliance does not survive – a later Athenian alliance with the Thessalian League stipulated its 
destruction – so the terms can only be guessed at from bits of information in the historians. 
Plutarch says that the Athenians for some time were receiving (εἶχον is imperfect) money from 
Alexander.183 If this was an obligatory condition of the alliance, then it was the first prescribed 
financial arrangement in an interstate treaty since Thrasybulus’ alliances in Thrace and in the 
Aegean. Revenue collection was a part of the Confederacy alliances but only in the form of 
συντάξεις (contributions), a practically ineffective mechanism for managing alliances. By 368, 
the Athenians apparently deemed financial obligations to be once again a necessary feature of an 
alliance. According to Diodorus, in return for Alexander’s money, the Athenians dispatched 
thirty ships carrying one thousand soldiers.184 The exchange of money and military support was 
an arrangement based on mutual benefit but not mutual defense. For through supplying large 
																																								 																				
 
 182 [Dem.] 49.10; Nep. Tim. 4.2. Cargill 1981, 83-85 and Sprawski 1999, 84-89 review 
arguments for and against Jason’s membership in the Confederacy (possibly indicated in IG II² 
43, line 111), concluding that he had only a bilateral alliance with Athens. Jason made an 
alliance with Amyntas in 371 (Xen. Hell. 6.1.11; Isoc. 5.20; Diod. Sic. 15.60.2-6), perhaps to 
obstruct Athenian influence in the north.  
 
 183 Plut. Pel. 31.4. Plutarch also claims that the Athenians erected a bronze statue to their 
benefactor (εὐεργέτης). Plut. Mor. 193d says Alexander promised to allow his new allies to 
purchase meat at a discount price. Sprawski 2006, 142-144 discusses Alexander’s coinage.  
  
 184 Diod. Sic. 15.71.3; cf. Xen. Hell. 7.1.28. The alliance in general: Cargill 1981, 87. 
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sums of money, the tyrant did not contribute directly or personally to the defense of Athens (as 
the Athenians did for him), but his contribution was to the benefit of Athens nonetheless. If there 
was a military threat to the city, that money could serve as an indirect means of defense because 
the Athenians could use it to hire outside help.  
Whatever the other arrangements may have been, there was a great deal of excitement in 
Athens. Demosthenes remarks that “Alexander was everywhere, by Zeus [πάντ᾽ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, 
πρὸς Διὸς].”185 But neither the enthusiasm nor the alliance was long-lived. In 364, the Thebans, 
having defeated Alexander in battle, forced him to accept a subordinate alliance with them (T7) 
and to cease his association with Athens. And yet the Athenians did not remove the alliance stele 
from their Acropolis, a strong indication of how seriously they took the alliance (see 
Conclusion). Nor did they remove it in 362 when Alexander made attacks against Athenian allies 
and the Piraeus.186 It was destroyed only in 361, as mentioned earlier, in accordance with a new 
alliance with the Thessalian League, a traditional enemy of Alexander (A19).  
A15 The Athenians and Dionysius I of Syracuse (368) 
 IG II2 105 
Also in 368, the Athenians secured a long sought-after alliance with Dionysius I of 
Syracuse, bringing them even closer to the Spartans, old allies of the tyrant (S1).187 Previously, 
during the Corinthian War, the Athenians had courted Dionysius in order to draw away western 
																																								 																				
 
185 Dem. 23.120. Isocrates saw in Alexander a candidate to lead an expedition against the 
Persians (cf. Sprawski 2006, 138). 
 
186 Heskel 1997, 66-70.  
 
187 Athens also made an alliance with Leucas (IG II² 104 = Tod 134), another Spartan 
ally.  
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support from Sparta, but they were unable to make any headway at that time.188 But now that 
they had become Spartan allies there was a better chance of reaching amity with the Syracusan 
leader. In 369, the Athenian council passed a probouleumatic decree that praised Dionysius and 
granted him and his descendants (ἐκγόνους) crowns, citizenship, and priority access to the 
council.189 It was a flattering and effective gesture, followed in the next year by an assembly 
decree, which records the alliance with Dionysius:  
“He and his descendants shall be allies of the people of Athens for all time on the following 
terms. If any one goes against the territory of Athens for war either by land or by sea, Dionysius 
and his descendants shall go in support as the Athenians call on them, both by land and by sea 
with all their strength as far as possible; and if any one goes against Dionysius or his descendants 
or what Dionysius rules for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support as they 
call on them, both by land and by sea with all their strength as far as possible.”190 
 
    εἶ[ναι δὲ συµµάχος αὐ]- 
 [τὸν κα]ὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους [τοῦ δήµου τοῦ Ἀθην]- 
 [αίων ἐ]ς [τ]ὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον [ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· ἐάν τις] 
 [ἴηι ἐπ]ὶ [τ]ὴν χώραν τὴν Ἀ[θηναίων ἐπὶ πολέµ]- 
 [ωι ἢ κατ]ὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλ[ατταν, βοηθεῖν Διο]- 
 [νύσιον] καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόν[ους αὐτο ͂καθότι ἂν] 
 [ἐπαγγέ]λλωσιν Ἀθηναῖ[οι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ] 
 [κατὰ θά]λατταν παντ[ὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνα]- 
 [τόν· καὶ] ἐάν τις ἴηι ἐ[πὶ Διονύσιον ἢ τοὺς ἐ]- 
 [κγόνου]ς αὐτο ͂ἢ ὅσων ἄ[ρχει Διονύσιος ἐπὶ] 
 [πολέµω]ι ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κα[τὰ θάλατταν, βοηθε]- 
 [ῖν Ἀθη]ναίους καθότι ἂ[ν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν κα]- 
 [ὶ κατὰ γ]ῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλα[τταν παντὶ σθένε]- 
 [ι κατὰ τ]ὸ [δυ]νατόν. 
 
																																								 																				
188 Athens passed an honorific decree for Dionysius in 394 (IG II² 18 = Tod 108 = 
Harding 20 = RO 10). Conon also tried to persuade Dionysius to make a marriage alliance with 
the Cyprian king Evagoras and to become a “friend and ally [φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος]” of the 
Athenians (Lys. 19.19-20). 
 
 189 IG II² 103 (Tod 133 = RO 33); Rhodes 1972, 80-81. 
 
190 Translation is from RO 34. The alliance in general: Caven 1990, 209-211.  
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As is customary in fourth-century Athenian alliances, there is a specification that the 
arrangements are to last forever (ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον), extending beyond Dionysius to his 
descendants. Mutual defense is expressed here in the terms of territorial defense clauses, 
encompassing the political centers as well as the larger territories (χώρα) in their possession.191 
There is also the converse of mutual defense, a promise of mutual non-aggression: 
“It shall not be permitted to Dionysius or his descendants to bear arms against the territory of the 
Athenians for hurt either by land or by sea; nor shall it be permitted to the Athenians to bear arms 
against Dionysius or his descendants or what Dionysius rules for hurt either by land or by sea.” 
 
 ὅπλα δ[ὲ µὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐπι]- 
 [φέρειν] Δ[ιο]νυσίωι µηδ[ὲ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις αὐ]- 
 [τοῦ ἐπὶ] τ[ὴν] χώραν τὴν Ἀ[θηναίων ἐπὶ πηµον]- 
 [ῆι µῆτε] κ[ατ]ὰ γῆν µήτε κ[ατὰ θάλατταν· µηδὲ] 
 [Ἀθηναί]ο[ι]ς ἐξεῖναι ὅπ[λα ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ] 
 [Διονύ]σι[ο]ν µηδὲ τοὺ<ς> ἐκ[γόνους αὐτοῦ µηδὲ] 
 [ὅσων ἄ]ρχ[ε]ι Διονύσιος [ἐπὶ πηµονῆι µήτε κ]- 
 [ατὰ γῆν] µ[ή]τε κατὰ θάλα[τταν. 
 
This mutual non-aggression clause, which also applies equally to the territories under each ally’s 
rule, is close in form to the prohibition against interference in an ally’s domestic constitution that 
is common in subsequent treaties. In other words, the allies are to act according to the guiding 
principles of reciprocity; they are to support each other as friends and not to harm each other as 
enemies. These terms are followed by the instructions for the swearing of the oaths in both poleis 
and for the erection of the alliance stele on the Acropolis. Very soon after the conclusion of the 
alliance, Dionysius, now an Athenian citizen, submitted one of his own tragedies to the Lenaean 
festival in Athens. After hearing that it won first prize, he celebrated so fiercely that he died, so it 
																																								 																				
191 Baltrusch 1994, 68-82. Territorial defense clauses appear in an undated Spartan 
alliance with the Aetolians and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461), the Athenian Confederacy’s alliance 
with Corcyra in 375 (IG II² 97), the Chalcidian alliance with the Illyrian king Grabus in 357 
(SEG 37.567), and an Athenian alliance with the Eretrians sometime in midcentury (IG II² 125). 
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is said.192 Despite the extension of the alliance to Dionysius’ descendants, his son and successor, 
Dionysius II, did not continue it.  
 
Alliances in the Peloponnesus and the North (366-357) 
 
A16 The Athenians and the Arcadian League (366) 
Xen. Hel. 7.4.2-3, 6 
Gradually, however, sentiment in Athens turned away from the Spartans and their 
traditional allies. In 366, after Chabrias and Callistratus lost control of the border town of Oropus 
to the Thebans, the first real signs of displeasure with the pro-Spartan policy began to surface.193 
Lycomedes of Mantinea, having difficulties with his own allies in the Peloponnesus, took notice 
of this shifting mood and made a second attempt (the first was in 370) to win over the Athenians 
to an alliance. Some Athenians stood fast in their devotion to preserving friendly relations with 
the Spartans, enemies of the Arcadians, unless they could be assured that this new alliance would 
be defensive in nature, without any requirement to assist in an Arcadian attack against their 
friends in Sparta.194 The proposal passed, but it was the result of a risky balancing act that 
																																								 																				
  
192 Diod. Sic. 15.74.1-2. 
 
193 Xen. Hell. 7.4.1; Dem. 18.99; Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1. Arist. Rh. 1.7.13 says 
Callistratus offered advice (τὸν βουλεύσαντα), perhaps to submit the Oropus issue to arbitration, 
but was ignored. Buckler 1977, 33-34 proposes that, despite claims to the contrary, arbitration 
favored Theban possession of Oropus, but he does not identify the arbiter.    
 
194 Xen. Hell. 7.4.1-3, 6. The Athenian-Arcadian alliance in general: Buckler 1980b, 195-
198. The Athenians did not go to the assistance of the Arcadians in 365 when the Spartans 
invaded Arcadia on behalf of Elis (Xen. Hell. 7.4.20-27). 
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reflected the division of opinion in Athens. In 362, after the Battle of Mantinea, the Mantinean 
faction of the Arcadians would be joined by the Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians in making a 
joint alliance with the Athenians. 
A17 The Athenians and Arcadia, Achaea, Elis, and Phlius (362) 
IG II2 112 
After the conclusion of the alliance with the Arcadians, there was a perceptible shift away 
from Callistratus’ policies. In the same year, the Athenians agreed to a common peace proposal 
from the Thebans, which included support for Messenian independence from Sparta.195 In 365, 
Callistratus was finally brought up on charges extending from his failure to regain Oropus. He 
escaped prosecution, because of his remarkable defense speech, but later, in 362, he was tried in 
absentia in an impeachment trial (εἰσαγγελία) and sentenced to death.196 This took place about 
the same time as the Battle of Mantinea, which pitted most of the Greeks on the side of the 
Thebans or on the side of the Peloponnesians and Athenians but, in the end, failed to bring about 
any decisive military or political outcome. In the subsequent peace conference, the Athenians 
agreed once again to Messenian autonomy.197 The alliance with the Spartans remained on the 
books for some time afterwards, but for all practical purposes the Athenians had renounced it.  
																																								 																				
 
195 Diod. Sic. 15.76.3; cf. Cawkwell 1961, 80-86 (reiterated in 2005, 292-299); Heskel 
1997, 101-114; Stylianou 1998, 485-489. 
 
196 Callistratus from 365 to his exile in 362 and his execution in the 350s: Hyp. 4.1; 
Lycurg. 1.93; Hansen n. 83, 87; Roberts 1982, 71-73; Pecorella Longo 2004, 105-110; 
Hochschulz 2007, 151-195.  
 
197 Polyb. 4.33.8-9; Diod. Sic. 15.89.1-2; Plut. Ages. 35.3; cf. Ryder 1965, 140-144; 
Jehne 1994, 96-115. 
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Also coming out of the aftermath of Mantinea was a joint alliance with four 
Peloponnesian poleis (Arcadia, Achaea, Elis, and Phlius). This alliance is only known through 
the epigraphical record. Compared to early alliances, this inscription is much lengthier and fuller 
in its expression of the alliance’s conditions. The main text opens with a vow:  
“The herald shall vow forthwith to Zeus Olympics and to Athena Polias and to Demeter and to 
Kore and to the Twelve Gods and to the August Goddesses, that, if what is resolved about the 
alliance is to the advantage of the people of Athens, a sacrifice and procession shall be made on 
the accomplishment of these things as the people shall resolve. That is to be vowed.”198  
 
εὔξασθαι µὲν τὸγ κήρυκα αὐτίκα µ- 
άλα τῶι Διὶ τῶι Ὀλυµπίωι καὶ τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι τῆι Πολιά- 
δι καὶ τῆι Δήµητρι καὶ τῆι Κόρηι καὶ τοῖς δώδεκα [θ]- 
εοῖς καὶ ταῖς σεµναῖς θεαῖς, ἐὰν συνενείγκηι Ἀ[θη]- 
ναίων τῶι δήµωι τὰ δόξαντα περὶ τῆς συµµαχία[ς θυ]- 
[σί]αν καὶ πρόσοδον ποιήσασθα[ι] τελουµένων [τούτω]- 
[ν κα]θότι ἂν τῶι δήµωι δοκῆι· τα[ῦ]τα µὲν ηὖχθ[αι, 
 
This vow is directed to six divinities or groups of divinities. Zeus and Athena are representative 
patrons of the Peloponnesians (in particular, Elis) and the Athenians, respectively. The 
accompanying relief, showing a standing Athena behind the figures of Hera and an enthroned 
Zeus, illustrates visually their presence in the alliance.199 The inclusion of Demeter and Kore, 
patron deities for Arcadia and Eleusis, the Attic religious center under Athenian control, may 
symbolize the close relationship which the Arcadians and the Athenians enjoyed since their 
alliance in 366 (A16). Slobodan Dušanić, scholar of the Arcadian League, argues that a kinship 
narrative proceeded from the recent contacts between the two parties and was communicated 
here by the appearance of the two goddesses.200 This is a long way from 385, when the 
																																								 																				
198 Translation is from RO 41. 
 
199 Vow: Bliquez 1979, 237-240; Dušanić 2000b, 59-71; Parker 2005, 406; Sommerstein 
and Torrance 2014, 8, 17-18. Relief: Lawton 1995, 94; Smith 2011, 105, 135. 
 
200 Dušanić 2000b, 67. 
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Athenians refused to send military assistance to the Mantineans because of their lack of close 
personal relationships and contacts. Now, the two express their relationship in terms of legendary 
kinship. These particular divinities, along with the Twelve Gods and the August Goddesses (i.e., 
the Eirynes), therefore, define the alliance in religious and social terms.  
The inscription then moves to the more practical items of the alliance. For the Athenians, 
this alliance indicated that they would continue on the trajectory away from Callistratus’ 
laconizing policy.201 But for the Peloponnesians, three of whom (Arcadia, Achaea, and Elis) 
were primary allies of the Thebans throughout the 360s (see Chapter V), this new alliance 
indicates their clean break with the Thebans. And the five provisions included here exhibit this 
shift in a subtle way. The first three are contained inside the familiar mutual defense clause: 
“If any one goes against Attica or overthrows the people of Athens or sets up a tyrant or an 
oligarchy, the Arcadians and Achaeans and Eleans and Phliasians shall go in support of the 
Athenians with all their strength as called on by the Athenians as far as possible; and if any one 
goes against those cities, or overthrows the people of Phlius or overthrows or changes the 
constitution of Achaea or Arcadia or Elis, or exiles anybody, the Athenians shall go in support of 
these with all their strength as called on by those who are being wronged as far as possible.” 
 
ἐὰν δέ τις ἴηι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττι]- 
[κὴ]ν ἢ τὸν δῆµον [καταλύηι τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ τύραννον] 
[κα]θιστῆι ἢ ὀλι[γαρχίαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαι]- 
[ος] καὶ Ἠλείους κ[αὶ Φλειασίους Ἀθηναίοις παντὶ σ]- 
[θε]νει καθότι ἂν [ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ τὸ δ]- 
[υν]ατόν· καὶ ἐάν [τις ἴηι ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὸν] 
δῆµον καταλύε[ι τὸν Φλειασίων ἢ ἐὰν τὴν πολιτεία]- 
ν τὴν Ἀχαιῶν ἢ τ[ὴν Ἀρκάδων ἢ τὴν Ἠλείων καταλύηι ἢ] 
µεθιστῆι ἢ φυγα[δεύηι τινάς, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους τ]- 
ούτοις παντὶ σθ[ένει καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν οἱ ἀ]- 
δικούµενοι κατ[ὰ τὸ δυνατὸν.  
 
																																								 																				
 
201 The alliance proposal was first introduced in the form of a resolution (δόγµα) from the 
allies in the Confederacy, who seem to have had more of a voice in the creation of Athenian 
alliances since the unilateral decision to ally with the Spartans in 369 (Ryder 1965, 88). The 
Athenian council also expressed its endorsement in a resolution (πρὀβούλευσεν) (Rhodes 1972, 
68-69, 76-78). 
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Mutual defense, the prohibition against any interference in another ally’s domestic constitution, 
and an exiles clause were all previously included in the joint alliance between the Arcadians, 
Eleans, Argives, and the Thebans in 370 (T2). Four years later, the Achaeans committed to an 
offensive alliance with the Thebans which also contained the latter two conditions (T6). Yet, as 
Chapter V explains further, these alliances collapsed rather quickly. All of those involved in this 
alliance in 362 must have had those failures in mind and sought ways to rectify them. At the 
close of this inscription, therefore, two new provisions were added that were not in the earlier 
Theban alliances:  
“Each shall have the leadership in its own territory. If it is resolved by all the cities to add 
anything else, whatever is resolved shall be within their oath. The oath shall be sworn in each city 
by the highest officials of the Peloponnesians, and of the Athenians by the generals and the 
taxiarchs and the hipparchs and the phylarchs and the cavalry –” 
 
ἡγεµονίαν δὲ ἔχειν ἐ]- 
ν τῆι αὑτῶν ἑκά[στους· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλο δοκῆι ἁπάσαις] 
[τ]αῖς πόλεσι πρ[οσθεῖναι, ὅτι ἂν δόξηι, εὔορκον εἶν]- 
αι. ὀµόσαι δ’ [ἐν ἑκάστηι πόλει τὰ µέγιστα τέλη Πελο]- 
ποννησίων, [τῶν δ’ Ἀθηναίων τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ το]- 
ὺς ταξιάρ[χους καὶ τοὺς ἱππάρχους καὶ τοὺς φυλάρ]- 
χους καὶ τ[οὺς ἱππέας] 
 
This unambiguous designation of leadership – each ally retains leadership within its territory – 
was included to prevent a repeat of the confusion that the Peloponnesians had experienced in 
their alliances with the Thebans due to a lack of clear leadership roles. Such a designation in this 
alliance with the Athenians, however, gave a sense of order and stability that the previous 
alliances lacked. Finally, there is provision for future amendment. This was not new to the 
Athenians – earlier alliances (A1, A2, A3) had it – but it was new to the Peloponnesians. The 
possibility of making adjustments to the alliance terms must have been regarded highly after the 
difficulties arising from the Theban arrangements. 
A18 The Athenians and the Thessalian League (361) 
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IG II2 116 
In the next year, the Athenians went even further in reversing the foreign policies of the 
past decade by making an alliance with the members of the Thessalian League, traditional 
enemies of Alexander of Pherae. The alliance with the tyrant (A14) had turned out to be an 
embarrassment – a temporary, hollow agreement. In 361, for example, Alexander, throwing off 
the shackles of his subordinating alliance with the recently defeated Thebans (T7), asserted his 
power on the sea by attacking Athenian possessions in the Cyclades and the Piraeus.202 He also 
intensified his usual conflict with the Thessalians, who, in response, took no thought of their 
hapless Theban protectors but instead looked to the Athenians for help.203 This was natural since 
both were under attack from Alexander. It is not clear who initiated the proceedings, but the two 
sides came to a final agreement which included four provisions.204 Each exhibits the potential 
influences of reciprocity and mutuality in governing classical Greek interstate alliances. The 
features of the first two, mutual defense and the preservation of each ally’s domestic constitution, 
are familiar and need not be rehashed here. In the opening lines of the inscription there is a new 
provision in Athenian alliances, the mutual acceptance of each other’s existing allies: 
“Concerning what is said by the envoys of the Thessalians, be it decreed by the people: Accept 
the alliance, for good fortune, as the Thessalians offer; and there shall be an alliance for them 
																																								 																				
 
202 [Dem.] 50.4-5; Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-2; Polyaenus Strat. 6.2; cf. Heskel 1997, 66-70; 
Sprawski 2006, 145. 
 
203 The Thessalians remained in alliance with the Thebans as late as the Battle of 
Mantinea in 362 (Xen. Hell. 7.5.4). 
 
204 Westlake 1935, 134-138; Giovannini 2007, 260-262. Lines 8 to 11 of IG II2 116 imply 
that the Thessalians initiated the alliance, but lines 34 to 36 suggest that the Athenians took the 
first step. Tracy 2009, 81-82 supposes, on the basis of letter shapes, that IG II² 175 refers to a 
Thessalian-Athenian alliance even earlier in the fourth century.  
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with the Athenians for all time. Also all the allies of the Athenians shall be allies of the 
Thessalians, and those of the Thessalians allies of the Athenians.”205 
 
[π]ε[ρὶ] ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ π- 
[ρ]έσβεις τῶν Θετταλῶ[ν], ἐψηφίσθα[ι] τῶι δ[ή]µωι, δέχεσθ- 
αι τὴν συµµαχίαν τύχ[η]ι ἀγαθῆι κ[α]θὰ ἐπ[α]νγέλλοντα- 
[ι] οἱ Θετταλο[ί]. εἶναι δὲ αὐ[τ]ο[ῖ]ς τὴ[ν] συµµ[α]χίαν πρὸς Ἀ- 
θηναίος εἰς [τ]ὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον. εἶ[ν]αι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθην- 
αίων συµµ[ά]χ[ο]ς ἅπαντας Θετταλῶ[ν] συµµ[ά]χος καὶ τὸς 
[Θ]ετταλῶν Ἀ[θη]ναίων. 
 
The alliance is designed not only for mutual defense against an enemy but also for the mutual 
benefit of the new allies. In this particular clause, for example, there is a call for each party’s 
existing allies to be held in common. Similar language shows up again in the last lines (45-46) of 
the text, which praise a certain Theaetetus “for speaking best and doing whatever good he can for 
the people of Athens and the Thessalians in an orderly manner [εἶναι δὲ καὶ [Θ]ε[αί]τητον τὸν 
Ἐρχιέα ὡ[ς] λέγο[ν]τα [ἄρ]ι̣σ̣τα [κα]ὶ [πρ]άττοντα ὅ[τ]ι ἂν δύνηται ἀγα[θὸ]ν τῶ[ι δήµ]ω[ι] τῶι 
Ἀ[θην]α[ί]ω[ν κα]ὶ Θετταλ[ο]ῖς ἐν τῶι τεταγµέ[ν]ωι].” This inhabitant of Attica had done some 
unrecorded service which resulted in mutual benefit for the larger communities and presumably 
played some part in bringing about this alliance. “What benefits the Thessalians, it might be 
argued,” Polly Low comments on Theaetetus’ service, “necessarily benefits the Athenians too – 
and vice versa [italics in original].”206 Positive reciprocity and shared objectives inspire the 
administration of the alliances as well as the military provisions, in this case reaching beyond the 
operations of the war to the conditions for ending a war:    
“It shall not be permitted to put an end to the war against Alexander, either to the Thessalians 
without the Athenians or to the Athenians without the archon and koinon of the Thessalians.” 
 
																																								 																				
 
205 Translation is from RO 44. 
 
206 Low 2007, 143.  
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τ]ὸ[ν] δὲ πόλεµον τὸν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν µὴ [ἐξεῖν]α[ι] κ- 
[αταλ]ύσασθαι [µήτε] Θετταλοῖς [ἄ]νευ Ἀθηναί[ων µήτε] Ἀ- 
[θην]αίοις ἄ[νευ το͂] ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ [τοῦ Θεττ]- 
[αλῶν]. 
 
This fourth provision, a prohibition against any unilateral attempt at peace with a mutual enemy, 
is also new for the Athenians. It was probably included in the Thessalians’ earlier alliance with 
the Thebans in 370 (T1), but the latter made an alliance with their mutual enemy, Alexander of 
Pherae, anyway (T7). Although the Thessalians probably conceded in 364 to the Theban alliance 
with Alexander, as argued in Chapter V, over time they came to regret that decision. It may be 
that the Thessalians expected a better result this time with the Athenians. Finally, to underscore 
the identity of allies and of enemies, the inscription calls for the destruction of the stele recording 
the Athenian alliance with Alexander and makes provision for a new stele to commemorate this 
alliance with the Thessalians. There is no record of the two conducting a campaign against 
Alexander before he was assassinated by his brothers in 358. When the Athenians made an 
alliance with those same brothers during the Third Sacred War (from 356 to 346), no one voiced 
a demand to destroy the stele for the Thessalian alliance.207  
A19 The Athenians and Cersebleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus (357) 
 IG II2 126; Dem. 23.170-178 
 Throughout the early fourth century, the Athenians had a keen interest in making 
alliances in the north, especially in Thrace: Thrasybulus’ alliances with Seuthes (A4) and 
Amadocus (A5) in 390, the reinforced alliance with Hebryzelmis in 386, and many others which 
were incorporated into the Second Athenian Confederacy.208 Throughout the 360s, the Athenians 
had a strained relationship with Seuthes’ successor, Cotys I, and even approved of his 
																																								 																				
207 Sprawski 2011, 203-210. 
 
208 Northern Greeks in the Confederacy: Cawkwell 1981a, 42-45. 
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assassination.209 The resulting instability from his son Cersebleptes’ rivalry with other 
Odrysians, Berisades and Amadocus, created anxiety among the Greeks in the region and among 
the Athenians. After a number of failed attempts on the part of Athenian generals to reconcile the 
three, Chares finally succeeded in bringing them into a joint alliance with the Athenians in 
357.210 The treaty contained three principal provisions: mutual defense, revenue collection 
arrangements, and a commitment to suppress any rebellion among each other’s existing allies.  
 The first can only be conjectured from the words βοιηθεῖν and οἱ σύµµαχοι in the 
fragmentary lines (1-2) at the opening of the inscription, but such a provision would be expected 
and not at all unprecedented. The majority of the inscription details the different aspects of the 
revenue collection arrangements.  
“Of the Greek cities which are written on the stelai as paying tribute to Berisades or Amadocus or 
Cersebleptes and as being allies of the Athenians, if they do not give up to the Athenians all their 
tribute, they shall be exacted by Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes as far as possible; and 
if anywhere they do not give to Berisades or Amadocus or Cersebleptes all their tribute, it shall be 
exacted by the Athenians and the generals in charge of the force as far as possible. The Greek 
cities in Thrace, paying to Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes the traditional tribute and to 
the Athenians the syntaxis, shall be free and autonomous, being allies of the Athenians as they 
swore and of Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes.”211 
 
περὶ δὲ τ]ῶµ πόλεων ὅσ[αι ἐγράφησαν ἐν ταῖς στ]- 
[ήλαις τελοῦ]σαι Βηρισάδε[ι ἢ Ἀµαδόκωι ἢ Κερσεβλ]- 
[έπτηι τοὺς] φόρους καὶ Ἀθην[αίοις ὑποτελεῖς ὑπά]- 
[ρχουσι, ἐὰ]µ µὴ ἀποδῶσιν Ἀθη[ναίοις αἱ πόλεις τὸς] 
[φόρους, πρ]άττειν Βηρισάδην [καὶ Ἀµάδοκην καὶ Κε]- 
[ρσεβλέπτ]ην κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. κ[αὶ ἐάν που Βηρισάδ]- 
																																								 																				
 
209 Athens and Cotys: Dem. 23 passim; Archibald 1998, 219-222; Zahrnt 2015, 44-45. 
 
210 Heskel 1997, 152–153; Archibald 1998, 231–232. Veligianni-Terzi 2004 uniquely 
associates the inscription for the alliance (IG II2 126) with Athenodorus’ treaty in 358 not 
Chares’ in 357 (Dem. 23.170-176). 
 
211 Translation is from RO 47. 
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[ει ἢ Ἀµαδόκ]ωι ἢ Κερσεβλέπτηι µὴ [ἀποδῶσι τοὺς φό]- 
[ρους αἱ πόλε]ς, πράττειν Ἀθηναίου[ς καὶ τῶν ἀρχόν]- 
[των τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐ]πὶ τῆι δυνάµει ὄντας [κατὰ τὸ δυνατ]- 
[όν· τὰς δὲ πόλει]ς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας τὰς ἐ[ν Χερρονήσω]- 
[ι ὑποτελούσας Β]ηρισάδει καὶ Ἀµαδόκ[ωι καὶ Κερσ]- 
[εβλέπτηι τὸµ φό]ρον τὸµ πάτριον καὶ Ἀ[θηναίοις τ]- 
[ὴν σύνταξιν, ἐλε]υθέρας εἶναι καὶ αὐτονό[µους συ]- 
[µµάχους οὔσας Ἀ]θηναίοις καθὰ ὤµοσαν κα[ὶ Βηρισ]- 
[άδει καὶ Ἀµαδόκω]ι καὶ Κερσεβλέπτηι· 
 
In Thrasybulus’ earlier alliances in the north, there had been revenue collection arrangements in 
the form of the εἰκοστή or the δεκάτη. Money was also a feature of the Athenian alliance with 
Alexander of Pherae. But in this alliance with the Odrysian kings, two types of revenue are 
mentioned: tribute (φόρος) and contributions (συντάξεις). The former was the major source of 
revenue for the Athenians in the Delian League and the latter in the Confederacy. This treaty 
reveals that there were Greek poleis in Thrace that had found themselves in the dual position of 
being tributaries of the Thracian kings as well as Athenian allies. This must have been a situation 
difficult for the great powers to manage, especially in times of instability. This leads Chrysoulla 
Veligianni-Terzi to deny that the Greek poleis ever paid tribute to the Odrysians or that the kings 
asserted any form of control over them. Louisa Loukopoulou, however, suggests that the Greeks 
only had to pay taxes when trading within the Odrysian territory.212 Whatever the case may be, 
for the primary allies, reconciled, the language employed in the treaty reflects a high degree of 
unity; they agreed to act on each other’s behalf in exacting the tribute payments. This is a 
remarkable arrangement and would have required frequent communication and interaction 
between the parties for it to operate efficiently.  
																																								 																				
 
212 Loukopoulou 2002, 345-353; Veligianni-Terzi 2004, 325-340.  
 
148	
	
According to the treaty, paying tribute or contributions is not incompatible with the free 
and autonomous status of the poleis.213 But one wonders whether the Greeks in Thrace agreed. 
Despite the assertion, the end of the treaty (18-21) implies that the Greek did not agree and in 
fact rebelled from the oversight of the great powers. Expanding on the probable mutual defense 
clause earlier in the inscription, there was a call on the Odrysians to help (βοηθεῖν) in 
suppressing any revolts among the Athenians’ existing allies: “If any of the poleis defect from 
the Athenians, they shall require Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes to help. If . . .  [ἐὰν 
[δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ἀφιστῆ]ται ἀπ’ Ἀθηναίων, βο[ηθεῖν Βηρισάδην καὶ Ἀµάδοκον] καὶ 
Κερσεβλέπτ[ην καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσι Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐὰν δὲ].” This provision carries the same 
connotations as a mutual defense clause or the mutual allies clause in the Athenian-Thessalian 
alliance (A18) in that they all encourage a shared operation of alliances. Indeed, the final line is 
incomplete (ἐὰν δὲ) but it probably expressed the same obligation for the Athenians to assist in 
suppressing revolts among the kings’ allies. The defections of allies was an overriding concern at 
the time for the Athenians. The Social War, a revolt of allies from the Confederacy, many of 
them original charter members, had just broken out in the Aegean. This explains why this clause 
was included in the treaty. It also explains why the alliance was fleeting. The alliance rested on 
the discourse of a shared identity and on the management of ambitious administrative matters, 
but, because of the Social War, Chares could not stay to ensure their smooth operation. At the 
same time, Philip II, king of Macedon since 359, began to expand his influence into the region. 
He overpowered the Odrysian allies, and the Athenians were unable to come to their defense. 
Berisades died soon afterwards but his son Cetriporis made a new alliance with the Athenians in 
																																								 																				
213 Cargill 1981, 133 sees more ambiguity in ἐλεύθερος καὶ αὐτόνοµος in this context. 
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the next year under different conditions (A20). Amadocus continued in the alliance until Philip 
overpowered him in 353.214 Cersebleptes renewed his alliance with the Athenians in 353, 
allowing them at that time to establish cleruchies in the Chersonesus.215 Finally, in the peace 
treaty at the end of the Third Sacred War in 346, the Athenians completely abandoned 
Cersebleptes to Philip’s designs.216    
 
Alliances against Philip of Macedon (356-338) 
 
A20 The Athenians and the Thracians, Paeonians, and Illyrians (356) 
 IG II2 127; Diod. 16.22.3 
In 357, Philip had made rapid advances in capturing Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidea, and 
in securing an alliance with the Chalcidians. In 356, he went further and seized Crenides (a 
recent Thasian colony established with the help of the Athenian exile Callistratus) and renamed it 
Philippi.217 These victories alarmed everyone in the north, especially the sons of the recently 
deceased Berisades, the Paeonian king Lyppeus, and the Illyrian king Grabus, who made their 
own alliance before inviting the Athenians to join as well. The latter, still fully engaged in the 
Social War, were in no position to accept but they did anyway.218 The inscription for the alliance 
																																								 																				
214 Dem. 23.10; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F101. 
 
215 Diod. Sic. 16.34.3-4; IG II2 1613, lines 297-298. 
 
216 Dem. [12.8], 19.174, 181.  
 
217 Ibid. 1.9, 12; 2.7; 4.4; Diod. Sic. 16.8.1-7. Crenides: Isoc. 8.24; Ps.-Scylax 67.2 (cf. 
Shipley 2011, 144); Diod. Sic. 16.3.7. 
 
218 Ibid. 16.22.3; cf. Ellis 1976, 70-71; Badian 1983, 56. 
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is somewhat turgid, filled mostly with praise and honors for individuals (1-33) and a provision 
for the council to make future amendments (34-35). It closes with a transcript of the alliance oath 
for the Athenians (38-47): 
“I swear by Zeus and Gaia and Helios and Poseidon and Athena and Ares that I will be a friend 
and an ally to Cetriporis and to the brothers of Cetriporis, and that I will wage the war with 
Cetriporis against Philip without deceit and with all my strength as far as possible, and I will not 
end the war against Philip without Cetriporis and his brothers; and the other places which Philip 
controls I will join with Cetriporis and his brothers in subduing, and I shall join in taking 
Crenides with Cetriporis and his brothers; and I will give back . . .”219 
 
 [ὀµνύω Δία καὶ Γῆν] καὶ Ἥλιον καὶ Ποσει[δ]ῶ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ 
 [Ἄρην, φίλος ἔσοµαι] Κετριπόρι καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς Κ- 
 [ετριπόριος καὶ σ]ύµµαχος καὶ πολεµή[σ]ω µετὰ Κετριπόρ- 
 [ιος τὸν πόλεµον τ]ὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀδόλως παντὶ σθένε[ι] 
 [κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κ]αὶ οὐ προκαταλύσοµαι τὸν πόλεµον ἄν- 
 [ευ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον κ[αὶ] 
 [τἆλλα χωρία ἃ κατ]έχε[ι] Φίλιππος συνκα[τ]α[σ]τρέψοµαι µ[ε]- 
 [τὰ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ Κρηνίδ[α]ς συνε[ξ]αι- 
 [ρήσω µετὰ Κετριπ]ό[ρ]ιος κα[ὶ τ]ῶν [ἀδ]ελφῶν καὶ ἀποδώσω τὰ 
 
The oath is directed towards six deities, the first four of which, according to Peter Rhodes and 
Robin Osborne, represented the four elements – air (Zeus), earth (Gaia), fire (Helios), and water 
(Poseidon). In the words of Andrew Bayliss, these four gods together make “a ‘formula’ for 
covering the cosmos.”220 They are accompanied by Athena, Athens’ patron deity and a goddess 
of war like Ares. Directing the vow to the six deities, the dedicatees highlight the intention of the 
four allies to depict their alliance having more than just a local importance as well as a military 
character. Within the oath are two conditions for the Athenians: their commitment to mutual 
																																								 																				
 
219 Translation is from RO 53. 
 
220 Ibid.; in Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 161-162. These same deities appear in 
Philip’s alliance with the Chalcidians (Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50) and the oath for the 
League of Corinth in 338 (Tod 177 = Harding 99 = RO 76). 
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defense and their promise not to make any unilateral attempt at peace with a mutual enemy 
(Philip). These are familiar items. But there is also the inclusion of a specific military objective: 
to retrieve Crenides from Philip. No other alliance in the fourth century expresses so precisely its 
target. War aims are always left open, allowing for changed circumstances and new enemies, 
both in the present and in the future. Since this alliance was more limited in its goal, there was no 
need for its eternal designation (εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον) so familiar in nearly every other Athenian 
alliance. The allies intended only to carry out their mission and then let the alliance rest. 
Nevertheless, like the one with the three Odrysians in the previous year, the alliance came to 
nothing. Diodorus says that the Macedonian king’s rapid advance surprised the other kings so 
that they could not mount an effective defense. The Athenians, because of their ongoing war 
with allies, were unable to perform their duty in the alliance and protect their allies.221 Thus came 
to an end perhaps the shortest Athenian alliance of the fourth century. 
A21 The Athenians and the Phocians (355) 
Dem. 19.61-62; Aeschin. 3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3 
The ease with which the northern alliances broke down did not stop the Athenians from 
continuing these practices. Once the Social War came to a resolution in 355, the Athenians were 
free to engage in the recent conflict in central Greece, the Third Sacred War.222 Their next 
alliance, with the Phocians, was not designed originally to confront Philip but rather the 
Amphictyonic League.223 Athenian interest in the alliance was multi-faceted, combining moral, 
																																								 																				
221 Diod. Sic. 16.22.3; cf. Dem. 1.13; Plut. Alex. 3.8-9. 
 
222 The Athenians permitted the rebels to sever their alliance ties with the Confederacy 
(Isoc. 8 16; Dem. 3.28; Aeschin. 2.70; Diod. Sic. 16.21.1-22.2). 
  
223 Dem. 19.61; Aeschin. 3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3.  
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social, and political concerns. The Athenians saw an opportunity to live up to their reputation as 
protectors of the weak and the wronged. Not knowing in 355 how the Phocian generals would 
abuse the wealth of Delphi in their prosecution of the war, the Athenians initially considered the 
Phocians to be the wronged party because the League had imposed onerous fines on them (and 
the Spartans) for supposed religious violations.224 The two also had a history of friendship and 
cooperation that extended back into the fifth century. Pausanias says that the Athenians agreed to 
the alliance, “remembering some old service from the Phocians [ἀρχαίαν δή τινα ἐκ τῶν Φωκέων 
µνηµονεύοντες εὐεργεσίαν].”225 Although Pausanias fails to mention exactly what that εὐεργεσία 
was, he expresses unambiguously the important role of reciprocity in the decision to ally with the 
Phocians. John Buckler, however, prefers to see the alliance only from a political standpoint. He 
emphasizes how the alliance offered the Athenians the opportunity to increase their political 
power at the expense of Thebes, in control of the Amphictyonic League in the 350s, and to 
perhaps regain control of Oropus.226 This makes good strategic sense and must have entered into 
the Athenians’ calculations. Therefore, like nearly every other example in the fourth century, the 
shape of this alliance was one that included a mixture of moral, social, and political factors.   
																																								 																				
 
224 Diod. Sic. 16.23.2-3, 29.2-4; cf. Buckler and Beck 2008, 217-222. A few years earlier 
the Athenians had expressed their displeasure with the League by granting refuge and honors to 
certain Delphians exiled by the League (SIG 3 175; cf. Scott 2014, 148). 
 
225 Paus. 3.10.3. Steinbock 2013, 331-336 explores the sentimental ties between the 
Athenians and the Phocians. McInerney 1999, 188-194 details Phocian collaboration with 
Athens in the fifth century. 
 
226 Buckler 1989, 27-29. 
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Unfortunately, however, nothing can be said of the specific provisions for this alliance or 
for any others in the next decade. The Athenians made alliances here, there, and everywhere 
(Thracian Neapolis in 355, the Messenians at about the same, the Olynthians in 349, and the 
Mytileneans in 346), but epigraphical and literary evidence is unable to provide any of the 
contents of the official treaties.227 Over the course of the Sacred War, as Philip became more 
involved in the conflict, the target of the Athenian-Phocian alliance shifted from the 
Amphictyonic League to the Macedonian king. The alliances with Neapolis and the Olynthians, 
too, were clearly directed against Philip, as were all of the alliances after the conclusion of the 
war. In 342, Demosthenes, leading an embassy around the Peloponnesus to shore up resistance to 
Philip, succeeded in renewing alliances with the Achaeans, Argives, Arcadians (Mantineans), 
Megalopolitans, and Messenians.228 Very little is known of these alliances, but it is noteworthy 
that all of the allies had a previous alliance with the Athenians at some point in the fourth 
century. The Athenians continued to reach out to old friends and associates for their alliances.   
A22 The Athenians and the Eretrians (341) 
 IG II2 230 
 
The alliance with the Eretrians on the island of Euboea was another one designed to 
reduce Philip’s influence in Greek affairs, and it also emerged from a long history of 
interactions. The two poleis made an alliance at the beginning of the Corinthian War (A3), and 
the Eretrians enrolled in the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377.229 But after Leuctra, the 
																																								 																				
227 Neapolis: IG II2 128. Messenians: Dem. 16.9. Olynthians: ibid. 1-3 passim; Philoch. 
FGrH 328 F49-51. Mytileneans: IG II2 213. 
 
228 IG II2 225; Dem. 9.72; Aeschin. 3.95-101; Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; cf. Cargill 1981, 94; 
Sealey 1993, 259-264; Lambert 2012a, 186 n.9.  
 
229 IG II2 43, line 81. 
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Eretrians followed the rest of Euboea in joining the ascendant Thebans (T1). Their tyrant 
Themiston seized Oropus from Athenian control in 366 and handed it over to the Thebans.230 
Then in 357, after factional conflict erupted all across the island, the Athenians renewed their 
alliances with the Eretrians and with the other major poleis of the island.231 The Athenians 
maintained a tenuous hold on these alliances until Philip intervened in the island’s affairs in the 
late 340s. In response, the Athenians dispatched Phocion, who removed Philip’s puppet and 
restored democracy to Eretria.232 This liberation coincided with the plans of Callias of Chalcis 
for the revival of an independent Euboean confederacy. Under the influence of Demosthenes, the 
Athenians supported Callias’ proposals and made alliances with Chalcis and with Eretria.233 The 
surviving treaty with the latter supplies just enough information to be useful. There is an 
incomplete reference (2) to monetary contributions (συνετάξαντο). The recorded oath (6-11) for 
the Eretrians refers to their responsibility to defend the Athenians, their territory, and their 
democratic constitution.234 The Athenians effectively outmaneuvered Philip and stood as 
																																								 																				
 
230 Dem. 18.99; Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1. 
 
231 IG II2 124 (Tod 153 = Harding 65 = RO 48); Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 16.7.2. Peake 
1997, 161-164 uses IG II2 124 to examine the Euboean campaign of the Social War. 
 
232 Dem. 9.57-58; Philoch. FGrH F160; Diod. Sic. 16.74.1; Plut. Phoc. 13.7. Date and 
extent of Philip’s intervention in Euboean affairs: Brunt 1969, 245-265; Cawkwell 1978, 42-67; 
Tritle 1993, 227-238. 
 
233 Aeschin. 3.89-105; Philoch. FGrH F159. 
 
234 Knoepfler 1995, 346-364 discusses other contemporary Athenian treaties with the 
Eretrians. 
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protectors of the new Euboean Confederacy. Their alliance proved strong enough that the 
Eretrians and their fellow islanders stood with the Athenians at the Battle of Chaeronea.235 
A23 The Athenians and the Thebans (339) 
Dem. 18.160-251; Aeschin. 3.142-143; Hyp. Against Diondas 137r/136v; Philoch. 
FGrH 328 F56b; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic. 16.84-85; Plut. Dem. 18 
 
Demosthenes had put in order a fair number of allies across the Peloponnesus and Euboea 
to oppose Philip. But in order to bring that conflict to a head, the Athenians needed a more 
powerful ally, such as the Thebans. The Athenians and Thebans had been allies in the Corinthian 
War (A1) and in the 370s (A12), but their partnership was severed once the Thebans embarked 
on their own attempt at hegemony in Greece (see Chapter V). That experiment failed rather 
quickly and during the Third Sacred War, in order to overcome the Phocians, the Thebans made 
an alliance with Philip. The Macedonian king did in fact bring an end to the war but in the 
process he also replaced Thebes as the leader in central Greek affairs.236 The Thebans, finding 
their continued association with Philip to be oppressive, retaliated in 340 by expelling the 
Macedonian garrison from Nicaea and seizing control of Thermopylae.237 This occurred at the 
same time as the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War, during which the members of the Delphic 
Amphictyony called on Philip to lead their forces against Amphissa. In late autumn of 339, the 
savior of Apollo headed south, bypassing Thermopylae, and took up a position at Elateia in 
Phocis, posing a direct threat to Thebes and a distant threat to Athens.  
																																								 																				
235 Dem. 18.237. 
 
236 Theban alliance with Philip: ibid. 5.20-22, 18.19, 19.321; Diod. Sic. 16.58.2-3, 59.2. 
Kelly 1980, 64-83 looks at the Theban allies who joined Philip. 
 
237 Philoch. FGrH 328 F56. 
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As mentioned in Chapter II, when a messenger announced Philip’s position to the 
Athenians, Demosthenes recognized in this an opportunity to expand the anti-Macedonian 
coalition. As the proxenos of the Thebans who had cautiously advocated a policy of cooperation 
between the two poleis ever since the 350s, Demosthenes determined to bring about the third 
alliance of the fourth century with the Thebans.238 Although security concerns must have 
weighed heavily on the minds of the Athenians, in his speech proposing the alliance, 
Demosthenes did not concentrate his argument on strategic considerations, such as BOP, but 
appealed to social and moral norms. He asked the members of the assembly to set aside their 
grievances with the Thebans, to recall their past experiences of collaboration, and to identify 
more closely with their old friends in this hour of peril. He also expected the same from the pro-
Athenian faction in Thebes (οἱ φρονοῦντες τὰ ὑµέτερα).239	Commenting on this speech in his 
book on social memory in Athenian politics, Bernd Steinbock writes, “his account proves that 
arguments based on a group’s shared image of the past, evoking their ancestor’s achievements 
and the values and beliefs of their community, carried great emotional weight and were therefore 
crucial factors in decision making.”240	In other words, despite the immediate crisis of Philip’s 
presence on their borders, Demosthenes still stressed the “irrational” factors, the social and moral 
reasons for allying with the Thebans. The assembly responded positively to these points and 
authorized Demosthenes to lead the alliance embassy to Thebes. 
																																								 																				
 
238 Demosthenes and Thebes: Trevett 1999, 184-202; Steinbock 2013, 269-271; Mack 
2015, 114-117. Trevett 1999, 187-188 mentions other Athenians with Theban connections.  
 
239 Dem. 18.176-177. 
 
240 Steinbock 2013, 271; cf. Yunis 2000, 97-118.  
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The Theban assembly on that occasion must have been a lively gathering with the whole 
Theban citizenry engaging with the Macedonian and Athenian delegations. The Macedonian 
representatives stressed the importance of reciprocity: the Thebans, still technically allied to 
Philip, should show gratitude (χάριν ἀποδοῦναι) for the king’s good services and, considering 
the injuries received from the Athenians in the past, join in the attack on Attica, or at least remain 
neutral.241 Demosthenes’ counter-argument is unrecorded, although if the earlier speech to the 
Athenian assembly is any indication, he probably emphasized reciprocity and the close historical 
ties between the two poleis.242 According to Aeschines, he also agreed that the Athenians would 
recognize the Thebans’ claims over Boeotia, bear all the costs of naval operations and two-thirds 
of the land campaigns, and allow the Thebans full command on land and joint command on 
sea.243 Upon these conditions, the Theban assembly voted to accept the alliance with the 
Athenians. Soon thereafter, the Athenian military marched into Boeotia and joined up with their 
new allies, ready to confront Philip.   
 Thus are the accounts of Demosthenes and Aeschines. But the contemporary logographer 
Hyperides, whose speech Against Diondas antedates the others by a few years, presents a 
																																								 																				
 
241 Dem. 18.213. 
 
242 Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328 would have the reader believe the alliance was the result 
of Demosthenes’ seductive oratory (Flower 1994, 143-145; contra Shrimpton 1991, 175-176). 
 
243 Aeschin. 3.142-143. In the same speech, Aeschines (3.106) criticizes the concessions 
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different version.244 According to Hyperides, the Thebans never agreed to the alliance during the 
assembly. They only did so when the Athenian military marched into Boeotia:         
“You travelled from Eleusis to Thebes; and you were so well disposed and friendly towards each 
other that having themselves entered they received your army into their city and their houses into 
the presence of their wives and children. And you, though you had not yet received any firm 
assurances from them, sent your force there while Philip was close at hand; and at that point 
Philip went off, without achieving any of his goals. We and the Thebans came back and rapidly 
confirmed the alliance.”245 
 
Ἐλευσινόθεν εἰς Θήβας ἐπορεύεσθε· οὕτως δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως καὶ φιλανθρώπως 
διετέθητε, ὥστ᾿ ἐκεῖνοι µὲν εἰσεληλυθότες αὐτοὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ εἰς τὰς οἰκίας ἐπὶ παῖδας καὶ 
γυναῖκας τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑµῶν ὑπεδέξαντο· ὑµεῖς δὲ οὐδέν πω παρ᾿ ἐκείνων εἰληφότες βέβαιον, 
τὴν δύναµιν ἐκεῖσε Φιλίππου πλησίον ὄντ(ος) ἀπεστείλατε· καὶ τότε µὲν ὁ Φίλιππ(ος) ἀπιὼν 
ὤιχετο οὐδὲν ὧν ἠβούλετο διαπραξάµενος· ἡµεῖς δὲ καὶ Θηβαῖοι ἐπανελθόντες τάχιστα τὰς 
συµµαχίας ἐπεκυρώσαµεν. 
 
Although this passage suggests some hesitation on the part of the Thebans to make a firm 
resolution with the Athenians, there is no impression that they feared or distrusted them. In fact, 
they welcomed the Athenians into their city walls and into their homes, a strong gesture 
demonstrating trust between the two parties.246 So whether the alliance was concluded during the 
assembly or later when the Athenian army reached the city, the two merged their forces into one 
and worked towards defeating Philip the same way that they did against the Spartans earlier in 
the century.  
Demosthenes mentions two successful skirmishes against the Macedonian army over the 
winter. Soon the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans, and a 
few other small powers joined the coalition.247 By the summer of 338, the Greeks had an army 
																																								 																				
244 Natalie Tchernetska (2005, 1-6) discovered the fragments in the Archimedes 
palimpsest in 2002. Care et al. 2008, 1-19 give the text, translation, and commentary. 
 
245 Hyp. Against Diondas 137r 2-6. Translation from Care et al. 2008, 1-19. 
 
246 This point is also made in Dem. 18.215.  
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roughly comparable in size to Philip’s. The high hopes of victory, however, were shattered by 
Philip’s decisive victory at the Battle of Chaeronea. The defeat silenced for a time resistance 
among the Greeks to the Macedonian presence in their affairs. In the next year, Philip established 
the League of Corinth, realligning all of the Athenian alliances to himself.248 The extensive 
practice of alliance-making was no longer an option for the Athenians.  
It is difficult to find a guiding policy in Athenian alliances between Leuctra and 
Chaeronea. They alternated from pro-Theban to pro-Spartan to anti-Macedonian.Throughout this 
period, Athenian alliances proliferated here, there, and everywhere. Nevertheless, even in the 
final alliance with the Thebans in 339, there was still a consistent thread of building interstate 
alliances upon the foundation of personal contacts between the parties. The specific military 
objectives changed but the manner in which alliance selectivity and formation was conducted 
remained consistent. It was not only the Athenians who built their political and military alliances 
on personal relationships and contacts. The next chapter shows how the principles of 
interpersonal friendship operated in Spartan interstate alliances as well.  
																																								 																				
247 Ibid. 18.237; cf. Aeschin. 3.97; Plut. Dem. 17.3; Sealey 1993, 197-198. Plut. Mor. 
845a adds “and many others [καὶ πολλοὺς ἄλλους].”  
 
248 RO 76; cf. Lambert 2012a, 385-386. 
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Chapter IV  
 
Spartan Alliances 
  
At the beginning of the fourth century, the Spartans were by no means unfamiliar with 
the practice of making bilateral alliances, a practice which over the course of the previous two 
centuries had resulted in the formation of a network of alliances known as “the Spartans and their 
allies,” or the Peloponnesian League. During the Peloponnesian War, the diplomatic reach of the 
Spartans expanded to embrace alliances even outside of the peninsula. After that war, under the 
dynamic leadership of the general Lysander, Sparta’s geopolitical influence multiplied 
exponentially in all directions, including contacts with both Greeks and non-Greeks.1 Sometime 
around the turn of the century, however, the Spartan authorities, apprehensive of the amount of 
individual power that Lysander was accumulating, scaled back his personal activities. 
Nevertheless, they still retained a strong Spartan presence throughout the Mediterranean. As a 
result, they made at least thirteen new bilateral alliances over the course of the fourth century. 
Most of these were the products of the diplomatic strategy set forth by the Eurypontid kings 
Agesilaus II and his son Archidamus III.   
Table 4: Spartan Alliances in the Fourth Century 
West Mainland Greece East 
Dionysius I of Syracuse (403) Acarnanians (389) Spithridates and Otys of 
Paphlagonia (395) 
Tarentines (346) Amyntas of Macedon (382) Evagoras of Cyprus (late 380s) 
 Olynthians (379) Glos (late 380s) 
 Athenians (369) Ariobarzanes (366) 
 Phocians (356) Tachos of Egypt (361) 
 
																																								 																				
1 Hornblower 1983, 218 (cf. 1992, 121-123) calls the extension of Spartan influence in 
the interbellum years of 403 to 395 as “almost a Weltpolitik.” Ferrario 2014, 234-240 looks at the 
agency of Lysander in the development of Spartan imperialism. 
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After examining the longest Spartan alliance in the fourth century, the one with 
Dionysius I of Syracuse, this chapter opens with an examination of the alliances with non-
Greeks, which Agesilaus framed according to the principles of Greek friendship (φιλία), an 
interpersonal relationship with reciprocal obligations of promoting mutual benefit. There were 
two phases to the eastern alliances – the Asian expedition of 396 to 394 and Agesilaus’ 
campaigns in the Hellespont and in Egypt in the 360s. None of these lasted very long. Those in 
this first phase came to an end because the new operative principles of friendship were not 
acceptable to Agesilaus’ conservative Spartan associates, who continued to view all of the allies 
as subjects rather than as equal partners. The final eastern alliance, the one with Tachos of Egypt, 
dissolved because the new alliance protocol did not translate well into an Egyptian context, so 
that the Egyptian king failed to fulfill his obligations and thus frustrated Spartan expectations. 
The disrepair into which the alliances in the east fell, therefore, is not due to any contempt for 
interstate and intercultural collaboration but rather to cultural dissonance and confusion over the 
new ideas that Agesilaus had introduced to the political and military accords.   
The alliances with Greeks, on the other hand, products of long historical interactions and 
social connections, lacked the potential difficulties of cross-cultural misunderstandings, and thus 
were more successful. Two of the most important alliances of this period were with the Phocians 
in central Greece and the Tarentines in southern Italy. Although emerging out of the same 
principles of friendship, the practical basis for these alliances was the exchange of money and 
manpower, which had the potential to advance the military objectives of the allies and at the 
same time the political objectives of the Spartans in the Peloponnesus. This chapter argues that 
because these practical advantages were predicated on the social obligations of reciprocity and 
the promotion of mutual benefit, the alliances operated according to sensible policies. That the 
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alliances failed to produce enduring results does not detract from their fundamental soundness in 
their own historical context. Uncovering the guiding principles for Spartan alliances, however, 
will be much harder than it was for the Athenian alliances because of the dearth of epigraphic 
evidence and the lack of detail in the literary accounts.2 This chapter, therefore, develops its 
thesis through a close investigation of the historical context and a judicious use of comparative 
analysis for each alliance.  
S 1 The Spartans and Dionysius I of Syracuse (403) 
 Diod. Sic. 13.81.2, 14.10.2-3, 70.3 
 The Spartan alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse is a model alliance. It was constructed 
on interpersonal contacts and the exchange of services, and endured for much of the first half of 
the fourth century. Cooperation with the Syracusans, however, began earlier, in 413, with the 
participation of Gylippus in the successful defense of Sicily against the Athenian invasion.3 The 
Syracusans repaid their protectors with a great portion of the spoils of war and contributed their 
own naval support – more than twenty ships under the command of Hermocrates – for the 
Spartans’ campaigns in the Aegean against their mutual enemy. Although that support was not 
enough for the defeat of the Athenians and the democrats in Syracuse took advantage of that 
failure to condemn Hermocrates in absentia to exile, the Spartans still continued their interest in 
Sicilian affairs.4 According to Diodorus, in 406, when the Syracusans were engaged in a conflict 
																																								 																				
 2 One possible exception is SEG 26.461 (an undated alliance between the Spartans and 
the Aetolians and the Erxadieis). Antonetti 2012, 193-208 reviews modern opinions of its date. 
 
 3 Thuc. 6.93.2, 7.1-6, 21-24, 85-86. Caven 1990 passim looks in detail at the many 
interactions between the Spartans and the Syracusans.  
 
 4 Thuc. 8.26.1, 85.3; Xen. Hell. 1.1.27; Diod. Sic. 13.34.4, 39.4. 
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with the Carthaginians, they finally negotiated a formal alliance (συµµαχία) with the Spartans.5 
Following his manner of only summarizing historical events, the Sicilian epitomator 
unfortunately does not expand on the alliance terms. It may have been as a part of this agreement 
that the Spartans dispatched Dexippus, a military expert, to defend the island and to ensure 
continued support from Syracuse for the war against Athens.6  
 This partnership grew much closer when Dionysius, a former follower of Hermocrates, 
pushed his way into power in 403. After seeing to the arrangement of postwar affairs in Greece, 
the Spartans dispatched to Syracuse the prominent Aristus to strengthen their alliance, but now 
with Dionysius personally. Despite their cultivated reputation as tyrant-haters, the Spartans 
charged Aristus to safeguard Dionysius’ rule from domestic enemies and, accordingly, “to get 
his attention because of their benefactions [ὑπήκοον ἕξειν . . . διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας].”7 Aristus was 
successful. Dionysius remained in power, and the Spartans continued their benefactions to him 
into the new century. In 398, for example, they “gave him authority to recruit from them as many 
soldiers as he wished [αὐτῷ συναύξοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔδωκαν ἐξουσίαν ὅσους βούλοιτο παρ᾽ 
αὐτῶν ξενολογεῖν].”8 They had granted the same concession to Lysander’s friend Cyrus in 401 
and would continue to do so with their allies throughout the fourth century, indicating that the 
																																								 																				
 
 5 Ibid. 13.81.2. 
 
 6 Ibid. 13.85.3; cf. Millender 2006, 238-239. 
 
 7 Diod. Sic. 14.10.2-3, 70.3. Sansone 1981, 202-206 is alone in rejecting Lysander’s 
involvement in the formation of the alliance with Dionysius.  
 
8 Diod. Sic. 14.44.2.  
 
164	
	
Spartans held some sort of supervisory role over the recruitment of Peloponnesian soldiers.9 
Affording this access to allies also netted the Spartans money for their own political and military 
ambitions. In 396, in preparation for yet another conflict with the Carthaginians, Dionysius “sent 
to the Peloponnesus recruiters with much money, commanding them to enlist the greatest amount 
of soldiers without sparing any money [ἔπεµψε δὲ καὶ ξενολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον µετὰ 
πολλῶν χρηµάτων, ἐντειλάµενος ὡς πλείστους ἀθροίζειν στρατιώτας, µὴ φειδοµένους τῶν 
µισθῶν].”10 The Spartans benefitted monetarily as did Dionysius in terms of manpower. They 
even allowed the dispatch of thirty ships under the command of a full Spartiate, Pharax, who 
went on to defeat the Carthaginian enemy and to provide further support for Dionysius against 
his domestic rivals.11 Through exporting military experts and large numbers of soldiers to 
Dionysius, the Spartans received in return extra funds for their activities in the Greek east. 
 Dionysius, therefore, owed his rule to the Spartans, and he reciprocated like services. In 
393, during the Corinthian War, he rejected an Athenian proposal, even though it was delivered 
by his guest-friend (ξένος) Eunomus, for a marriage alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, which 
would have created an anti-Spartan alliance stretching across the Mediterranean.12 Although he 
remained aloof from eastern Greek affairs for the next few years on account of his campaigns in 
southern Italy, in 387, he came through for the Spartans by sending enough ships to the 
																																								 																				
 9 Millender 2006, 235-266. 
 
 10 Diod. Sic. 14.58.1, 62.1. At this time, Dionysius doubled his money supply by fiat.  
 
 11 Ibid. 14.63.4, 70.1-3. Isoc. 8.99 (cf. Hornblower 1992, 121-123) cites the support for 
Dionysius as one of many examples of Spartan imperialistic excesses.  
 
 12 Lys. 19.19-20. The Athenian assembly also passed honors for him in 394 (IG II2 18).  
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Hellespont to give them a numerical superiority over the Athenians and bring an end to the 
war.13 Over the course of the next twenty years, despite continued conflict in the west with 
Carthage, Dionysius contributed as needed to Spartan military campaigns.14 Then in 368, the 
year before his death, he finally concluded an alliance with the Athenians (A15), but it was only 
after his Spartan friends agreed to their own alliance with the Athenians (A13). For nearly forty 
years Dionysius and the Spartans worked in concert.15 It was the longest and most successful 
Spartan alliance of the fourth century, operating on the exchange of money and manpower in 
observation of the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit.  
 
Friendship and Spartan Alliances 
 
 The same protocol directed the alliances arranged by Agesilaus, but his alliances were 
even more personal. It will be useful to review the principles of friendship that Agesilaus valued 
so highly and to see how they operated in his interpersonal relationships before proceeding to 
their application to his eastern alliances. Xenophon, an admirer of the Spartans and a close friend 
of Agesilaus, stresses repeatedly in his Agesilaus the great interest that the king had in forming 
bonds of friendship. He considered the possession of many friends more important than victories 
																																								 																				
 13 Xen. Hell. 5.1.26-28. 
  
 14 Ibid. 6.2.33-36, 7.1.20-22, 28-32; Diod. Sic. 15.47.7, 70.1, 72.3; Plut. Ages. 33.3. 
 
 15 Dionysius’ son sent twelve triremes to help the Spartans capture Sellasia in 365 (Xen. 
Hell. 7.4.12), but then, because of domestic upheavals, apparently ceased his father’s Spartan 
policy. The Spartans, however, continued to be involved in the complex Syracusan affairs in the 
350s (Zorat 1994, 165-175; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 14). 
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in a chariot race (9.7) and the loss of friends worse than poverty (11.5). He cultivated friendships 
by giving careful attention to the practical needs of his friends, even if it meant going without 
necessities himself (4.3, 8.1, 11.11). His friendships, moreover, were mutually beneficial: he 
supported his friends unequivocally, even when they were in the wrong (11.4) and they, in turn, 
were committed to him (6.4). As a result, many sought out his friendship (1.19).16 Plutarch, too, 
although less enthusiastic about the Spartan king, highlights in his own Agesilaus the importance 
of his personal friendships. Agesilaus possessed an unparalleled generosity for his friends, going 
so far as to share in their misdeeds in the spirit of comradeship (5.1-4, 13.3-4). In order to 
increase the number of his friends, he even defended enemies in court so that they would be 
attracted to him (20.4-6). Indeed, Plutarch says, with exaggeration, that he eventually had no 
more domestic enemies, and that his reputation in Sparta was greater as a friend than as a king or 
a general (15.6).17 Neither Xenophon nor Plutarch, however, describes friendship with a succinct 
definition, preferring to illustrate it through anecdotes. Although the concept is expansive and 
difficult to articulate succintly, a working definition for this chapter comes from David 
Konstan’s summary of near contemporary Aristotle’s three conditions for friendship: “(1) mutual 
good will; (2) consciousness that the good will is reciprocated; and (3) desiring the good for the 
sake of the other.”18 In other words, as will be demonstrated further in the chapter, to Agesilaus 
																																								 																				
 
16 Cartledge 1987, 139-159; Mitchell 1997, 73-89; Hodkinson 2000, 343-352; Azoulay 
2004, 305-310.  
 
 17 Shipley 1997, 32-35; Trego 2014, 47-51. 
 
 18 Konstan 1998, 284 (cf. 1997, 72-78); Arist. Eth. Nic. 1155b31-1156a5. 
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friendship was an interpersonal relationship with reciprocal obligations for the promotion of 
mutual benefit. It is on this premise that many Spartan alliances of the fourth century operated. 
 With such an emphasis in the ancient sources, it is no surprise that modern scholars have 
also taken notice of how friendship influenced the king’s political activities. Paul Cartledge and 
Stephen Hodkinson go to great lengths to show how Agesilaus put friendship to use as an 
instrument of patronage in his domestic alliances as well as in his interstate attachments in the 
Peloponnesian League. David Konstan broadens this perspective and suggests that friendship 
(φιλία) with non-Greeks worked in essentially the same way as guest-friendship (ξενία) with 
Greeks did. Vivienne Gray looks in greater detail at the particular contacts that Agesilaus had 
with eastern leaders during his 396-394 expedition, seeing his application of friendship 
principles as a thematic model “of how to secure the willing obedience of new friends.”19 The 
next section of this chapter builds on these perspectives by examining even more closely the role 
of friendship in Agesilaus’ eastern alliances. For, as Xenophon states, the Spartan king practiced 
interstate relations out of the impulse of love of friends (φιλεταιρία).20  
 This can be illustrated further in his friendship with Lysander, a relationship that exhibits 
in microcosm the fundamental elements of the larger interstate alliances. In fact, it is entirely 
possible that Agesilaus developed his friendship approach to foreign affairs by observing how 
Lysander created political associations out of personal relationships. In the closing years of the 
Peloponnesian War, for example, as admiral (ναύαρχος) of the Spartan fleet in the Aegean, 
																																								 																				
 19 Cartledge 1987, 139-159, 242-273; Gray 1989, 46-58; Konstan 1997, 83-87; 
Hodkinson 2000, 347-352, 361-365. Spartan friendships with non-Greeks in Xenophon’s 
writings: Hirsch 1985; Lendon 2006, 82-98; Gray 2011, 291-329; Millender 2012, 377-426. 
 
20 Xen. Ages. 2.21-22.  
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Lysander developed a close friendship with Cyrus, the young Persian prince, and elicited from 
him large subsidies to expand Sparta’s naval activities against their mutual Athenian enemy. 
Lysander and Cyrus became so close that when the prince had to return to the Persian capital, he 
appointed his Spartan friend to be his proxy in western Asia. Out of their friendship came the 
exchange of services for mutual benefit: moral and monetary support from Cyrus for the war 
against Athens and, in return, Spartan assistance in Cyrus’ (failed) uprising against his brother, 
the new King, in 401.21  
It must have been with great admiration that Agesilaus watched his mentor’s friendship 
with a Persian make such an impact on international affairs. But, as Lysander began to abuse his 
position of power by unilaterally imposing on many Greek poleis decarchies (boards of ten) of 
his own partisans, harmosts (governors), and the burden of tribute, Agesilaus’ admiration turned 
to disgust. This tyrannical manner of administration, compounded by the fact that ultimate power 
resided in someone outside of the royal families, was unacceptable to the Spartan authorities. 
They put an end to Lysander’s activities, but they did not reduce their general involvement in the 
east.22 From 399 to 397, after Agesilaus had ascended to the throne, the Spartans authorized 
expeditions to Asia under Thibron and Deryclidas to fight against the Persian satrap 
																																								 																				
21 Lysander and Cyrus in 407: Xen. Hell. 1.5.1-7; Diod. Sic. 13.70.3-4; Plut. Lys. 4.1-4. 
Lysander and Cyrus in 405: Xen. Hell. 2.1.10-15; Diod. Sic. 13.104.3-4; Plut. Lys. 9.1-2; Alc. 
35.4; cf. Debord 1999, 224-232. Spartan support for Cyrus in 401: Xen. An. 1.4.2-3; Hell. 3.1.1; 
Diod. Sic. 14. 21.2. Isoc. 12.104 says the Spartans persuaded (ἔπεισαν) Cyrus to revolt.  
 
22 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2, 5.13; Diod. Sic. 14.10.1-2, 13.1; Nep. Lys. 1.5; Plut. Lys. 13.3-5; cf. 
Debord 1999, 233-236. Andrewes 1971, 206-215 considers the possible dates for the end of the 
decarchies. 
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Tissaphernes, who was threatening the Asiatic Greeks.23 Neither of these generals followed the 
friendship strategy of Lysander and in fact acted in an opposite manner. Cozying up to non-
Greeks (medizing or “flattering barbarians [βαρβάρους κολακεύουσιν],” in the words of 
Callicratidas, Lysander’s rival and successor in 406) in a close collaborative capacity was alien 
to most Spartans.24 Whereas Thibron was ineffective against Tissaphernes and did more damage 
to friendly states by plundering their lands, Deryclidas avoided Tissaphernes’ territory altogether 
and attacked the satrapy of Pharnabazus, an important friend and ally of the Spartans.25 These 
Spartans treated friends as enemies and enemies as friends. But when Agesilaus received the 
appointment to be the third commander of the Asian campaign, he determined to realign the 
expedition according to traditional friendship principles. 
Although some sources depict his appointment to be the doing of Lysander, who had 
aspirations to revive his own authority in the east, the king, no pawn of Lysander, had his own 
ideas for the expedition.26 No matter the amount of resources which the Spartans could muster 
for the campaign, Agesilaus recognized that he would need to win the hearts and minds of the 
																																								 																				
 23 The date for Agesilaus’ accession is either in 400 (Cartledge 1987, 99-115), 399 
(Pascual 2012, 29-49), or 398 (Hamilton 1982c, 281-296).  
 
 24 Xen. Hell. 1.6.7. Callicratidas undid all of Lysander’s work by refusing to collaborate 
with Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 1.6.1-11; Diod. Sic. 13.76.2-6; Plut. Lys. 6.1-7).  
 
25 Thibron and Dercylidas: Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9; cf. Westlake 1986, 405-426; Debord 1999, 
236-242; Buckler 2003, 44-58; Hyland 2008, 16-25.  
 
 26 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2 and Plut. Ages. 6.1-3 consider the appointment to be Lysander’s doing; 
Xen. Ages. 1.6-8 and Nep. Ages. 2.2 (cf. Paus. 3.9.1) have the initiative coming from the king. 
Trego 2014, 39-62 thinks Plutarch’s portrayal (Ages. 3.3-4.1; Lys. 22.3-6) of Agesilaus as a tool 
of Lysander is due to the biographer’s interest in developing the theme of friendship. 
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people of western Asia by creating alliances based on friendship.27 Lysander, one who above all 
should have recognized this game plan, was a liability. When the army arrived in Ephesus, 
Xenophon says that Agesilaus first restored order to the Greek cities that had been divided by 
Lysander’s decarchies.28 Also, because Lysander possessed an inordinate amount of power in the 
region and did not cease his practice of dispensing patronage, thus undermining the influence of 
Agesilaus, the king humiliated his friend by refusing to pay attention to the requests that local 
leaders made through him and demoting him to the position of the royal meat carver. Plutarch 
criticizes this, suggesting that there must have been a better way to respond to Lysander’s 
ambitions. But Vivienne Gray, working from Xenophon’s account in the Hellenica, interprets the 
disciplinary measure as a means of “having Lysander eventually see his offence and mend his 
ways.”29 Beyond the didactic elements, however, Agesilaus was justified because Lysander had 
violated a social contract. He failed to treat Agesilaus as a friend, not to mention as his king, and 
thus transgressed the code of friendship with its reciprocal obligations of seeking mutual benefit. 
Looking forward in the campaign, if Agesilaus continued to have difficulties in his personal 
friendship with Lysander, he could expect to have trouble communicating this formula to other 
Spartans and in translating it to a non-Greek context so that all parties shared the same 
																																								 																				
 
 27 Seager 1977, 184 (cf. Hamilton 1991, 102-103) says Agesilaus intended to build a 
“buffer zone of rebel satraps.” Kelly 1978, 97-98 considers that to be a “response to the 
stagnation in the war” rather than the initial plan. Xen. Hell. 4.1.41 (cf. Plut. Ages. 15.1) says that 
Agesilaus was thinking of this indirect strategy in 394, but this does not rule out an earlier 
conception of the plan. 
 
 28 Xen. Ages. 1.37; cf. Plut. Ages. 6.1. 
 
29 Gray 1989, 46-49 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7-9). Bearzot 2005, 31-49 examines the less 
favorable representation in Plut. Ages. 7.1-8.4 and Lys. 23. 
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appreciation of the alliances. Ironically, by humiliating an erring friend, he was actually 
highlighting the principles of friendship in his overall strategy.   
 
Alliances in the East (396-360) 
 
He put this strategy into operation even before he left Greece by requesting an alliance 
(συµµαχία) with the Egyptian king Nepherus (or Nepherites), who was already in revolt from 
Persia. Since there was the possibility that Agesilaus might be confronted by a great number of 
enemy ships during his expedition, he hoped that the Egyptians could supply him with naval 
support. Although Nepherus sent a large shipment of grain and equipment for the Spartan navy – 
all of which, however, Conon and the Persian fleet stationed at Rhodes intercepted – he would 
not agree to a formal alliance.30 It may be that he, unlike his successor Acoris, who would make 
an alliance with the Athenians and Evagoras of Cyprus in 388, was not bold enough to do more 
than offer a one-time contribution to the Spartan cause.31 Anyhow, this initial setback did not 
deter Agesilaus but rather encouraged him that there were indeed those willing to support in 
some way his objectives.  
After arriving at Ephesus, Agesilaus set about looking for opportunities to demonstrate 
his devotion to the code of friendship, in order to attract allies in the region. His first opportunity 
																																								 																				
 
 30 Diod. Sic. 14.79.4-7. Ruzicka 2012, 49-50 suspects that it was because of the 
possibility of a Persian attack on Egypt that Nepherus would not send a fleet and did not agree to 
an alliance. Just. Epit. 6.2.1 states incorrectly that the Egyptian king sent 100 triremes.  
 
 31 Athenian alliance with Acoris: Ar. Plut. 178; cf. Carrez-Maratray 2005, 50-53; Perdu 
2010, 153-154. 
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came with a letter from Tissaphernes proposing a temporary truce so that he might arrange a 
peace between his King and the Spartans. Since his strategy did not include a direct attack on the 
Persians, he agreed. But he was also under the assumption that the satrap would not honor the 
truce but use it to collect military reinforcements, and thus inadvertently advance his diplomatic 
strategy. Xenophon says that the king continued to observe the armistice (“his first noble 
achievement [πρῶτον καλὸν . . . διαπράξασθαι]”), showing to all that he, unlike Tissaphernes, 
was trustworthy. As a consequence, “he gave all, both Greeks and non-Greeks, the confidence to 
make an agreement with him, if he might wish for anything [πάντας ἐποίησε καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ 
βαρβάρους θαρροῦντας συντίθεσθαι ἑαυτῷ, εἴ τι βούλοιτο].”32 In the next verse the religiously 
sensitive Xenophon adds that the satrap’s treachery made even “the gods allies [συµµάχους] of 
the Greeks.”33 Later the historian continues: “from all nations they were sending ambassadors 
concerning friendship, and many, yearning for freedom, were revolting to his side, so that 
Agesilaus was the leader of not Greeks alone but of many non-Greeks [ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν 
ἐθνῶν ἐπρεσβεύοντο περὶ φιλίας, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀφίσταντο πρὸς αὐτόν, ὀρεγόµενοι τῆς 
ἐλευθερίας, ὥστε οὐκέτι Ἑλλήνων µόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρων πολλῶν ἡγεµὼν ἦν ὁ 
Ἀγησίλαος].”34 Two of the first to join Agesilaus were Spithridates and Otys. 
 
 
																																								 																				
32 Xen. Ages. 1.12; cf. Hell. 3.4.5-6; Nep. Ages. 2.3-5; Plut. Ages. 9.1-3. Hirsch 1985, 40-
41 looks at Xenophon’s emphasis on trust (πίστις) in this episode. Danzig 2007, 27-50 discusses 
Xenophon’s portrayal of Tissaphernes’ failure to observe oaths. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 
312-320 examines other cases of Persians repudiating oaths and treaties.  
 
33 Xen. Ages. 1.13; cf. Hell. 3.4.11. 
  
34 Xen. Ages. 1.35.  
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S2-S3 The Spartans and Spithridates and Otys (395) 
Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, 4.1.3; Ages. 3.2-4 
In Xenophon’s portrayal, at least, Agesilaus was paving a new path for the Spartans’ 
conduct of international relations. Unlike his immediate predecessors, who levelled particularly 
harsh measures on foe and friend alike, Agesilaus set out to make clear his devotion to the 
precepts of friendship, mutual benefit, and fidelity to oaths, qualities that made him successful in 
attracting new allies. This was why, during the truce, he humiliated Lysander. Paradoxically, it 
was out of this act that the first friendship alliances in Asia came about. In order to redeem 
himself, Lysander went northwards to Hellespontine Phrygia where he met Spithridates, a 
subordinate officer to the satrap Pharnabazus. Like Lysander, Spithridates had been dishonored 
by his superior, but for a very different reason: Pharnabazus had disregarded Spithridates’ 
dignity by attempting to take his daughter for a concubine. Lysander, therefore, easily persuaded 
his comrade-in-shame to leave Persian service and to ally with Agesilaus.35  
The Spartan king naturally approved of the alliance. But there was no time to exchange 
ambassadors with the distant Spartan assembly, so he concluded it on his own authority.36 
Chapter I noted that allowance could be made for alliances arranged by individuals, but in this 
case it was a mistake. The private nature of the alliance meant that not all around Agesilaus 
recognized the guiding principles upon which it operated. For his part, Spithridates clearly 
																																								 																				
35 Ibid. 3.2-3; Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 8.3; Lys. 24.1. Hell. Oxy. 21.3-4 obscures 
Lysander’s role in winning over the Persian. Spithridates in general: Weiskopf 1989, 23-25; 
Briant 2002, 644.  
 
 36 Ferrario 2014, 243-245 stresses the agency of Agesilaus in the Asian expedition. Beck 
1999, 181-185 and Beneker 2012, 210-214 discuss the king’s attraction to Spithridates’ son 
Megabates (Xen. Ages. 5.4-5; Plut. Ages. 11.1-7). 
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understood the reciprocal obligations of the alliance. His gifts and services came in the form of 
his and his family’s personal involvement in Agesilaus’ expedition, as well as the provision of 
money (χρήµατα), 200 much needed horses, and a detailed knowledge of the region and its 
inhabitants.37 In the spring of 395, he introduced Agesilaus to Otys (or Cotys), a Paphlagonian 
chieftain, who had recently rejected the right hand (δεξιά) of friendship with the Persian King. 
Instead, he agreed to an alliance (συµµαχία) with Agesilaus and surpassed Spithridates with a 
gift of 2000 horses and 1000 peltasts.38  
Agesilaus, too, was obligated to return proportionate gifts or services to the new allies. 
He did this by proposing to mediate a marriage alliance between Spithridates’ daughter and the 
Paphlagonian chieftain. He stressed to the latter the far reaching implications of this marriage for 
international relations: “with this having been brought about, he [Spithridates] would not be 
connected by marriage only to you, but so would I and the rest of the Spartans and the other 
Greeks, since we are the leaders of Greece [τούτων πραχθέντων µὴ ἐκεῖνον ἄν σοι µόνον 
κηδεστὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐµὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιµονίους, ἡµῶν δ᾽ ἡγουµένων τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα].”39 In other words, the marriage had the potential of turning 
two bilateral alliances (Agesilaus with Spithridates and Otys, respectively) into a trilateral and 
even a universal alliance. Vivienne Gray, viewing the proposal as a token of their friendships, 
																																								 																				
 37 Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Hell. Oxy. 21.3, 6. 
 
38 Xen. Hell. 4.1.3; Ages. 3.3-4; Hell. Oxy. 22.1; Plut. Ages. 11.1-3; cf. Weiskopf 1989, 
24; Debord 1999, 113. Hellespontine rulers: Briant 2002, 641-643; Maffre 2007, 126-129.  
 
39 Xen. Hell. 4.1.8; cf. Plut. Ages. 11.2. The Spartan kings were traditionally involved in 
arranging marriages for unmarried Spartan women (Hdt. 6.57.4). The interchangeability of 
Lacedaemonia and Sparta: Ducat 2010, 189-196. 
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thinks it grew out of Agesilaus’ concern for his new allies. Lynette Mitchell agrees with this 
reading but adds that the king “made assumptions for the Persian [Spithridates] based on his own 
understanding of the relationship.”40 Peter Krentz, more skeptical than Gray and Mitchell, thinks 
that the alliance was doomed from the start because the Spartan king strong-armed Spithridates 
into agreeing to a marriage beneath his daughter’s dignity and he did not understand Otys. There 
is nothing in the primary texts to support this interpretation, one that falls more in line with the 
overall negative assessments of Agesilaus’ career from scholars such as Paul Cartledge, Charles 
Hamilton, and John Buckler.41 Rather, the three new friends appear to have collaborated well 
enough for the remaining six or so months of the year. When the alliance did break apart, the 
culprit was not one of the principal agents of the alliance but a Spartan from outside of this 
friendship circle.    
On account of Spithridates’ valuable intelligence operations, the Greek army was able to 
capture Pharnabazus’ camp and stay supplied through the winter in Phrygia. But Herippidas, one 
of Agesilaus’ thirty official advisors and the overseer of distributions (ἐξεταστὴς), refused the 
Persian allies their portion of the booty, an insult violating the reciprocal obligations of the 
alliance.42 Although a close associate of Agesilaus, Herippidas was clearly unaware of the 
programmatic principles of the alliances, and, in a domineering fashion typical of Spartans, 
																																								 																				
 40 Gray 1989, 49-52; Mitchell 1997, 121-122.  
 
 41 Cartledge 1987; Hamilton 1991; Krentz 1995, 203. Buckler 2003, 188: “. . . Agesilaos, 
an arrogant, malicious, and stupid man.”  
 
 42 Xen. Hell. 4.1.25-27; Plut. Ages. 11.3-4. Trundle 2004, 113 discusses the position of 
ἐξεταστής. Other instances of Spartan insubordination to authority: Hdt. 9.53-57; Thuc. 5.72.1; 
Xen. Hell. 4.2.22, 7.4.24-25. 
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continued to treat the Persians as subjects. Consequently, Spithridates and Otys, being “wronged 
and dishonored [ἀδικηθέντες καὶ ἀτιµασθέντες],” abandoned the Spartans and joined another 
rebel satrap. To Agesilaus, having constructed the alliances specifically around the principles of 
friendship only to see Herippidas destroy his achievement with contemptuous behavior, this loss 
was said to have been the most distressing of the campaign.43  
Xenophon adds that there were others entrusting themselves to Agesilaus (Ἀγησιλάῳ δὲ 
αὑτοὺς ἐνεχείριζον), although he limits himself to naming only the most famous (τοὺς 
ἐπιφανεστάτους αὐτῶν) – Spithridates and Otys, for example – because the actual numbers 
joining the Greek army might be unbelievable to his readers.44 He entered into a guest-friendship 
(ἐξενώθη) with Apollophanes of Cyzicus, who, being also a guest-friend (ξένος) of Pharnabazus, 
brought the Spartan king and Persian satrap together to discuss the possibility of a friendship 
alliance (φιλία).45 Pharnabazus was, after all, once a “friend and ally [φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος]” of 
the Spartans during and after the Peloponnesian War.46 But on account of the recent Spartan 
attacks on his territory, he was naturally resistant to the proposal. He opened the parley with a 
complaint to the king: “if, therefore, I do not understand either what is sacred or what is just, 
then teach me how these are the acts of men who know how to repay favors [εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ µὴ 
																																								 																				
 43 Xen. Hell. 4.1.28; Plut. Ages. 11.4. Briant 2002, 696 thinks that Spithridates was 
looking for a reason to abandon Agesilaus and return to Persian service, but he fails to recognize 
that Spithridates joined another rebel satrap (Xen. Hell. 4.1.27). Nor does his conclusion that 
“this desertion sounded the death knell for Agesilaus’ hopes” find substantiation in the sources. 
 
 44 Xen. Ages. 3.2; cf. Hell. Oxy. 21.1. 
 
 45 Xen. Hell. 4.1.29; Plut. Ages. 12.1. 
 
46 Thuc. 8.39.1, 80.2; Xen. Hell. 1.1.6, 24-26, 4.1.32-33. Pharnabazus and the Spartans: 
Hyland 2008, 1-27.  
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γιγνώσκω µήτε τὰ ὅσια µήτε τὰ δίκαια, ὑµεῖς δὲ διδάξατέ µε ὅπως ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνδρῶν 
ἐπισταµένων χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι].”47 Agesilaus, who had advocated for alliances on the basis of 
mutual benefit, was caught in flagrante delicto. The Spartans had not fulfilled their moral and 
material obligations to their old ally and, even worse, done exactly the opposite by harming him; 
in extending an invitation to abandon the Persian King, moreover, Agesilaus was asking 
Pharnabazus to do what the Spartans have treacherously done: defect without cause. The satrap 
presented a fine criticism, leaving the king with no response but prevarication:  
“But I think that you, Pharnabazus, know that even in the Greek poleis, men become guest-
friends of one another. And these men, when their poleis come to war, fight with their countries 
even against their former friends and, if it should so happen, sometimes even kill one another. 
And, therefore, we now, being at war with your king, have been compelled to consider hostile all 
that is his. As for you, however, we should consider it above everything to become friends.”48   
 
ἀλλ᾽ οἶµαι µέν σε, ὦ Φαρνάβαζε, εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι ξένοι ἀλλήλοις 
γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι. οὗτοι δέ, ὅταν αἱ πόλεις πολέµιαι γένωνται, σὺν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ τοῖς 
ἐξενωµένοις πολεµοῦσι καί, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἡµεῖς οὖν 
νῦν βασιλεῖ τῷ ὑµετέρῳ πολεµοῦντες πάντα ἠναγκάσµεθα τὰ ἐκείνου πολέµια νοµίζειν: σοί γε 
µέντοι φίλοι γενέσθαι περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιησαίµεθα. 
 
																																								 																				
 
47 Xen. Hell. 4.1.33. The parley in general: Gray 1989, 52-58; Konstan 1997, 83-86; 
Mitchell 1997, 122-124; Shipley 1997, 180-188. Pazdernik 2006, 175-206 explores allusions to 
this conference in Procop. Pers. 4.6.17-22. Briant 2002, 697-700 and Abe 2012, 4-5 discuss the 
burning of Dascylium by the Greek army. 
 
48 Xen. Hell. 4.1.34. Herman 1987, 2 and Vlassopouls 2013, 131-132 contrast Agesilaus’ 
argument with the reason that Diomedes and Glaucus in Hom. Il. 6.231 give for not fighting one 
another on the battlefield: “so that these may know how we profess to be ancestral friends [ὄφρα 
καὶ οἵδε γνῶσιν ὅτι ξεῖνοι πατρώϊοι εὐχόµεθ᾽ εἶναι].” Konstan 1997, 86 suggests that Xenophon 
had in mind this Homeric encounter.  
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His argument that a polis’ wartime choices take precedence over one’s private 
relationships is specious and not at all consistent with his own interstate activities.49 It must be 
that Agesilaus, recognizing his countrymen’s acts of injustice and also embarrassed by the 
satrap’s marked fidelity to his King, simply dissembled in order to defend himself and his 
predecessors.50 Like all Greeks, he avoided at all costs the appearance of being the violator of an 
alliance, even if that meant expressing a sophistic interpretation of the Spartans’ violations. 
Nonetheless, Pharnabazus recognized what Agesilaus was trying to achieve by basing his 
alliances on the principles of friendship and offered to join him as “both a friend and ally [καὶ 
φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος]” should his King ever demote him to the position of a subject (ὑπήκους).51 
But this would not be the case. Before leaving Agesilaus, he allowed his young son, apparently 
under no obligation to the Persian King, to become the Spartan’s guest-friend (ξένος).52 
																																								 																				
49 Xen. Hell. 4.1.41 claims that after the parley, he led his army away from Phrygia on 
account of his admiration for the Persian rather than any military or political concerns. In 385 he 
recused himself from a state authorized command against his friends in Mantinea (ibid. 5.2.3). A 
few years later he sustained a twenty-month siege of Phlius on behalf of his Phliasian friends in 
spite of severe criticism from home (ibid. 5.3.10-17, 20-25).  
 
50 Krentz 1995, 207 considers the representational contrasts of the ignoble Spartans and 
the noble Pharnabazus. Bradford 1994, 59-86 and Bayliss 2009, 231-260 examine the literary 
motif of the “duplicitous Spartan.” March 1997, 257-269 and Ruzicka 2012, 51-56 discuss 
Pharnbazus’ simultaneous activities in preparing a fleet to fight against the Spartan navy, a detail 
Xenophon ignores. 
 
 51 Xen. Hell. 4.1.37. Hyland 2008, 1-27 shows how Pharnabazus’ continued cooperation 
with the Cyreans and the Spartans after the Peloponnesian War placed him in a precarious 
position in the eyes of the King. 
 
52 Xen. Hell. 4.1.39-40; Plut. Ages. 13.1-2, 6-7. Herman 1987, 58-60 uses this guest-
friendship as a model illustration of the initiation ceremony of such relationships. 
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It should not be thought that Agesilaus’ diplomatic strategy was an abysmal failure.53 The 
ancient historians highlight the defection narratives because they are dramatic and illustrate the 
disregarded moral components to the agreements. Through the outcomes of the Spartans’ 
repeated attacks on Pharnabazus’ territory, Lysander’s failure to respect Agesilaus qua king and 
friend, and Herippidas’ refusal to share spoils with Spithridates and Otys, one can recognize how 
important those friendship values were. When one party discarded the reciprocal obligations, the 
other was justified in abandoning the alliance. Despite the failures, Agesilaus had some 
successes on which the ancient historians chose not to elaborate. In fact, he began the new 
campaigning season of 394 with aplomb, attracting more rebels to his side and preparing to 
continue his advance further into Persian territory.54 He could not know that it would end so 
soon. Events back in Greece – the formation of an anti-Spartan alliance begun by the Athenian-
Boeotian alliance (A1) – demanded that he abandon the expedition and return home. There 
would not be another Spartan alliance in western Asia for twenty-eight years. 
S4-S6 The Spartans and the Acarnanians (389), Amyntas III of Macedon (382), and the 
Olynthians (379) 
 Isoc. 4.126; Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1, 5.3.26; Ages. 2.20; Diod. Sic. 15.19.3 
 
During the decades when the Spartans were collaborating with Dionysius, they also made 
a few alliances on the mainland with the Acarnanians in 389, King Amyntas III of Macedon in 
382, and the Olynthians in 379. There is not enough evidence to reconstruct the conditions for 
any of these except for the recognition that Sparta was the dominant partner. Amyntas, for 
example, being on the losing end of a territorial dispute with the Olynthians, was wholly 
																																								 																				
 53 As in Cartledge 1987, 217-218; Buckler 2003, 73-74. 
 
54 Xen. Hell. 4.1.41.  
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dependent upon Spartan assistance and recruited forces to supplement their attack on his behalf 
against Olynthus. Fully equipped, the Spartans defeated the Olynthians, enrolled them as Spartan 
allies, and returned the disputed territory back to the Macedonian king.55 Both the Olynthians 
and the Acarnanians in 389 swore the so-called oath of the Peloponnesian League: “to consider 
the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, to follow them wherever they lead, and to be allies 
[τὸν αὐτὸν µὲν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον Λακεδαιµονίοις νοµίζειν, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται καὶ 
σύµµαχοι εἶναι].”56 These alliances, however, did not last long; all three abandoned the Spartans 
and joined the Athenians in the 370s.57 There were also temporary alliances in the late 380s with 
Evagoras of Cyprus and a Persian naval commander named Glos, both in revolt from the Persian 
King, but little can be said on the part, if any, that the Spartans actually played in these revolts 
besides the expressions of support.58  
 The Spartans had overreached. The renewal of war throughout Greece in the 370s, which 
culminated in the disastrous defeat of the Spartan army by the Thebans at the Battle of Leuctra, 
reduced further their capability to stand as a first-rate hegemonic power. Because of the 
invasions of the Peloponnesus by the Theban victors in 370 and 369, the Spartans found 
																																								 																				
 55 Parker 2003, 133-135 compares mentions of the alliance in Isoc. 4.126 and Diod. Sic. 
15.19.3 with its absence in Xenophon. A fragmentary inscription (SEG 53:587) may refer it. 
  
 56 Olynthians: Xen. Hell. 5.3.26. Acarnanians: ibid. 4.6.1-7.1; Ages. 2.20; Plut. Ages. 
22.5; Polyaenus Strat. 2.1.10. Franco 2008/2009, 95-96 looks at Agesilaus’ diplomatic activity 
with the Acarnanians.  
 
 57 IG II2 43, lines 101-102 (Olynthus); 96 (Acarnanians); 102 (Amyntas). 
 
 58 Evagoras: Isoc. 4.135; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; Diod. Sic. 15.2.3, 3.3-4. Glos: 
ibid. 15.9.3-5; cf. Ryder 1963, 105-109; Stylianou 1998, 143-154; Ruzicka 2012, 94-98. 
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themselves in the unfamiliar position of being only a local power. This new geopolitical reality 
forced the Spartans to revise their alliance strategy. In order for them to ward off the threats 
encircling their city and to renew their presence as a leader in the region, they would need the 
regular support of more powerful and wealthier allies than they previously had. This became 
obvious in 368 when Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, defeated a combined attack of Arcadians 
and Argives largely on account of the military contribution from Dionysius I of Syracuse and the 
financial contribution from the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes.59 Plutarch comments that the 
victory, far from showing Sparta’s strength, “most of all proved the weakness of the polis [αὕτη 
µάλιστα τήν ἀσθένειαν ἤλεγξεν ἡ νίκη τῆς πόλεως].”60 In other words, it was clear that any hope 
for a Spartan revival without new allies was fanciful.  
Even outsiders recognized this. The Athenian Isocrates, for example, wrote a speech for 
Archidamus set in the context of the dissolution of the once-mighty Peloponnesian League in 
366. Isocrates’ young prince cautions the Spartans against despair, advocating that they could 
regain their lost position with a little help from their friends outside of the Peloponnesus (τῶν 
ἔξωθεν βοηθειῶν):  
“For I know, in the first place, that the Athenians, even though they are not with us in everything, 
would do anything for our preservation. . . . Moreover, the tyrant Dionysius and the Egyptian 
king and other dynasts in Asia, according to how much each is able, would willingly come to our 
aid. Besides, there are those of the Greeks who have wealth and are the first in reputation and 
desire the best of political affairs, even if they have not yet joined us are with us in goodwill. 
Upon them we are reasonable in our great hopes for what is to come.”61 
																																								 																				
 59 Xen. Hell. 7.1.28-32; Diod. Sic. 15.72.3; Plut. Ages. 33.3-5. Dionysius also sent a 
support force of 2,000 Celtic and Iberian soldiers and fifty horsemen (paid in advance for five 
months) in the previous summer (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20-22; Diod. Sic. 15.70.1).  
 
 60 Plut. Ages. 33.3.  
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ἐπίσταµαι γὰρ πρῶτον µὲν Ἀθηναίους, εἰ καὶ µὴ πάντα µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέρ γε τῆς 
σωτηρίας τῆς ἡµετέρας ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιήσοντας: . . . ἔτι δὲ Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον καὶ τὸν 
Αἰγυπτίων βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν δυνάστας, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἕκαστοι δύνανται, 
προθύµως ἂν ἡµῖν ἐπικουρήσοντας: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις 
προέχοντας καὶ ταῖς δόξαις πρωτεύοντας καὶ βελτίστων πραγµάτων ἐπιθυµοῦντας, εἰ καὶ µήπω 
συνεστήκασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γ᾽ εὐνοίαις µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν ὄντας, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῶν µελλόντων εἰκότως ἂν 
µεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοιµεν. 
 
Isocrates mentions five allies or groups of allies: the Athenians, Dionysius II, the Egyptian king 
Nectanebo I, rebel satraps, and wealthy and reputable Greeks. It is true that these are the words 
of an Athenian, but the evidence presented throughout this chapter confirms that the Spartans did 
in fact believe that through cooperation with wealthy and powerful allies outside of the 
Peloponnesus they could find the moral and material support necessary to make a return to 
geopolitical prominence.62 The first two alliances (A13, S1) have already been discussed. The 
remaining three are the subjects of the rest of this chapter, beginning with the closest in time to 
the dramatic context of the Archidamus, the alliance with the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes.  
S7 The Spartans and Ariobarzanes (366) 
 Xen. Ages. 2.25-26 
Writing about the nadir of Spartan geopolitical influence in the mid-360s, Xenophon 
writes that Agesilaus 
“was noticing that the state was in need of money if it intended to have an ally, so he set himself 
to procuring these things. . . . He did not hesitate to pursue what was advantageous; he was not 
ashamed go out as an ambassador instead of a general, if it would help the polis.”63  
 
																																								 																				
61 Isoc. 6.62-63. Harding 1973, 137-149 and Moysey 1982, 118-127 debate whether 
Isocrates’ Archidamus was anything more than a rhetorical exercise. Luraghi 2008, 55 n.32 sees 
the timing of the speech as more significant.  
 
62 Hodkinson 2000, 343-352 shows how variations of this strategy existed in Spartan 
policy-making throughout the classical period. 
 
63 Xen. Ages. 2.25. 
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 χρηµάτων δὲ ἑώρα τὴν πόλιν δεοµένην, εἰ µέλλοι σύµµαχόν τινα ἕξειν, ἐπὶ τὸ πορίζειν ταῦτα 
 ἑαυτὸν ἔταξε. . . ἃ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν οὐκ ὤκνει µετιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ᾐσχύνετο, εἰ µέλλοι τὴν πόλιν 
 ὠφελήσειν, πρεσβευτὴς ἐκπορευόµενος ἀντὶ στρατηγοῦ. 
 
In the next verse Xenophon explains that this refers to an alliance in 366 with the satrap 
Ariobarzanes, an old friend of the Spartans and a relative of Pharnabazus.64 As mentioned 
earlier, in 368, Ariobarzanes contributed much money for the Spartans to collect a large army to 
fight the Arcadians and Argives.65 There is some debate over the motivation behind this 
contribution. Eduard Rung views the money as a proleptic means “to establish the basis of an 
alliance with the Spartans and the Athenians prior to his revolt against the King.”66 Of course, it 
is very difficult to determine with certainty the satrap’s motivations, but the long history of 
interactions which he and his predecessors had with the Spartans makes it likely that he 
understood the Greek conception of reciprocity. His contribution indebted the Spartans to return 
gifts and services in the future, perhaps in the form of an alliance. The use of money as an item 
of exchange for services, moreover, is consistent with this period. In the Peloponnesian-Theban 
alliance in 370 (T2), for example, Elis contributed ten talents to support the Boeotian army. In 
368, Alexander of Pherae presented Athens with a great amount of money in return for military 
																																								 																				
 
64 Ibid. 2.26. In the role of guest-friend (ξένος) of the Spartan Antalcidas, he supplied 
ships to the Spartans in 387, contributing to the defeat of the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28-29).  
 
65 Ibid. 7.1.27. Diod. Sic. 15.70.2 numbers this army at 2,000 soldiers, so if the rough 
estimate that one talent supported 200 soldiers for a month stands true (cf. Trundle 2004, 91-98), 
he contributed approximately ten talents a month for as long as the campaign lasted. Philiscus of 
Abydus, a subordinate of Ariobarzanes with his own contacts with the Greeks, brought the 
money to the Spartans (Heskel 1997, 114-117, 123-125; Ruzicka 2012, 125; Rung 2013, 35-50).  
 
66 Rung 2013, 37-39 describes the various positions of modern scholars. Proleptic gift-
giving in the mid-fourth century: Gygax 2009, 163; contra Deene 2012, 171-175.  
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assistance (A14). This becomes standard practice for the Spartans in later alliances. The 
implication of such arrangements was that they operated on terms of mutual benefit rather than 
mutual defense. The donor did not contribute any armed forces; the money was for the receiving 
ally to recruit an army. Ariobarzanes, therefore, although he did not directly support the Spartans 
militarily, in like spirit, he supported them monetarily.  
 It was the obligation of the Spartans to defend Ariobarzanes. In 366, when the satrap 
finally revolted and he was immediately confronted by a Persian attack on his cities in the 
Hellespont, he naturally reached out to his Spartan (and Athenian) friends and reminded them of 
his earlier benefaction. The Spartans repaid that service by entering into an alliance with him and 
assigning Agesilaus, aged yet capable, to the Hellespont, where he immediately removed the 
threats to the new ally.67 Nothing more is known about the practicalities of the alliance. Nor did 
it last very long: in the next year or two, Ariobarzanes’ own son betrayed him to the King, and 
there was nothing the Spartans, having already returned home, could do for him.68 Nevertheless, 
despite its brevity, because everyone understood the principles on which the alliance rested, this 
was the most successful alliance the Spartans made with an eastern power in the fourth century.  
S8 The Spartans and Tachos of Egypt (361) 
Xen. Ages. 2.28-31; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2-93.6; Plut. Ages. 36-40 
While in the Hellespont, Agesilaus struck up an acquaintance with King Tachos (or Teos) 
of Egypt, who provided him with a transport home and money to support more military forces in 
																																								 																				
 
67 Xen. Ages. 2.26 (cf. Kovacs 2011, 752-753); Nep. Tim. 1.3. Ariobarzanes’ revolt: 
Weiskopf 1989, 37-49; Heskel 1997, 71-72, 110-111, 131-132; Debord 1999, 296-297.  
 
 68 Arist. Pol. 5.1312a. 
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the Peloponnesus (e.g., at the Battle of Mantinea in 362).69 Tachos, impressed by the Spartan’s 
recent accomplishments on behalf of Ariobarzanes, also seems to have supplied these gifts in 
anticipation of future repayment. With the recent outbreak of the so-called “satraps’ revolt” in 
western Asia, the Egyptian king had plans of his own to take the offensive against the Persians in 
Phoenicia, and probably expected results from Agesilaus similar to those recently accomplished 
in the Hellespont. Unlike Ariobarzanes, however, Tachos did not possess strong contacts with 
the Spartans, so he was unfamiliar with the fine points of detail in the Greek conception of 
reciprocity. He contributed money as an attempt to purchase Agesilaus’s assistance rather than to 
receive a return from a friend.  
Sometime at the end of the decade, after making extensive preparations for the invasion 
of Phoenicia, Tachos dispatched ambassadors to the Spartans to remind them of his past gifts and 
to call for an alliance. Xenophon says that Agesilaus was happy to hear of the appeal because he 
had moral objectives of his own for the campaign: the repayment of the earlier gifts, the 
liberation of the Asiatic Greeks (a bizarre ambition for an expedition to Phoenicia), and revenge 
against the Persian King for supporting Messenian independence.70 He may also have been 
excited for one last opportunity in his long life to establish a friendship alliance. Because the 
Egyptian ambassadors made the proposal in Sparta, it was not Agesilaus alone but the assembly 
that would have negotiated the alliance. No record survives of the proceedings, but a few specific 
																																								 																				
69 Xen. Ages. 2.27. Ruzicka 2003, 104 (reiterated in 2012, 136-137) supposes that an 
Egyptian embassy to Athens (IG II2 119) carried Agesilaus home. 
 
70 Xen. Ages. 2.29. Stylianou 1998, 526-527 and Ruzicka 2012, 137 consider what is 
meant by Tachos’ earlier services to Sparta. Agesilaus’ Panhellenism: Cawkwell 1976a, 66-71 
(reprinted in 2011, 247-255); Cartledge 1987, 180-202; Harman 2012, 427-453.  
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provisions can be teased out of the ancient historians.71 Plutarch suggests that there was an 
agreement that Tachos would contribute money (χρήµατα) so that the Spartans could recruit 
Peloponnesian soldiers (µισθοφόρους).72 Xenophon and Diodorus indicate that there was an 
expectation of a monetary reward at the end of the campaign for successful service.73 And 
Xenophon and Plutarch both agree that Agesilaus was promised the overall command of the 
Phoenician expedition.74 Under these conditions the assembly agreed to the alliance and assigned 
thirty advisors to accompany Agesilaus to Egypt.  
But the excitement wore off before they ever reached Phoenicia. This time the problem 
was not because of a misconception on the part of Agesilaus’ countrymen – they were involved 
in the negotiations and understood the conditions – but a cross-cultural misunderstanding. 
Indeed, early in the campaign an acute observer could have recognized this and predicted the 
rapid dissolution of the alliance. Theopompus says that as soon as (εὐθύς) the Greek army 
arrived on the Egyptian coast, those in the welcoming party were shocked by the sight of the 
octogenarian king – short, lame, and unadorned – and began to laugh at him. But they were still 
																																								 																				
 71 Xen. Ages. 2.28-31; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2-93.6; Plut. Ages. 36-40. Kelly 1981, 47-61 
reviews the major twentieth-century positions on Spartan policy-making institutions; cf. 
Cartledge 1987, 116-138; Kennell 2010, 93-114.  
 
 72 Plut. Ages. 36.2-3. After the Battle of Mantinea in 362, there were so few funds 
available to the government that Agesilaus called for loans from citizens (Plut. Ages. 35.3).  
 
 73 Xen. Ages. 2.31; Diod. Sic. 15.93.6. 
 
74 Xen. Ages. 2.28 says hegemony (ἡγεµονία) and Plut. Ages. 37.1 commander of all the 
powers (ἁπάσης στρατηγὸς . . . τῆς δυνάµεως), but Diod. Sic. 15.92.2 only hegemony of the 
mercenaries (τῶν µὲν µισθοφόρων τὴν ἡγεµονίαν).  
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more (ἔτι . . . µᾶλλον) surprised at Agesilaus’ eccentricity (ἀτοπία), in particular that he 
personally accepted only their simple gifts but passed the luxuries on to the helots.75 With the 
Egyptian conception of kingship as an elevated position above that of the rest of society, 
Agesilaus’ appearance and behavior did not instill confidence. If he had imagined that he could 
translate the Greek friendship values of reciprocity and mutual benefit into the Egyptian context, 
this opening contact did not bode well for the overall success of that project. 
Agesilaus was then surprised himself to hear that he would be the commander of only 
those he brought with him.76 In clear violation of the alliance terms, Tachos named himself the 
supreme commander. This was a personal injury to Agesilaus, who had never held anything but 
the chief command, because by assigning to him a position lower than the one promised, Tachos 
deemed him as less than an ally, a dishonor similar to that meted out earlier by the Spartans to 
Pharnabazus and Spithridates. Although the Egyptians and Spartans had numerous economic, 
military, and diplomatic contacts over the centuries, the two sides still persisted in divergent 
views on the nature of leadership.77 For the Egyptian king, in a society that was hierarchical and 
perpetuated social inequality, there was nothing reprehensible in demoting the foreign king.78 
Although he originally agreed to assign the chief leadership to Agesilaus, in his interpretation of 
																																								 																				
 75 Theopomp. FGrH 115 F106a-108 (cf. Nep. Ages. 8.2-7).  
 
76 Xen. Ages. 2.30; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2; Plut. Ages. 37.1. 
 
 77 Greek and Egyptian contacts: Lloyd 2007, 35-50. 
 
78 The tradition of divine kingship in Egypt made impossible any sense of balanced 
reciprocity (Morris 2010, 207-213). Egyptian values of reciprocity and exchange with Greeks 
have not been studied as extensively as those of the Persians (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989, 135-
139; Mitchell 1997, 111-114; Briant 2002, 316-323; Iancu 2014, 53-70).  
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the alliance he also reserved the right to subordinate the Spartan king, a matter of treachery to the 
Greeks but a matter of course to the Egyptians.  
Although confined in an illegitimate alliance, Agesilaus, wary of giving any impression 
at all that he was the violator of the alliance, remained in the Egyptian’s service and proceeded to 
lead the Greek army to Phoenicia.79 In the meantime, a revolt broke out in the Egyptian ranks led 
by Nectanebo, a relative of Tachos, who invited Agesilaus to join him.80 Xenophon describes his 
anxiety in trying to discern which of the two Egyptians would be more successful in the contest 
for leadership, provide money (µισθὸν) for the Greeks, and be a philhellene (φιλέλλην).81 
Plutarch says that although he had thirty advisors with him, he sent for further instructions from 
the authorities in Sparta, who gave him permission to join Nectanebo if he thought that was best 
for the state’s prospects (τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συµφέρον). Plutarch adds that, in his opinion, Agesilaus’ 
decision to join Nectanebo was an act of betrayal (προδοσία), and many modern scholars follow 
him in this interpretation.82 Stephen Ruzicka, however, argues rightly that Agesilaus was able to 
abandon Tachos with impunity because the Egyptian’s promises of material reward went 
unfulfilled.83 In addition to this monetary aspect, one can add the moral offense of denying an 
																																								 																				
 79 Plut. Ages. 37.2 says the alliance went against his dignity and nature (παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν 
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν φύσιν). 
 
80 The relationship of Nectanebo and Tachos: Engsheden 2006, 62-70. 
 
 81 Xen. Ages. 2.31.  
 
82 Plut. Ages. 37.5-6 (cf. Cartledge 1987, 329; Hamilton 1991, 255; Trundle 2004, 146). 
Piccirilli 1999, 261-266 argues that the task of thirty advisors was not executive in nature but 
simply “di controllarne l'operato per poi darne notizia alle autorita lacedemoni.” 
 
83 Ruzicka 2003, 118.  
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ally a promised position. In other words, to the Spartans it was Tachos who betrayed Agesilaus 
rather than the other way around.  
The alliance did not fall apart because Agesilaus, an alleged mercurial mercenary leader, 
betrayed Tachos for a wealthier employer. Nor was it due to an intentional violation on the part 
of Tachos. The problem was that both parties held different interpretations of the terms and the 
guiding principles of the alliance. Contrary to Agesilaus’ expectations, his Egyptian friend did 
not show himself to be one who valued mutual benefit, and, as a result, the Spartans lost an ally. 
It was a different case from the earlier alliances in Asia, in which the allies defected because the 
Spartans refused to honor the principles of friendship. Spithridates, Otys, and Pharnabazus, the 
injured parties, were free and just to abandon their alliances with Sparta, just as Agesilaus was in 
leaving Tachos. In the end, Agesilaus made Nectanebo a “friend to the Spartans” (φίλον . . . τῇ 
Λακεδαίµονι), helped him overcome yet another rival in Egypt, and then, in spite of the pleas of 
his new ally to stay, he left Egypt with a reward of over 200 talents.84 But he died en route, in 
Cyrene, leaving the challenges of reviving Sparta’s influence in Greece through the construction 
of new alliances to his son. 
 
Alliances with Greeks (355-338) 
 
S9 The Spartans and the Phocians (355) 
 Theopomp. FGrH 115 F312; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3 
																																								 																				
 
84 Nectanebo gave Agesilaus much money (χρήµατα πολλὰ) (Xen. Ages. 2.31), either 220 
(Nep. Ages. 8.7) or 230 talents (Plut. Ages. 40.1); cf. Shipley 1997, 398.  
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 Archidamus ascended the Eurypontid throne in 360, but his first opportunity to make an 
interstate alliance did not come until 355, at the beginning of the Third Sacred War, with the 
Phocians against the members of the Delphic Amphictyony.85 The alliance came about largely 
due to the fact that the two shared the same predicament. Both were recently fined enormous 
sums by the Amphictyony, now under Theban leadership, for past violations – 500 talents (and 
then doubled to 1000 talents) against the Spartans for occupying the Theban Cadmeia in 382 and 
many talents (πολλά τάλαντα) against the Phocians for cultivating sacred land.86 The response of 
the Phocians was to elect for their general (στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ) a man named Philomelus, 
who put into motion a plan to reassert an ancient claim to guardianship of Delphi.  
 After he accomplished that and annulled the Amphictyonic judgments, he dispatched 
ambassadors to Sparta and Athens promising to act as the proper steward of Apollo’s treasures 
and asking for alliances.87 As for the Spartans, there were many reasons to accept the proposal.  
They had an old concern for the affairs of Delphi, and the removal of the monetary penalties and 
the religious shame were naturally powerful incentives. They were also traditional friends of the 
Phocians, collaborating often throughout the classical period. Theopompus believes that 
friendship (φιλία) was only a pretext (πρόφασις); in his opinion (ἐµοὶ δοκεῖν), hatred of Thebes 
was the real reason for the alliance. Pausanias says the same but replaces friendship with some 
																																								 																				
 85 In 358, he rejected an alliance proposal from Artaxerxes III, saying that the Spartans 
would only observe friendship (φιλίαν) with him (Diod. Sic. 16.44.1). 
  
 86 Diod. Sic. 16.23.2-3, 29.2-4; cf. Buckler and Beck 2008, 217-222. 
 
 87 Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5. 
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old service (ἀρχαίαν εὐεργεσίαν) as the pretext.88 But there is no reason to isolate the hatred 
motive from the others. The Spartans had gone to the defense of the Phocians on numerous 
occasions even when Thebes was not involved. Furthermore, the Spartans probably recognized 
the strategic logic of the alliance: support for the Phocian struggle against Thebes in central 
Greece hindered any further Theban interference in Spartan designs in the Peloponnesus.  
Archidamus, the primary advocate of the alliance in Sparta, also took into consideration 
the same practical considerations as those of previous alliances, the exchange of money and 
manpower. In this case, there is intriguing numismatic evidence. With the wealth from Delphi all 
of the Phocian generals minted gold and silver coins. They contained the traditional Phocian 
bull’s head on the obverse but a new image on the reverse, the head of Apollo, representing the 
Phocians’ guardianship of Delphi. Many of these issues carried on the reverse the names of the 
generals. Whenever the Peloponnesian soldiers who received these coins as pay saw the imagery 
and the legends, they reminded them of their military leaders and the larger alliance, and 
connected them more closely to each other and to the cause.89  
When Phocis’ enemies grew to include the Locrians and the Boeotians, as well as the 
Amphictyonic League, the Phocian generals began to exploit the wealth of Delphi in order to 
increase the pay of the soldiers. Despite the sacrilege, however, the Spartans continued to honor 
the alliance and benefitted monetarily as a result – Diodorus states that they “received pay out of 
proportion to the number of soldiers they sent out [οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐκπεµποµένων 
																																								 																				
 88 Theopomp. FGrH 115 F312; cf. Paus. 3.10.3. Sparta and Delphi: Parke and Wormell 
1956, 82-98. Sparta and Phocis: McInerney 1999, 188-198.  
 
 89 Diod. Sic. 16.33.2, 36.1, 61.3; cf. Williams, 1976. 45-60. Trundle 2004, 117: the coins 
were considered by the common soldier “as a gift to symbolize his relationship to his employer.” 
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στρατιωτῶν τοὺς µισθοὺς λαβόντες].”90 At first the Phocians kept the Thebans occupied in 
central Greece, giving the Spartans a brief window of opportunity to reassert their dominance in 
the south.91 But then Philip II of Macedon intervened in the war, frustrating Phocis’ plans for 
Delphi and Sparta’s for the Peloponnesus.92 Finally, in 346, fearing Philip’s continued advances, 
the Phocian authorities deposed Phalaecus, the latest Phocian general. But he reacted by making 
a private agreement with the Macedonian king which granted him safe passage through 
Thermopylae.93 Philip liberated Delphi, reduced Phocis, and obstructed further contact between 
the allies. But in reality Phalaecus’ treacherous unilateral peace with a mutual enemy had already 
violated the Spartan-Phocian alliance. Although the alliance began as a promising enterprise and 
for nine years it operated with a small measure of success, in the end it was a failure. At this 
nadir envoys from southern Italy approached Sparta.  
S10 The Spartans and the Tarentines (346) 
 Diod. Sic. 16.62.4 
 The last Spartan alliance of the classical period was with Tarentum, a late eighth-century 
Spartan colony in southern Italy. From its earliest years, Tarentum had difficulties with its native 
Italian neighbors, but it had not sought out help from its metropolis. Instead, it survived through 
collaboration with other western Greeks, such as those in the Italiote League.94 In the early 
																																								 																				
90 Diod. Sic. 16.30.1-31.4; 57.1. 
 
91 Ibid. 16.34.3, 39.1-5; Paus. 4.28.1-2; cf. Hamilton 1982b, 64-72; Buckler 1989, 85-99. 
 
 92 Diod. Sic. 16.58.3-6. 
 
 93 Ibid. 16.59.3; cf. McInerny 1999, 217-225.  
 
 94 Malkin 2003, 115-127 looks at Tarentum’s early conflicts with its neighbors. Material 
evidence, however, exhibits close cultural and economic interactions with natives (Whitehouse 
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fourth century, Dionysius I of Syracuse intervened in Italian affairs and captured many of the 
Greek cities, but he spared Tarentum on account of his friendship with the Pythagorean 
statesman Archytas.95 By midcentury, while the native Italians banded together into larger 
confederations, expanding and intensifying their attacks on the Greeks, Tarentum, at the head of 
an exhausted Italiote League, could expect little support from its local allies.96 As for the strength 
of the Tarentines, despite the Roman geographer Strabo’s moralistic reproof that they were 
governed poorly on account of enervating luxury (τρυφὴ) and thus hired foreign generals (τὸ 
ξενικοῖς στρατηγοῖς χρῆσθαι) to do their fighting for them, other accounts indicate that all 
branches of their military remained at a considerable level.97 Rather than noxious pleasures, the 
problems facing Tarentum were external: increased cooperation among their enemies and the 
inability of its traditional allies to provide support. In 346, therefore, even though contacts with 
the metropolis had been sporadic since the colony’s foundation, Tarentum dispatched 
ambassadors to Sparta to seek help in surmounting these overwhelming difficulties.98  
																																								 																				
and Wilkins 1989, 102-126; Lomas 2000, 79-90; Genovese 2012). Italiote League: Wonder 
2012, 128-151; Fronda 2015, 386-402.  
 
 95 Lomas 1993, 34-35; Huffman 2005, 9-10. Possible Pythagorean influences in Sparta: 
Moore 2009, 1-25. 
 
96 Lomas 1993, 37-39; Wonder 2012, 141-149. Raaflaub, Richards and Samons 1992, 21 
criticizes, unfairly, Tarentum for not making full use of the Italiote League against mutual 
enemies.   
 
97 Strabo 6.3.4. There are large contributions of “Tarentine” horseman, infantry, and ships 
to Greek generals throughout the closing decades of the fourth century (Diod. Sic. 19.29.2, 39.2, 
70.8, 71.6, 20.104.1-2). Lomas 1993, 13-17 and Trundle 2004, 34-39 discuss tropes and negative 
images in Roman literature concerning states that relied on outside military aid. 
 
98 There are brief references to Tarentine support in the Peloponnesian War for the 
Spartan Gylippus, whose father was a Tarentine (Thuc. 6.104.1-2, 7.1.1; cf. 8.91.2).  
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 Before examining the alliance, there is a need to address briefly the misconception that 
by the middle of the fourth century, Sparta was a non-entity in wider Greek affairs.99 Helen 
Roche has recently challenged the implicit teleological assumptions in modern scholarship which 
argue that since Sparta eventually faded into geopolitical insignificance, then it must have been 
nothing more than a paper tiger after Leuctra. She reminds us that Sparta’s ultimate demise is 
clear in retrospect but not so much to contemporaries.100 It can be added to her argument that the 
numerous alliance proposals to the Spartans in the 360s and 350s work against the representation 
of their political and military impotence. Decline does not mean death, and in 346 the Tarentines 
did not consider their prospective ally to be an expired power. This also warns against putting 
any credence in the negative assessments of Archidamus for his participation in this alliance. 
Theopompus, for example, characterizes him as intemperate (ἀκρασία), disgusted with Sparta’s 
traditional customs (τῆς πατρίου διαίτης), and anxious to live elsewhere (ἔξω διατρίβειν). This 
character defamation, however, is formulaic, typical of Theopomous, and need not be taken 
seriously. In his career Archidamus consistently emerges as a responsible and patriotic leader, 
not at all fitting the wanderlust of Theopompus’ depiction.101 Even Isocrates held up Archidamus 
																																								 																				
 
 99 Words like “decline” (Cawkwell 1983, 385-400; reprinted in 2011, 275-294), “crisis” 
(Cartledge 1987), and “failure” (Hamilton 1991) routinely appear in descriptions of Sparta’s 
condition at this time.  
 
100 Roche 2013, 91-112.  
 
101 Theopomp. FGrH F 115 F232; cf. Ath. 12.51c-e. Christien 2009, 248: “la remarque 
ironique de Théopompe.” Shrimpton 1991, 137-138 comments on ἀκρασία as the anti-Spartan 
characteristic. Archidamus’ early career: Hamilton 1982a, 5-20. 
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as a capable candidate to lead his cherished crusade against Persia.102 The Tarentines, too, took 
notice of his qualifications and deliberately sought out the Spartans for an alliance.  
 Ephorus of Cyme (via Diodorus) gives the most complete account of the initiation of the 
Tarentine-Spartan alliance:  
“When the Tarentines were carrying on the war against the Lucanians and sent to the Spartans, 
being descendants of their ancestors, envoys for help, the Spartans, being eager to make an 
alliance with them because of their kinship, quickly mustered an army and navy and assigned 
King Archidamus as general.”103  
 
Ταραντίνων διαπολεµούντων πρὸς Λευκανοὺς καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιµονίους, ὄντας προγόνους 
ἑαυτῶν, πεµψάντων πρέσβεις περὶ βοηθείας οἱ µὲν Σπαρτιᾶται διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν προθύµως 
ἔχοντες συµµαχῆσαι ταχέως δύναµιν ἤθροιζον πεζικήν τε καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ ταύτης στρατηγὸν 
ἀπέδειξαν Ἀρχίδαµον τὸν βασιλέα. 
 
Like many other Greek embassies during the fourth century, the Tarentine ambassadors engaged 
in kinship diplomacy. There were, however, at least two conflicting foundation accounts for 
Tarentum. The fifth-century historian Antiochus of Syracuse highlights the hostility with which 
the colonists (Partheniae), children of cowardly Spartan soldiers, viewed their progenitors. Not 
allowed any political rights in Spartan society, the Partheniae made an unsuccessful attack 
against Sparta, after which they left the Peloponnesus and founded Tarentum.104 It seems 
unlikely that the Tarentine ambassadors in 346 raised this account of their shared origins. But, 
like the Chian ambassadors to Athens in 384, who had in the writings of the poet Ion a modified 
																																								 																				
102 Isoc. Let. 9.17; cf. Hamilton 1982a, 12-14. Natoli 2004, 154-155 discusses the 
possibility of an earlier appeal from Isocrates to Agesilaus. 
 
 103 Diod. Sic. 16.62.4. 
 
104 FGrH 555 F13; Strabo 6.3.2. Ogden 1997, 73-80 considers the legal and physical 
inferiority of the Partheniae to the Spartans. Fragoulaki 2013, 180-183 notes Thucydides’ 
silence on Tarentum’s Spartan origins. 
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foundation legend of Chios that reflected contemporary conditions, the Tarentines could also 
point to a more recent account in the writings of the historian Ephorus. The Cymean historian 
emphasizes closer ties of blood and sentiment between colony and metropolis. His Partheniae 
were born to widowed Spartan women and young, energetic Spartiate men. But, being 
illegitimate, they still had no hope of inheritance in the city, so the benevolent Spartans 
instructed them to make a better life in Italy. This is more likely what the Tarentine ambassadors 
had in mind when they called for an alliance with their Spartan ancestors.105  
After stating that the Spartans agreed to the alliance because of their kinship, Ephorus, 
dismissing the charge that Spartan power was moribund, says the Spartans quickly (ταχέως) 
mustered an army and navy. Although they had continued to experience a gradual decline in the 
number of their elite soldiers (ὀλιγανθρωπία), they still had a great advantage in their access to 
an available fighting population in the Peloponnesus.106 Over the course of the fourth century, 
due to persistent social and economic crises throughout the Greek world, more and more 
dispossessed and destitute men, with little more than military skills to offer, came to the 
peninsula to find employment and a new life.107 Modern scholars have recognized that many of 
																																								 																				
 105 FGrH 70 F216; Strabo 6.3.3 (cf. Arist. Pol. 1306b; Just. Epit. 3.4). Qviller 1996, 34-
41 defends Ephorus’ version. The ambassadors’ use of the past: Nafissi 1999, 254-255; Malkin 
2003, 139-142; 2011, 34-35. Dench 1995, 52-61 examines the Tarentines’ fabrication of shared 
Spartan origins with the Samnites (Strabo 5.4.12) in order to get military assistance. In 315, the 
Spartan prince Acrotatus sought out Tarentine help for his Sicilian campaign on the basis of 
kinship (διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν) (Diod. Sic. 16.70.8). 
 
 106 Spartiate decline: Arist. Pol. 2.1270a15-1270b7; cf. Hansen 2009, 393-396; 
Hodkinson 2009, 432-442. Non-elites in the Spartan army: Hawkins 2011, 401-434. 
 
 107 Trundle 2004, 104-122; Millender 2006, 235-266. Crises in the fourth century: Austin 
and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 131-155; Fuks 1984; Cartledge 2001, 104-123.  
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the unemployed gathered at Taenarum, the southern port of Laconia, although as Jean-
Christophe Couvenhes has recently cautioned, the area should not be considered in the 
anachronistic terms of a huge mercenary market or a central processing center.108 Rather, the 
experience of finding employment at Taenarum was less formal, with military groups forming 
through word-of-mouth, friendship contacts, and the reputation of commanders.109  
The Tarentines, whose forefathers in the eighth century had made religious dedications at 
the port before departing for Italy, would have recognized the practical and social value of this 
area. Both the Tarentines and the soldiers at Taenarum could find common ground in their shared 
worship of Poseidon.110 At about this time the Tarentines first minted a gold stater depicting on 
the reverse a boy (perhaps Taras, Poseidon’s son and mythical founder of Tarentum) in 
supplication to Poseidon. If it is true, as is commonly accepted, that this image symbolizes the 
appeal of Tarentum (Taras) to Sparta (Poseidon), the coins would have had symbolic as well as 
monetary value to all parties involved. The coins served as a method of payment and a 
commemoration of the alliance between the two poleis, creating a sense of group solidarity and 
shared goals. Just as the principal allies were materially invested, the soldiers would be 
																																								 																				
108 Couvenhes 2008, 279-284 reviews modern scholarship. Taenarum in the final third of 
the fourth century: Diod. Sic. 17.108.6-7, 111.1-2, 18.9.1; Arr. Anab. 2.13.6; cf. Christien 1992, 
147-167. Shipley 2000, 383-385 looks at Sparta’s control of Taenarum in the late classical 
period. 
 
 109 Trundle 2004, 132-164. 
 
110 Strabo 8.5.1; Paus. 3.25.4, 7.25.3; cf. Schumacher 1995, 58-60; Ustinova 2009, 69-71. 
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psychologically invested in the expedition and would forge a new identity through their 
involvement in it.111  
Not every soldier had the same experience, of course, yet it is important, nevertheless, to 
see the soldiers serving in this alliance in a relational rather than only a commercial 
(“mercenary”) function. In fact, if a contemporary account survived outside of a later epitome, it 
would likely employ more intimate terminology, such as ἐπίκουρος (one fighting alongside), 
φίλος (friend), or ξένος (foreigner) rather than the banal µισθόφορος (wage-earner), as Diodorus 
does centuries later.112 Anyhow, through the experience of recruitment at Taenarum and 
participation in the campaign, the soldiers came to play a significant social function in the 
alliance. Matthew Trundle supports this in his description of foreign soldiers serving as 
intermediaries between states, tying them together in much the same way that gifts and services 
did in traditional friendships.113 In other words, they were a tool to fulfill reciprocal obligations 
and made it possible for there to be mutual benefit for the two allies. The Tarentines, advantaged 
to have a source of wealth at their disposal, could provide money to support Spartan designs in 
the Peloponnesus; in exchange, the Spartans could supply an army to protect Tarentum. By 
																																								 																				
 111 Kray 1976, 191-192; Nafissi 1999, 247-248. Brauer 1986, 64-65 points out that the 
stars above Poseidon’s head on the coin might symbolize the Dioscuri, Sparta’s patrons. The 
construction of identity through coins: Trundle 2004, 114-117. The construction of identity 
through myth: Hall 1997, 40-51; Low 2007, 48-51; Patterson 2010, 1-21.  
 
112 Terminology for hired soldiers: Lavelle 1989, 36-39; 1997, 229-262; Kaplan 2002, 
230-234; Trundle 2004, 10-21. Xen. An. 1.1.10-11, 2.6.28, 3.1.4, 3.3, 18, for example, calls the 
Greeks who served under Cyrus the Younger ξένοι, whereas Diod. Sic. 14.19.3 calls them 
µισθοφόροι. 
 
113 Trundle 2004, 132-164; cf. Hodkinson 2000, 344-352. 
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means of this quid pro quo arrangement, the alliance had the potential of restoring harmony in 
southern Italy and of renewing Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesus.  
The two parties came to agreement on the alliance terms in an unrecorded session of the 
Spartan assembly. Then the Tarentine ambassadors gave enough money for the Spartans to 
assemble an army and a navy at Taenarum.114 After a brief detour at Crete, this large force 
finally arrived in Italy. There must have been some early activity but the sources contain a 
mysterious gap until 338, when the Spartan-led army confronted the Lucanians at the Battle of 
Manduria. Archidamus died fighting in that battle and even though the Tarentines offered a great 
amount of money, the enemy refused to hand over his body for burial.115 Instead, the Tarentines 
erected marble statues of Archidamus at Olympia and at Delphi, commemorating his 
achievements on their behalf and the alliance in perpetuity.116 
The situation in southern Italy remained critical, and the Tarentines continued for the next 
sixty years to enlist the aid of foreign generals – Alexander of Epirus, Cleonymus of Sparta, 
Agathocles of Syracuse, and, most famously, Pyrrhus of Epirus – until their final defeat by the 
Romans. These later generals, driven by policies of “micro-imperialism,” fought to extend their 
																																								 																				
114 When Tarentine ambassadors approached Sparta again in 303, they provided enough 
money for Cleonymus to hire 5,000 soldiers from Taenarum (Diod. Sic. 20.104.2). 
 
115 Theopomp. FGrH F 115 F232, 312 (cf. Ath. 12.51c-e); Diod. Sic. 16.63.1, 88.3; Plut. 
Agis 3.2 (cf. Bracsesi 1993, 137-141); Paus. 3.10.5.  
 
116 Ibid. 6.4.9, 6.15.7 (Olympia); Ath. 13.59 (Delphi). Mattusch 2005, 172-173 looks at a 
copy (NM 6156) of one of the statues which was found at Herculaneum. Christien 2009, 251-252 
believes Lysippus’ colossal bronze statues of Zeus and Heracles set up in Tarentum were further 
memorials to Archidamus.  
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own power into the west, and it would be a mistake to include Archidamus among their ilk.117 
Archidamus operated along the lines of constructing alliances according to the aspects of 
traditional Greek friendship. That he died without realizing his goals does not diminish the 
significance of that strategy. The same can be said for the earlier Spartan alliances of the fourth 
century. Many of them, it is true, failed to endure and even came to ignoble ends, but this chapter 
has eschewed the teleological approach of evaluating the alliances by their unfavorable 
outcomes. Instead, the programmatic principles of the alliances, rooted in the conventional Greek 
respect for reciprocity, held out great promise for the Spartans and for their allies. In the 
perceptions of contemporaries, at least, who continued to seek out alliances with the Spartans, 
the policy was fundamentally sound.  
																																								 																				
117 Ma 2000, 352. Purcell 1994, 393 calls the activity of the generals following 
Archidamus “part of a single complex phenomenon, the near-birth of a Successor state in the 
west.” Urso 1998 gives a full treatment of gli xenikoı̀ strategoı́.  
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Chapter V 
 
Theban Alliances in the 360s 
  
 
 In the fourth century, the third Greek power to create an extensive alliance network was 
Thebes. By following in the path of their Athenian and Spartan predecessors, the Thebans used 
their alliances to support their claim to Panhellenic leadership; yet, in the end, the so-called 
Theban hegemony was a poor imitation, lasting less than a decade (371 to 362).1 Through their 
earlier experiences as leaders of the Boeotian League and their collaboration with the 
Peloponnesian League, the Corinthian War alliance, and the Second Athenian Confederacy, the 
Thebans became familiar with the formal and informal institutions of interstate affairs.2 Yet, 
once they stepped out of the shadow of others and extended their own alliance arrangements into 
the Peloponnesus and central and northern Greece, they did not follow these precedents in all 
particulars. They preferred to conclude alliances based solely on temporary politico-military 
objectives and neglected the cultivation of social ties with the new allies.  
There are seven alliances or groups of alliances: the central and northern Greeks (370), 
Arcadia, Elis, and Argos (370), Sicyon and Pellene (369), Alexander II of Macedon (369), 
Ptolemy of Macedon (368), the Achaean League (366), and Alexander of Pherae (364). Nearly 
every alliance was made with a former or existing ally of the Spartans or the Athenians. Being 
newcomers to the world of Panhellenic leadership, the Thebans could only reach their political 
																																								 																				
1 Buckler 1980b, vii-viii discusses the (mis)application of “hegemony” to Thebes. 
Sterling 2004, 453-462 points out that Xenophon never objects to Theban hegemony as such, 
only the failure of Thebes to achieve a lasting hegemony. 
 
2 Buck 1994; Buckler 2003, 98-99; Larson 2007; Buckler and Beck 2008, 127-139; 
Mackil 2013, 22-45; Beck and Funke 2015, 132-157. 
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objectives by pilfering the allies of others. Without the deep, historical ties with the new allies, 
therefore, many of the Theban alliances, and thus the hegemonic experiment, collapsed within a 
few years of their inception.  
This chapter looks at this rapid rise and fall of the Thebans’ interstate alliance activities. 
The first section addresses the alliances arranged under the auspices of Epaminondas, the 
mastermind of Leuctra, who was obsessed with reducing the power of Sparta and revising the 
geopolitical status quo in Thebes’ favor. To that end, he arranged alliances with various 
Peloponnesians from 370 to 366. The next section explores Pelopidas’ alliances with northern 
dynasts. Unlike the Peloponnesian alliances, these were unequal alliances that placed the other 
parties in a definite position of subordination to the Thebans as subject-allies. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with explanations for why the Thebans, unlike the Athenians and the Spartans, did not 
enjoy a more lasting success with their alliances.    
 
Alliances in Central Greece and the Peloponnesus (370-369) 
 
 No one could have predicted at the end of the Corinthian War in 386, with the Spartans 
executing the King’s Peace and presiding over the dissolution of the Boeotian League, that 
within two decades it would be the Spartans who would watch their Peloponnesian League 
disintegrate, while the Thebans occupied a position of supreme leadership in Greece.3 This 
scenario would have appeared even less likely in 382, when the Spartans, with the cooperation of 
																																								 																				
3 Xen. Hell. 5.1.32-33. Isoc. 14.27 and Plut. Pel. 4.4-5 (cf. Paus. 9.13.1) claim that after 
the conclusion of the King’s Peace, the Thebans and Spartans made an alliance (συµµαχία) and 
fought together against the Mantineans. Hack 1978, 217 and Hamilton 1991, 142 accept this 
alliance, but Buckler 1980b, 179-185 and Mackil 2013, 66 n. 41 deny its historicity.  
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Leontiades, the prominent pro-Spartan politician in Thebes, occupied the Theban Cadmeia. The 
anti-Spartan leader Ismenias was taken in chains to Sparta and executed on charges of medism; 
his followers fled to Athens for refuge.4 Thebes appeared destined to be under Spartan control 
for some time to come. In the winter of 379, however, the Theban exiles in Athens were able to 
dislodge the occupiers of their city and regain control. Subsequently, the new Theban 
government made an official alliance with their Athenian benefactors (A12), and became charter 
members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.5 Their liberation from Spartan control and their 
alliance with the Athenians set the Thebans on a path towards their own series of interstate 
alliances and a bid for hegemony in Greece.  
The two principal proponents for this greater role interstate affairs were Pelopidas and 
Epaminondas.6 The former was aligned politically with Ismenias and was a close friend of his 
son, but, despite his time in exile in Athens, unlike Ismenias, he does not seem to have acquired 
any social ties with the Athenians.7 Nor did Epaminondas, who, because of his reputation as a 
Pythagorean philosopher posing no threat to the establishment, was allowed to remain in Thebes 
																																								 																				
 
4 Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-31; Diod. Sic. 15.20.2; Plut. Pel. 5.2-6.4; Mor. 576a. Hack 1978, 210-
227 sees the domestic success of Leontiades or Ismenias in the mid-380s as reactions to Sparta’s 
activities against the Greeks. Ismenias’ medism: Dušanić 1985, 227-235; Landucci Gattinoni 
2000, 149-154.  
 
5 IG II² 40; Xen. Hell. 5.4.1-19; Din. 1.39; Diod. Sic. 15.28.5; Plut. Pel. 14.1, 15.1.  
 
6 Friendship of Epaminondas and Pelopidas: ibid. 4.4-5; Georgiadou 1997, 32-37. 
 
7 Plut. Pel. 5.1, 27.1; cf. Buckler 1980b, 135. 
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during the Spartan occupation.8 Although both men were instrumental in the immediate revival 
of democracy in Thebes and the subsequent restoration of the Boeotian League, it is not recorded 
to what extent they were involved in the restoration of alliance ties with the Athenians or in 
Thebes’ enrollment in the Second Athenian Confederacy.9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine 
that they were unaware of the ins and outs of the mechanics of interstate alliances. Epaminondas, 
at least, participated in the 375 and 371 common peace conferences, fiercely contesting for but 
ultimately failing to see the inclusion of Thebes into the wider hegemonic arrangements set down 
by the Athenian Callistratus and the Spartan Agesilaus (see Chapter III). The latter’s stubborn 
refusal to placate the Thebans resulted in the Battle of Leuctra, where the Thebans destroyed the 
Spartan army.10  
The aftermath of Leuctra changed the composition and reach of Theban alliances. On the 
negative side of the ledger, the important alliance with the Athenians came to an end. Over the 
370s, Theban commitment to Athens and the Confederacy had wavered, and Theban belligerence 
against the Boeotians concerned the Athenians, who gradually turned away from Thebes to 
																																								 																				
8 Diod. Sic. 15.39.2; Nep. Epam. 2.1-2; Plut. Pel. 5.3; Paus. 9.13.1. Pythagorean 
influence on Epaminondas’ later military innovations: Vidal-Naquet 1986, 61-82; Stern 2012, 
160-161 (doubted by Hanson 1988, 190-207). 
 
9 Theban democracy: Robinson 2011, 55-61. Restoration of the Boeotian League: 
Buckler 1980b, 15-33; Bakhuizen 1994, 307-330; Buckler and Beck 2008, 87-98; Rzepka 2010, 
115-118. Both men were highly active in Theban military affairs during the 370s: Diod. Sic. 
15.81.2; Plut. Pel. 13.1, 15.3, 16.1-2, 23.4 (Pelopidas); Diod. Sic. 15.50.6, 52-56; Plut. Pel. 20.2, 
23; Ath. 602a (Epaminondas).  
 
10 Mosley 1972a, 312-318 thinks it was Epaminondas’ tactic to sign as “Thebans” on the 
first day of the 371 conference and then attempt to change it to “Boeotians” on the second day in 
the hopes that the other parties would not object. Boeotian autonomy: Keen 1996, 115-117; 
Rhodes 1999, 33-40. 
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support the pro-Spartan policy of Callistratus (see Chapter III-b).11 After the Theban victory over 
the Spartans, the Athenians offered no hospitality (ξένια) or reply to the Theban herald who 
brought the news of the battle. The Athens peace conference, when the Athenians and their allies 
offered military assistance to the Spartans, marks the effective end of their alliance with 
Thebes.12 From then on, the Thebans had to re-work the positive side of the alliance ledger. 
T1 The Thebans and Central and Northern Greeks (370) 
Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 15.62.4 
 It seems that Epaminondas, had he his way, would have invaded the Peloponnesus and 
taken the fight into Spartan territory immediately after Leuctra.13 The Theban authorities, 
however, chose instead to use their victory to finish their consolidation of the Boeotian League 
and make alliances in central Greece.14 One of the first was with the Phocians, traditional friends 
of the Spartans.15 On the basis of their hostile relationship, it may seem that the Thebans must 
have forced the Phocians into alliance. Even though the treaty for the alliance does not survive, 
																																								 																				
11 Theban attacks on Boeotians: Isoc. 14 passim; Xen. Hell. 6.3.1; Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; 
Paus. 9.1.8, 14.2. Callistratus made a veiled reference to the Thebans at the 371 conference in 
Sparta: “it is clear that some of the allies are not acting towards us in a pleasing manner” (Xen. 
Hell. 6.3.13). 
 
12 Herald: ibid. 6.4.19-20. Peace conference: ibid. 6.5.1-3.  
 
13 Paus. 9.14.1. Sprawski 1999, 96-97 looks at what influence the advice of Jason of 
Pherae, a Theban ally, had in restraining the Theban attack (Xen. Hell. 6.4.21-25).  
 
14 Destruction of Thespiae: Xen. Hell. 6.3.1, 4.10; Diod. Sic. 15.46.6, 51.3; Paus. 9.14.2-
4; cf. Tuplin 1986, 321-341; Stylianou 1998, 367, 387. Incorporation of Orchomenus into 
Boeotian League: Xen. Hell. 6.4.10; Diod. Sic. 15.57.1; Paus. 9.15.3; cf. Buckler 1980b, 66; 
Stylianou 1998, 410-411. 
 
15 Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 15.62.4.  
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however, there is still evidence that it was not asymmetrical; it was, in fact, a standard fourth-
century defensive alliance. Xenophon reports that the Phocians did not follow (οὐκ ἠκολούθουν) 
Epaminondas on his fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus in 362 because “their agreement said 
that, if anyone went against Thebes, they would help, but to march against others was not in the 
agreement [ὅτι συνθῆκαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἶεν, εἴ τις ἐπὶ Θήβας ἴοι, βοηθεῖν: ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ 
στρατεύειν οὐκ εἶναι ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις.].”16 In other words, the Phocians did not agree to an 
offensive alliance. But if it is a defense alliance, it is surprising, then, to see them on 
Epaminondas’ first invasion of the Peloponnesus in the winter of 370. No explanation is given 
for this; perhaps there was some incentive to join at this time. Of course, the Phocians in 362 did 
not say there was a prohibition in the original treaty against voluntary participation in offensive 
campaigns.17 Whatever the case, this defensive alliance is probably representative of the other 
alliances concluded in central and northern Greece. Xenophon says that many of the Euboeans, 
both Locrian peoples, Aenianians, Acarnanians, Heracleots, Malians, and Thessalians allied with 
Thebes and joined the first expedition into the Peloponnesus.18 These alliances also lacked a 
clause obligating participation in offensive campaigns. The Thebans, therefore, had effectively 
																																								 																				
16 Xen. Hell. 7.5.4.  
 
17 The Phocians’ participation in the first expedition may have led Xenophon (ibid. 
6.5.23), no friend of Thebes or of those who abandoned the Spartans, to call them subjects 
(ὑπήκοοι) rather than allies (σύµµαχοι), as Diod. Sic. 15.62.4 does. This is supported by 
Cawkwell 1972, 268-269 (reprinted in 2011, 320); Roy 1994, 189; Buckler and Beck 2008, 134. 
McInerney 1999, 198 agrees with Xenophon’s characterization because the Phocians would not 
willfully join Epaminondas’ expedition while Jason of Pherae threatened their region. 
 
18 Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; Ages. 2.24. Diod. Sic. 15.57.1, 62.4 adds the Aetolian Confederacy. 
Thebes and Euboea: Wallace 1962, 15-28; Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012, 239-254.  
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expanded their alliances in central Greece, but extending them into the Peloponnesus was a new 
prospect for which they were not wholly prepared.  
T2 The Thebans and the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives (370) 
Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; Paus. 8.6.2, 9.14.4 
The Theban-Peloponnesian alliance of 370 was the inspiration of the Arcadians, Eleans, 
and Argives, although the Thebans were not their first choice. Once the consequences of Leuctra 
became clear, the Mantineans undid the dioecism (break-up) which the Spartans imposed on their 
city in 385 and re-synoecised (re-established) themselves into a unified democratic state. 
Lycomedes, a prominent Mantinean, went further and brought others in the region into an 
Arcadian Confederation.19 The Arcadians then turned to the Eleans and the Argives, two 
confirmed enemies of Sparta, and made a trilateral alliance directed against their mutual enemy. 
Their combined strength, however, was still insufficient to match that of the Spartans, so the 
three made a joint appeal to the Athenians, but the pro-Spartan leaders in Athens rejected the 
proposal.20  
As an alternative, the Peloponnesians extended the same proposition to the Thebans.21 It 
appears that there was some reluctance to it from Epaminondas’ domestic rivals. Among the 
																																								 																				
19 Xen. Hell. 6.5.3-6; Diod. Sic. 15.59.1, 62.2; Paus. 8.27.2. Ibid. 8.8.10, 9.14.4 
incorrectly ascribes Mantinea’s re-synoecism to Epaminondas. Beck 2000, 340-343 disputes any 
putative Theban involvement in the creation of the Arcadian Confederacy. Hornblower 1990, 71-
77 shows that the inception of the Arcadian capital at Megalopolis predated any involvement of 
Epaminondas in Arcadian affairs. 
 
20 Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; cf. Xen. Hell. 6.5.16, 19. The appeal to the 
Athenians was probably the design of Lycomedes, who would orchestrate another alliance with 
them in 366 (A16). Thompson 1983, 149-160 disputes the alleged unity in Arcadia’s anti-
Spartan policies, but see responses by Roy 2000, 322-325 and Nielsen 2002, 486-488.  
 
21 Xen. Hell. 6.5.19; Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; Paus. 8.6.2, 9.14.4.  
208 
Arcadians, too, such as Lycomedes, a devout defender of Arcadian sovereignty, there were 
voices of dissent. Still the proponents for the alliance, in particular Epaminondas, prevailed and 
secured its safe passage. Since the Peloponnesians invited the Thebans to help them fight off 
their Spartan attackers, the alliance was probably a standard defensive alliance, such as the recent 
ones with the Phocians and others.22 The official treaty for the alliance is not extant, but it is 
possible to reconstruct at least two other terms by looking closely at allusions to the alliance in 
Xenophon’s record. First, the allies agreed not to make a unilateral peace agreement with a 
common enemy. This is clear from an episode in 363, when the Mantineans made peace with 
their erstwhile allies, the Eleans. Epaminondas complained to the Arcadians: “for although we 
came into the war [i.e., in 370] on your account, you made peace without our knowledge. How 
would it not be just for someone to charge you with treason for this [τὸ γὰρ ἡµῶν δι᾽ ὑµᾶς εἰς 
πόλεµον καταστάντων ὑµᾶς ἄνευ τῆς ἡµετέρας γνώµης εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι πῶς οὐκ ἂν δικαίως 
προδοσίαν τις ὑµῶν τοῦτο κατηγοροίη]?”23 Although the common enemy here is Elis, in 370, 
when the Thebans entered the war, it was Sparta. Evidently, the treaty did not specify the identity 
of the enemy with whom they were not to make a unilateral peace agreement. There was also an 
exiles clause. The allies agreed that the extradition of exiles from one city was applicable to all 
within the alliance, and likewise the return of exiles required the approval of all. This is 
mentioned by the assassin of Euphron of Sicyon during his trial in 366: 
																																								 																				
 
22 In 366, the Arcadians made a defensive alliance with the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 7.4.2-3, 
6), an arrangement that would have been impossible to maintain if their alliance with the 
Thebans, at war with the Athenians, was offensive.  
 
23 Xen. Hell. 7.4.40. Roy 1971, 597 comments further on this clause.  
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“remember also that you indeed voted that the exiles are to be led away from all of those in the 
alliance. But when any exile returns without a general resolution of the allies, is anyone able to 
say how it is not just for him to be put to death?”24 
 
ἀναµνήσθητε ὅτι καὶ ἐψηφίσασθε δήπου τοὺς φυγάδας ἀγωγίµους εἶναι ἐκ πασῶν τῶν 
συµµαχίδων. ὅστις δὲ ἄνευ κοινοῦ τῶν συµµάχων δόγµατος κατέρχεται φυγάς, τοῦτον ἔχοι τις ἂν 
εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀποθνῄσκειν 
 
The alliance with Sicyon did not occur until 369, but the Sicyonian assassin indicates that an 
exiles clause was a part of all the alliances in the Peloponnesus, including this one with the 
Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives. Since there was this provision about political undesirables, there 
may also have been mention about the preservation of each ally’s domestic constitution, as will 
be the case in later alliances.25  
There was no clause defining leadership roles. It was only on the basis of charismatic 
leadership, not legal authority, that the Thebans commanded the allied army. Plutarch writes that 
“the reputation of the men [i.e., Epaminondas and Pelopidas], without a general resolution or 
decree, made all of the allies follow their leadership in silence [ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄνευ 
δόγµατος κοινοῦ καὶ ψηφίσµατος ἐποίει τοὺς συµµάχους ἕπεσθαι σιωπῇ πάντας ἡγουµένοις 
ἐκείνοις].”26 It is incredible to think that there was no opposition, but the main point here is that 
																																								 																				
24 Xen. Hell. 7.3.11.  
 
25 So suggests Buckler 1980b, 73. The Theban alliances with Sicyon and the Achaeans 
protected domestic constitutions (T3). The Athenian alliance with Arcadia and Elis (and Achaea 
and Argos) explicitly forbid intervention in each other’s domestic affairs and an exiles clause 
(A17). 
 
26 Plut. Pel. 24.3. But complaints about the leadership arrangements were heard from 
Lycomedes in the summer of 369: “Now if you [i.e., the Arcadians] follow Thebes heedlessly 
and do not think it fit to lead by turns, perhaps you will soon find them to be another Sparta [νῦν 
δὲ ἂν Θηβαίοις εἰκῇ ἀκολουθῆτε καὶ µὴ κατὰ µέρος ἡγεῖσθαι ἀξιῶτε, ἴσως τάχα τούτους ἄλλους 
Λακεδαιµονίους εὑρήσετε]” (Xen. Hell. 7.1.24). 
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the Thebans occupied the position of leadership in the alliance without any official sanction in 
the treaty. Later this ambiguity would be a cause for the breakdown of the alliance.  
It was not until December of 370 that Epaminondas led the allied troops from central and 
northern Greece through the Isthmus and into Arcadia, only to find that the Spartans had already 
retired. The purpose of the defensive alliance, therefore, was technically fulfilled, and the 
Thebans could return home just before the term of the generals expired at the end of the year.27 
But they did not. Despite the illegality of extending the command of the generals and the 
harshness of winter, it was decided that the army would continue into Laconia and attack Sparta 
itself. Xenophon claims the Peloponnesians made this decision. Diodorus says it was the Theban 
leaders. But Plutarch and Pausanias credit it to Epaminondas. Cornelius Nepos adds that 
Epaminondas was forced to continue the expedition or else he would lose the army, indicating 
how loose the attachments between the new allies were. Epaminondas, obsessed with destroying 
Sparta’s power, must have been involved in this decision to continue.28 He was blind, though, to 
the futility of luring the Spartans out of their city for battle against his large army. After a failed 
attack on Sparta, he permitted the allies to plunder the rest of Laconia, which encouraged a few 
other small powers in the region to join the allied army. Finally, as a war measure, he liberated 
the Messenians and founded Messene, thus destroying the economic base of Spartan society.29 
																																								 																				
 
27 There was no provision for prorogation, so if the Theban generals did not return in time 
to lay down their commands, they would be prosecuted (Plut. Pel. 24.2; cf. Hanson 2010, 98-99). 
 
28 Xen. Hell. 6.5.23-25; Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 15.62.4-5; Plut. Pel. 24.2; Paus. 9.14.5; 
Nep. Epam. 7.3-5. The first invasion of the Peloponnesus: Fortina 1958, 39-56; Buckler 1980b, 
70-90; Shipley 1997, 336-349; Stylianou 1998, 423-444; Hanson 2010, 93-117.  
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Notwithstanding this climactic success, when he returned home in the spring of 369, his political 
rivals, dissatisfied with the expedition from the start, brought him up on the expected charge of 
refusing to surrender his command at the end of the year. Epaminondas, however, no mean 
public speaker, defended himself by pointing to his recent achievements, which were sufficient 
for the court to dismiss the charges.30  
T3 The Thebans and Sicyon and Pellene (369) 
 Xen. Hell. 7.2.2-3.3.2; Diod. 15.69.1 
Epaminondas’ acquittal gave him a mandate to continue his Peloponnesian policy. 
According to Diodorus, he led another invasion of the Peloponnesus in the summer of 369 in 
response to another appeal from the Peloponnesian allies.31 This time he succeeded in securing 
alliances with Sicyon and Pellene. More information is available for the former. Diodorus says 
that Epaminondas bullied (καταπληξάµενος) the Sicyonians into an alliance. Xenophon, 
however, in his record of a speech by Euphron of Sicyon, says they held a vote (ψῆφος).32 It may 
be that a vote followed the bullying. Whatever the case, in the alliance Epaminondas assured the 
Sicyonians that the Thebans would respect their constitutional government. Unlike the earlier 
alliances, however, Epaminondas also installed a governor (ἄρχων) on the Sicyonian 
																																								 																				
29 Xen. Hell. 6.5.27-32; Diod. Sic. 15.64.1-67.1; Plut. Pel. 24.5; Paus. 4.26.5-27.10, 
9.14.5. Luraghi 2008, 209-248 looks at the creation of the Messenian state in the context of the 
formation of Messenian identity. 
 
30 Nep. Epam. 8.1-5 (cf. Stern 2012, 178-183); Plut. Pel. 25.1-2; Mor. 194a-b, 540d-e (cf. 
Buckler 1978b, 36-42); Paus. 9.14.7; Polyaenus Strat. 2.3.5.  
 
31 Xen. Hell. 7.1.18; Diod. Sic. 15.68.1; Paus. 9.15.4. The second invasion of the 
Peloponnesus: Fortina 1958, 59-62; Buckler 1980b, 90-102; Stylianou 1998, 457-461. 
 
32 Xen. Hell. 7.3.2; Diod. 15.69.1. The Sicyonian alliance in general: Roy 1971, 574-575 
(cf. 1994, 191-192); Buckler 1980b, 98-99; Griffin 1982, 68; Lolos 2011, 68-69. Pellene: Xen. 
Hell. 7.2.2-3. 
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Acropolis.33 But this was a necessary wartime measure, not an attempt to create a satellite or to 
forcibly impose a Theban-style democracy on the Sicyonians. Even the subsequent (c. 367) 
constitutional changes by Euphron were not considered a violation of the alliance.34 
Epamindonas’ approach to interstate relations was a pragmatic one. Since the primary objective 
was the reduction of Sparta, the political ideology of an ally meant little to him as long as the 
alliance contributed to that goal. In addition to the guarantee to respect each other’s constitution, 
there was an exiles clause. As the Sicyonian assassin of Euphron mentioned during his trial in 
Thebes in 366, there was a prohibition against the return of an exile “without a general resolution 
of the allies [ἄνευ κοινοῦ τῶν συµµάχων δόγµατος].”35 The control of exiles added to the 
stability of the existing government, which in turn supported the alliance and put pressure on the 
common enemy. There is no evidence for other stipulations in the alliances with Sicyon and 
Pellene, though one might suspect that there was a prohibition against any independent peace 
efforts with an enemy, as was the case in the 370 alliances.   
Overall, however, the success of the second expedition was negligible. There was no 
attempt on the city of Sparta. Xenophon says that a failed Theban attack on Corinth even revived 
the spirits of the Spartans and their allies.36 Nor were the Thebans able to deter the new 
																																								 																				
 
33 Ibid. 7.2.11, 3.4.  
 
34 Ibid. 7.1.44. The Theban governor remained in Sicyon until 366 (ibid. 7.2.11, 15, 3.4, 
9). Griffin 1982, 72-73 thinks the Theban garrison was temporarily removed during Euphron’s 
coup. Lewis 2004, 65-74 disputes the characterization of Euphron as a typical tyrannt. Robinson 
2011, 51-53 argues that Euphron’s government was a true democracy not a tyranny.  
 
 35 Xen. Hell. 7.3.11. 
 
36 Ibid. 7.1.19. 
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Athenian-Spartan alliance (A13). Instead of finding Sparta further isolated, the allies watched as 
their enemy secured new sources of support from Athens, Dionysius I of Syracuse, and 
Ariobarzanes of Phrygia.37 So this time when Epaminondas returned home, his opponents found 
it easier to secure a guilty verdict against him on the charge of treason (προδοσία) for not 
destroying Sparta. He was blocked from the generalship for the next year and would not return to 
the Peloponnesus until 366.38   
 
Alliances in Northern Greece (368-364) 
  
 During Epaminondas’ second invasion of the Peloponnesus, Pelopidas was in the north. 
The new tyrant of Pherae, Alexander, had recently occupied a number of key Thessalian cities.39 
The victims sent ambassadors to Thebes appealing to their previous year’s defensive alliance. 
Plutarch says that Pelopidas volunteered for the northern assignment because he no longer 
wished to play second fiddle to Epaminondas. Diodorus adds that the Theban authorities handed 
Pelopidas the vague instructions to “manage affairs in Thessaly in the interest of the Boeotians 
[εἰς τὸ συµφέρον τῶν Βοιωτῶν διοικῆσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θετταλίαν].”40 Whatever this may have 
																																								 																				
 
37 Ibid. 7.1.1-14 (Athens), 20-22 (Dionysius), 27 (Ariobarzanes). 
 
38 Diod. Sic. 15.72.2; cf. Cawkwell 1972, 267 (reprinted in 2011, 318-319); Buckler 
1980b, 142-145. The Thebans maintained their garrison at Sicyon after 369 (Xen. Hell. 7.2.11-
15; Diod. Sic. 15.75.3). 
 
39 Xen. Hell. 6.4.29-35; Diod. Sic. 15.60.5, 61.2; cf. Sprawski 2006, 139-140.  
 
40 Diod. Sic. 15.67.3; Plut. Pel. 26.1; Nep. Pel. 4.3 (cf. Stern 2012, 190-192). This may 
refer to the security of Thebes’ northern borders. The Athenians were also a threat: they had 
recently made an alliance with Amyntas of Macedon, who supported their claims to Amphipolis. 
214 
meant, the Thebans were obligated, according to the terms of their defensive alliance, to respond 
positively to the Thessalian appeal. Their alliance probably contained another clause prohibiting 
the unilateral conclusion of peace or other arrangement with a common enemy. This would 
explain why Pelopidas, after liberating Larissa from Alexander, refused the tyrant’s offer of 
alliance. Plutarch, the only source for this proposal, says that although Alexander begged 
(δεόµενον) him, Pelopidas refused to make an alliance with one so “incurably savage and all 
cruelty [ἀνήκεστος καὶ θηριώδης καὶ πολλὴ µὲν ὠµότης].”41 It is a moralizing and melodramatic 
explanation typical of Plutarch. Pelopidas may have had some personal aversion to Alexander’s 
behavior and attitude, but it is more likely that he was prevented from entering into a binding 
relationship with the Pheraean by the terms of his alliance with the Thessalians. He, therefore, 
continued the military solution until the area was secure for his allies.  
T4 The Thebans and Alexander II of Macedon (369) 
Diod. Sic. 15.67.4; Plut. Pel. 26.4; Just. Epit. 7.5.1  
News of Pelopidas’ success in Thessaly reached neighboring Macedonia, where a rivalry 
had erupted between King Alexander II and his brother-in-law Ptolemy Alorus. The adversaries 
invited Pelopidas to arbitrate. He decided in favor of the king and made an alliance with him. 
Alexander’s father, Amyntas, had an alliance with the Athenians, made Iphicrates his adopted 
son, and supported Athenian claims to Amphipolis; yet Alexander, by making the alliance with 
																																								 																				
Buckler 1980b, 111 and 2003, 320 suggest that Pelopidas may also have been concerned for the 
safety of his friend Jason’s family (Plut. Pel. 28.4). Pelopidas’ first northern mission: Buckler 
1980b, 110-119; Georgiadou 1997, 191-196; Stylianou 1998, 455-457; Buckler 2003, 320-323.  
 
41 Plut. Pel. 26.2. Xen. Hell. 6.4.35 and Diod. Sic. 15.61.2 also speak of Alexander’s 
violent nature, but see Sprawski 2006, 135-138. Diod. Sic. 15.67.4 states incorrectly that Larissa 
was under the occupation of Alexander II of Macedon.  
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Pelopidas, turned from that policy. Diodorus only mentions briefly the alliance (συµµαχία). 
Plutarch, though, goes into slightly more detail:  
“After he came, put an end to their differences, and recalled the exiles, he received as hostage 
Philip, the king's brother, and thirty other sons of the most distinguished men, and brought them 
to Thebes, thus showing to the Greeks how far the affairs of the Thebans extended in the glory of 
its power and in the confidence in its justice.”42 
ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ διαλύσας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ καταγαγὼν τοὺς φεύγοντας, ὅµηρον ἔλαβε τὸν ἀδελφὸν 
τοῦ βασιλέως Φίλιππον καὶ τριάκοντα παῖδας ἄλλους τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων, καὶ κατέστησεν εἰς 
Θήβας, ἐπιδειξάµενος τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὡς πόρρω διήκει τὰ Θηβαίων πράγµατα τῇ δόξῃ τῆς 
δυνάµεως καὶ τῇ πίστει τῆς δικαιοσύνης. 
 
It was dissimilar to the alliances with the southern Greeks and contained none of their clauses, 
except for a possible clause – indicated by καταγαγὼν τοὺς φεύγοντας – calling for the return of 
the exiles from the recent dispute with Ptolemy. A new condition was the demand for hostages. 
Plutarch points out that this demonstrated Theban power, as it surely did, but it was also a tool of 
alliance maintenance: possessing hostages ensured Alexander’s continued compliance with the 
terms of the alliance.43 The Macedonian king must have been in no position to refuse and handed 
over the hostages, including one of his younger brothers, Philip, the future king of Macedonia.44   
T5 The Thebans and Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (368) 
Plut. Pel. 27.3 
But the arrangements in Macedonia proved temporary. In the next year, Ptolemy 
murdered Alexander and set himself up as king, thus nullifying the alliance with Thebes. The 
situation became even more complex when the Athenians sent Iphicrates, the adopted brother of 
																																								 																				
42 Ibid.; Plut. Pel. 26.4; Just. Epit. 7.5.1. The alliance with Alexander in general: Buckler 
1980b, 117-118; Hatzopoulos 1985, 252-253.  
 
43 Amit 1970, 143-144; Low 2007, 113-116. Gazzano 2005, 12 calls “lo scambio di 
ostaggi . . .  come strumento per garantire la validita degli accordi.”  
 
44 Philip in Thebes: Hammond 1997, 355-372. 
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Perdiccas, another younger brother of the murdered king, to advance Athenian interests in the 
north.45 To counter these developments, Pelopidas, already en route to Thessaly at the head of a 
diplomatic mission to Alexander of Pherae, raised an army of Thessalians and marched on 
Macedonia.46 According to Plutarch, Ptolemy, although he had bribed the Thessalians away from 
Pelopidas, immediately made an alliance with the Theban: 
“Since Ptolemy feared the very name and reputation of Pelopidas, he approached him as the 
stronger, and after welcoming him and asking for his favor, he agreed to be regent for the 
brothers of the dead king, and to have the same friends and enemies as the Thebans; moreover, to 
confirm this, he gave him his son Philoxenus and fifty of his companions.”47 
 
τοῦ δὲ Πελοπίδου τὴν δόξαν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὔνοµα δεδοικώς ἀπήντησεν ὡς κρείσσονι, καὶ 
δεξιωσάµενος καὶ δεηθεὶς ὡµολόγησε τὴν µὲν ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἀδελφοῖς διαφυλάξειν, 
Θηβαίοις δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν ἕξειν καὶ φίλον ὁµήρους δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν υἱὸν Φιλόξενον ἔδωκε 
καὶ πεντήκοντα τῶν ἑταίρων 
 
Ptolemy was placed in a clear position of subordination to the Thebans. Plutarch expresses the 
alliance with an hegemonic oath formula in imitation of earlier Spartan and Athenian alliances: 
“to have the same friends and enemies as the Thebans.” This was not a part of the previous 
alliance with Alexander. Ptolemy had disrupted Pelopidas’ political arrangements in Macedonia, 
and if the Theban did not respond to this provocation, it might have negative repercussions for 
all of his northern settlements. The fifth-century Athenians imposed new oaths on subdued rebel 
																																								 																				
45 Aeschin. 2.27-29; Diod. Sic. 15.71.1; Plut. Pel. 27.2; Nep. Iphic. 3.2. Mosley 1972b, 7-
11 shows how alliances with a Macedonian king came to an end with a monarch’s death.  
 
46 Pelopidas’ second northern mission: Buckler 1980b, 119-129; Georgiadou 1997, 196-
199; Stylianou 1998, 466-468. 
 
47 The Loeb for Plut. Pel. 27.3 translates Θηβαίοις δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν ἕξειν καὶ φίλον 
ὁµήρους as “to make an alliance with the Thebans.” Aeschin. 2.29 mentions the συµµαχία but 
nothing more. Heskel 1997, 42-43 suggests that it was rather Pelopidas who bribed away 
Ptolemy’s soldiers, which may explain why Ptolemy asked so quickly for an alliance. The 
alliance in general: Buckler 1980b, 122-123; Hatzopoulos 1985, 253.  
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states. The Spartans continued to impose this same oath on their allies in the fourth century (the 
Athenians in 404 and the Olynthians in 379).48 By adopting this particular oath, therefore, 
Pelopidas punished the Macedonian usurper by forcing him to place his foreign policy under the 
authority of Thebes.49  
Plutarch reinforces this control aspect of the alliance, a fortiori, by mentioning two 
practical conditions imposed on Ptolemy. He was to offer up hostages, more than was required of 
Alexander, a means of guaranteeing the Macedonian’s loyalty to the new compact.50 Ptolemy, 
furthermore, was not permitted to take the throne in his own right. He would be only the regent 
for young Perdiccas. But in the larger scheme of interstate relations, he had to adhere to Theban 
wishes. The agreement kept Ptolemy out of Thessalian (and by extension Theban) affairs, and 
continued to obstruct contact between the Macedonians and the Athenians.51 For all of its 
potential, this alliance, too, turned out to last little longer than the one with Alexander did. In 
365, young Perdiccas murdered his regent and collaborated briefly with the Athenians.52 But that 
was three years in the future.  
																																								 																				
48 This oath goes back to the establishment of the Delian League (Thuc. 3.75.1, 7.33.6; 
Aristot. Ath. Pol. 23.5). Athenians in 404: Xen. Hell. 2.2.20. Olynthians in 379: ibid. 5.3.26. 
Bolmarcich 2008, 65-79 argues that the Spartans adopted the oath from the Athenians. It is also 
in an undated alliance between the Spartans and the Aetolians and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461).  
 
49 Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 205-211 discusses the imposition of this oath on rebel 
states to ensure their loyalty. 
 
50 Amit 1970, 144. 
 
51 Ptolemy was one of the Macedonian ambassadors in the alliance negotiations between 
Athens and Amyntas III in the mid-370s (IG II2 102, line 7).  
 
52 Dem. 2.14; Aeschin. 2.26-29; Nep. Iph. 3.2; Polyaenus Strat. 3.10.14. Perdiccas and 
Athens: Hatzopoulos 1985, 255-256; Borza 1990, 195-196; Heskel 1997, 31.  
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T7 The Thebans and Alexander of Pherae (364) 
Diod. Sic. 15.80.6; Plut. Pel. 35.1-2 
After the settlement with Ptolemy, Pelopidas returned to unfinished business in Thessaly, 
but as soon as he arrived at Pharsalus, Alexander of Pherae placed him in prison.53 The Thebans 
quickly authorized a rescue mission. Before it arrived, however, Alexander made an alliance 
with the Athenians, who dispatched significant military support under the command of Autocles 
(A14). Reinforced, Alexander defeated the Thebans and imprisoned Pelopidas. In the next year, 
Epaminondas, re-elected to the generalship, took command of the army in Thessaly and 
confronted Alexander. The tyrant quickly offered to discard his alliance with the Athenians and 
asked for peace and friendship (εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν) with the Thebans. Like Pelopidas in 369, 
however, Epaminondas refused to enter into any binding relationship with Alexander, probably 
on account of its prohibition in the Theban-Thessalian alliance. All he agreed to was a truce and 
the release of Pelopidas.54  
It would not be until 364, after Pelopidas died fighting against Alexander, that the 
Thebans made an official alliance with the tyrant. Of course, to make this alliance required that 
Alexander terminate his alliance with the Athenians. This new one, however, was asymmetrical. 
Diodorus and Plutarch say that the Pheraean was forced – both use a form of ἀναγκάζω – to give 
back to the Thessalians their cities, submit Magnesia and Phthiotic Achaea for inclusion into the 
Boeotian League, and become an ally of Thebes. In describing the latter condition, Plutarch adds 
that Alexander swore an oath “to follow against whomever the Thebans may lead and bid [ἐφ᾽ 
οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται Θηβαῖοι καὶ κελεύσωσιν ἀκολουθήσειν],” another oath formula borrowed from 
																																								 																				
 
53 Polyb. 8.35.6-9; Diod. Sic. 15.71.2; Nep. Pel. 5.1; Plut. Pel. 27.4-6; Paus. 9.15.1.  
 
54 Diod. Sic. 15.75.2; Plut. Pel. 29.6; Paus. 9.15.1-2. 
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Spartan alliances.55 It also appears in Epaminondas’ alliance with the Achaeans in 366 (see more 
below). This oath imposed an offensive alliance on Alexander. He was required to contribute to 
Theban campaigns, as he did in 362 at the Battle of Mantinea. But why did the Thessalians 
permit the new Theban alliance with their mutual enemy? It must be because it restricted 
Alexander’s military activities. The tyrant agreed to submit his military to Theban control, and 
he could not summon the Thebans in any attack on the Thessalians. Alexander was in effect 
more of a subject than an ally of Thebes. At the time the Thessalians must have been delighted in 
this outcome.  
 
The Breakup of Theban Alliances (367-362) 
 
Immediately after his release from imprisonment, Pelopidas shifted his attention towards 
gaining Persian support for Thebes. In 367, he convinced the Persian King to endorse a new 
settlement for Greece, which included an independent Messenia, the demobilization of the 
Athenian fleet, and a recognition of Theban hegemony (ἡγεµονία) over Greece. The King also 
decided in favor of the Eleans in their dispute with the Arcadians over Triphylia, a verdict with 
repercussions for the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance.56 But when Pelopidas announced the 
settlement at a congress in Thebes, the Greeks refused to accept it. Lycomedes of Mantinea, 
																																								 																				
 
55 Diod. Sic. 15.80.6; Plut. Pel. 35.1-2. The alliance with Alexander in general: Buckler 
1980b, 181-182; Stylianou 1998, 499-500. The oath of the Peloponnesian League: Bolmarcich 
2008, 65-79; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 212-222.  
 
56 Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-40 (the only mention of Pelopidas in the Hellenica); Nep. Pel. 4.3; 
Plut. Pel. 30; cf. Jehne 1994, 82-90; Georgiadou 1997, 205-211; Bearzot 2011, 21-37.  
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dissatisfied generally with Theban claims to hegemony and specifically with the decision on 
Triphylia, led the opposition to the peace. In response, the Thebans angrily claimed that 
Lycomedes was destroying the alliance (τὸ συµµαχικόν). That was true: following the 
Mantinean’s example, the other Greek representatives rejected the peace. “In this way,” 
concludes Xenophon, “came to an end this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans for the 
leadership [καὶ αὕτη µὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη].”57 
But it was really only the beginning of the end. In 366, according to Diodorus, the Greeks 
accepted a modified version of the peace, which included a general acknowledgement of Theban 
leadership in Greece.58 But it was a tenuous acceptance, as events would soon bear out.  
T6  The Thebans and the Achaeans (366) 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.41-42; Diod. Sic. 15.75.2 
Epaminondas interpreted the passage of the peace as license to enforce Theban leadership 
and to promote more alliances in the Peloponnesus. The specific goal of the third expedition was 
the addition of the Achaeans, who probably remained aligned with the Spartans in the years after 
Leuctra, giving Epaminondas a pretext to invade.59 The expedition, moreover, had the effect of 
uniting the existing Peloponnesian allies under Theban authority. Because there had not been any 
specific designation of leadership roles, cracks had begun to form in the Theban-Peloponnesian 
																																								 																				
57 Xen. Hell. 7.1.39-40. Sterling 2004, 456-458 and Buckler and Beck 2008, 130-133 
discuss what Xenophon means by ἡγεµονία and ἀρχή.  
 
58 Diod. Sic. 15.76.3. Cawkwell 1961, 80-86 and Stylianou 1998, 485-489 posit the 
probable modifications to the peace (Messenian independence, Theban recognition of Athenian 
rights to Amphipolis and the Chersonese and of Arcadian rights to Triphylia, and Athenian 
recognition of Theban hegemony in Greece).  
 
59 Polyb. 2.39.8-10 (cf. Strabo 8.7.1) claims the Achaeans served as arbiters between 
Thebes and Sparta after Leuctra. Buckler 1978a, 85-96 and Freitag 2009, 22-23 dismiss this as 
Achaean tradition; Mackil 2013, 71 n. 75 expresses more confidence in Polybius’ account.  
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alliance. But this new campaign united the allies once again under Epaminondas’ charismatic 
leadership. The campaign was initially successful. The allied army attacked Dyme, Naupactus, 
and Calydon, until the Achaean oligarchs agreed to an alliance. Xenophon records its conditions:  
“With the oligarchs of Achaea making appeals to him, Epaminondas saw to it by his own power 
that no one exile them or change their constitution, but after he received pledges in good faith 
from the Achaeans that they would indeed be allies and would follow wherever the Thebans 
lead.”60  
 
προσπεσόντων δ᾽ αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαµεινώνδας ὥστε µὴ 
φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους µηδὲ πολιτείαν µεταστῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πιστὰ λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἦ 
µὴν συµµάχους ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν ὅποι ἂν Θηβαῖοι ἡγῶνται, 
 
There are three conditions: a prohibition against the exile of the oligarchs, the preservation of 
their oligarchic constitution, and their promise to “follow the Thebans wherever they lead.” 
Forms of the first two appeared in the Peloponnesian alliances of 370 and 369; the third is a new 
one for Epaminondas. The oath “to follow x wherever they lead” is recognizable from Spartan 
alliances, and by swearing the oath, the new allies promised that in practice they would 
subordinate their military policies to those of the Spartans.61 It was in essence an offensive 
alliance, or Epaminondas’ response to the problems of late with the Arcadians and the issue of 
leadership. The insertion of the hegemonic oath into the alliance with the Achaeans made that 
unquestionably clear.  
																																								 																				
 
60 Xen. Hell. 7.1.41-42; Diod. Sic. 15.75.2. The alliance in general: Buckler 1980b, 189; 
Roy 1994, 197-198. Freitag 2009, 23-24 places the attacks on Achaea after the conclusion of the 
alliance. Merker 1989, 305-306 supposes that the Thebans returned Naupactus to the Locrians 
and gave Calydon to the Aetolians, both as awards to new allies. Robinson 2011, 25-28 examines 
the struggle between Achaea’s democrats and oligarchs in the classical period.  
 
61 Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; 5.3.26; cf. Bolmarcich 2008, 65-79; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 
212-222 (with bibliography). In 389, the Achaeans alluded to the same oath (Xen. Hell. 4.6.2).  
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Since Epaminondas was on campaign, he concluded this alliance on his own authority 
(ἐνδυναστεύει), intending to submit it later to the home authorities for official ratification, but it 
never got that far.62 For the arrangements with the Achaean oligarchs alienated the Arcadian (and 
Achaean) democrats, who complained to Epaminondas’ rivals in Thebes. The Thebans decided 
in their favor, overruling their general; expelled the Achaean oligarchs; and propped up the 
Achaean democrats.63 But that solution failed as well. The oligarchs quickly regained power and 
renewed their allegiance not to Epaminondas but to the Spartans. Pellene followed suit and 
returned to the Spartans.64 Then the Arcadians (Mantineans), exasperated by the Thebans’ 
blunders in Achaea, secured an alliance with the Athenians (A16). The Theban alliance network 
in the Peloponnesus was insecure. 
Instead of addressing these schisms, in 364, Epaminondas turned his attention to a new 
theater, the Aegean, to recruit new allies.65 The primary targets – Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium 
– were all charter members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, so winning their allegiance 
would put Thebes in the position of leadership in the region previously held exclusively by 
Athens. The grandiose mission, however, failed to meet expectations: of the three major islands, 
only Byzantium gave him anything more than a warm welcome. Elsewhere, at Cnidus, the 
islanders passed a proxeny decree granting him free passage. The island of Ceos revolted from 
																																								 																				
 62 Ferrario 2014, 262-265 considers Epaminondas as an agent of historical change.  
 
63 Xen. Hell. 7.1.43.  
 
64 Ibid. 7.4.17, 43. 
 
65 Diod. Sic. 15.78.4-79; Aeschin. 2.105. The Aegean expedition: Buckler 1980b, 170-
171; Ruzicka 1998, 60-69; Mackil 2013, 80-81. 
 
223 
Athens at this time, but it is not certain to what extent it had anything to do with the Theban 
presence in the Aegean. Even so, he failed to make any official alliances.66  
To his credit, Epaminondas recognized the futility of continuing the venture.67 There 
were also troubles on the mainland that required immediate attention. In 364, after Pelopidas 
died fighting Alexander of Pherae, the Thebans sent northwards another large army of 7,000 
soldiers. They brought the troublesome tyrant into an alliance, as mentioned above, but it was an 
unexpectedly expensive investment. In 363, the Amphictyonic League exiled certain Delphians 
on an unknown charge, creating a disturbance in central Greece.68 Of course, there were the 
continuing and growing tensions among the Peloponnesian allies.  
 Sometime after 366, when the modified peace reversed the judgment on Triphylia in 
favor of the Arcadians, the Eleans abandoned the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance, made a new 
alliance with the Spartans, and attacked the Arcadians.69 Among the Arcadians, who had 
																																								 																				
66 Some (Lewis 1990, 72; Ruzicka 1998, 60-69; Stylianou 1998, 412-413) think that 
Byzantium concluded an alliance with Thebes at this time, but no official treaty exists. Although 
Diod. Sic. 15.79.1 says vaguely that Epaminondas “made the cities Thebes’ own [ἰδίας τὰς 
πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν],” he continues in 15.79.2 that he did not win “rule of the sea [ἡ 
τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχή].” Cnidus: Blümel 1994, 157-159; Buckler 2008, 199-210. Ceos: RO 39; 
Rutishauser 2012, 176-181. Just. Epit. 16.4.3-4 adds a stop at Heraclea Pontica. Carthaginian 
support for the fleet: RO 43; Roesch 1984, 45-60. 
 
67 Ruzicka 1998, 67 n. 26, believing Epaminondas secured alliances in the Aegean 
(previous note), regards the abandonment of the expedition to indicate a successful completion: 
“Once Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes broke with Athens there was no reason for renewed 
Theban maritime enterprise.” He is contradicted by Isoc. 5.53 and Plut. Phil. 14.2. 
 
68 The exiles found refuge in Athens (IG II2 109; FD III 5: 15-18; Osborne 1982, 59-61). 
Buckler and Beck 2008, 213-223 sees this exile as a contributing factor to the Third Sacred War. 
Scott 2014, 148 places it within the broader disorder in Greece during the 360s.  
 
69 Xen. Hell. 7.4.12, 19. 
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retaliated by seizing Olympia and its treasures from Elean control, only Mantinea counselled 
caution and passed a resolution to make peace with Elis. The attempt at making peace without 
consulting Thebes was a violation of the 370 alliance, so Epaminondas charged the Mantineans 
with treason (προδοσία) and called a fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus to settle the disputes.70 
He was accompanied by his remaining allies from Boeotia, Euboea, Thessaly, Argos, Messene, 
and Arcadia (Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Pallantion).71 On the other side, the Mantineans, 
Eleans, and Achaeans found support from the Athenians and the Spartans. In the culminating 
battle at Mantinea, Epaminondas defeated his enemies but lost his life. His final words, 
according to Diodorus, were “I leave behind two daughters, Leuctra and Mantineia, my 
victories.”72  
It is fitting that he would point to his military victories over any diplomatic achievements. 
Admittedly, the former were exceptional feats for the age; on the other hand, to Epaminondas, 
the act of making alliances was more like an uncomfortable learning exercise in the school of 
diplomacy. His track record bears this out. The alliances with the Peloponnesian states in 370 
and 369 were made with the only purpose being collective resistance to Sparta. Without specific 
details of leadership roles, the maintenance of the alliances was a troublesome affair. It is true 
																																								 																				
 
70 Ibid. 7.4.28-37, 40.  
 
71 Ibid. 7.5.4-5; Diod. Sic. 15.84.4. This may be the context for Epaminondas’ (and 
Callistratus’) embassy to the Arcadian assembly (Nep. Epam. 6.1-3; Plut. Mor. 193c-d, 810f; 
Hansen n. 87; Hochschulz 2007, 172-179). 
 
72 Diod. Sic. 15.87.6. Nep. Epam. 9.4 says his final words were “I have lived long 
enough; for I die unconquered.” Gryllus, the son of the historian Xenophon, is said to have killed 
him (Paus. 9.15.5).  
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that the alliance with the Achaeans included a clear stipulation for Thebes to be the leading 
partner, but in this case Epaminondas did not take into account the domestic politics of the 
Achaeans (or even of his own city). The expedition in the Aegean was too ambitious and failed 
to secure any alliances at all. Pelopidas did not fare any better in the north. After two years of 
effort, all he achieved were two brief alliances with Macedonian rulers – both of which were 
nullified after each ruler’s assassination – and a precarious imprisonment in Thessaly. It was not 
until 364 that a posthumous alliance was made with Alexander of Pherae. 
Epaminondas and Pelopidas were not senseless and in many respects they were 
exceptional leaders.73 Moreover, they were familiar with the previous Athenian and Spartan 
alliance experiences. What, then, was wrong? Why were they unable to establish more enduring 
alliances? Modern scholarship focuses on three related problems. The first is the failure to codify 
leadership roles.74 This glaring omission particularly applies to the early Peloponnesian alliances. 
With this aspect left ambiguous, Epaminondas could only rely on his charismatic authority to 
direct the allies. But since his leadership lacked a solid legal footing, there was always the 
possibility of a challenger, such as Lycomedes. It is not that the Thebans were unaware of the 
necessity of making this unquestionably clear; they took notice of how Athenian and Spartan 
alliances operated. At the same time as the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance, the Athenians and 
Spartans expended much energy on determining who would be in charge of military affairs in 
their alliance (A13). Epaminondas, however, was more concerned with a quick attack on Sparta 
																																								 																				
73 Words of praise for Epaminondas: Diod. Sic. 15.88 (cf. Roldán 1992, 39-46); Cic. 
Tusc. 1.4; Nep. Epam. 10.4 (cf. Stern 2012, 163-188); Paus. 9.15.6; Just. Epit. 6.8.1-2. Vottero 
1999, 43-86 analyzes Epaminondas’ reputation throughout antiquity. 
 
74 Roy 1971, 597; Buckler 1980b, 73-74; Buckler and Beck 2008, 135-137.  
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than negotiating leadership clauses. Nevertheless, this is not a comprehensive answer to Thebes’ 
alliance problems. Even without such a clause, other Arcadians and the Argives continued to 
defer to Theban leadership. Then there is the case of the Achaean alliance, which made Theban 
leadership abundantly clear but still fell apart quickly.   
The second problem is the absence of any formal organization of the new allies. Nearly 
every scholar today believes that the operation of Theban alliances was ad hoc and informal; 
there was no sort of overarching political institution that served as an umbrella for the many 
Theban allies.75 D.M. Lewis and P.J. Stylianou, however, are lone exponents of an official 
council (συνέδριον) for the allies running on the model of the Second Athenian Confederacy. 
They rest this on two pieces of evidence: the remark of the Sicyonian assassin to a κοινὸν τῶν 
συµµάχων δόγµα and a reference in a Theban inscription from the mid-350s to Byzantine 
σύνεδροι attending a συνέδριον in Thebes.76 But few are convinced by these points. John 
Buckler, for example, calling attention to the wide range of meanings for δόγµα, disputes that it 
must indicate a formal political institution. He does the same with σύνεδρος, showing that it can 
refer to casual gatherers for conversation, envoys, or other sorts of representatives, not always to 
council representatives.77 The evidence for a Theban council, therefore, stands on weak ground. 
The allies were joined to Thebes by ties no more formal than their individual treaties and by their 
shared anti-Spartan aims. Again, it is not that the Thebans were unaware of such arrangements, 
																																								 																				
75 Roy 1971, 598 (reiterated in Roy 1994, 202 n. 17); Buckler 1980b, 222-223 (reiterated 
in 2003, 299; Buckler and Beck 2008, 137-139); Kelly 1980, 67-73; Jehne 1994, 22 n. 74; Beck 
1997, 216 n. 15.  
 
76 Xen. Hell. 7.3.11; IG VII 2418, lines 11, 24 (= Tod 160). Lewis 1990, 71-73 (with 
bibliography of much earlier proponents); Stylianou 1998, 412-413. 
 
77 Buckler and Beck 2008, 171-172 (δόγµα); 177-178 (σύνεδρος). 
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having observed and participated in the institutional practices of Athenian and Spartan alliances; 
yet, they failed to establish specific fiscal, military, and political institutions to manage the 
alliances beyond their short-term objectives. This was due largely to the fact that the alliances 
relied so much on the personal goals of individual leaders that they ignored any need for 
structural institutions that would survive the passing of those individuals. Nevertheless, this, too, 
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure of Theban alliances. The existence of 
an allied council in the Second Athenian Confederacy, after all, did not preclude the troubles that 
Athens faced from its allies in the 350s.     
The third problem that scholars put forth is the sheer scale of what the Thebans were 
trying to achieve in comparison with their available means. Enacting and maintaining alliances 
on multiple fronts outside of Boeotia was a project for which the Thebans were unprepared in 
terms of manpower, finances, and experience. “Epaminondas’ policies,” George Cawkwell 
comments, “would in the long run have proved to have overstretched his country’s resources.”78 
For example, when Epaminondas took the allied army into the Peloponnesus in the summer of 
369, he left Pelopidas without any local troops during his second expedition to the north, so the 
latter was forced to hire Thessalian troops. Furthermore, there is no record of the Thebans ever 
including provision for financial contributions from the new allies to defray expenses. In 370, 
Elis lent (δεδανεῖσθαι) 10 talents to the Thebans but this was an inconsequential sum (compare 
Ariobarzanes’ contribution of 10 talents per month to the Spartans in 368 [S7] or Nectanebo’s 
220 talents to Agesilaus in 362 [S8]).79 Although the addition of a financial contribution clause 
																																								 																				
78 Cawkwell 1972, 275 (reprinted in 2011, 329). Buckler and Beck 2008, 210 calls the 
Theban naval program “an expensive failure.” 
 
79 Elis: Xen. Hell. 6.5.19.  
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to the alliances or the establishment of a revenue collection agency under the supervision of an 
allied council would certainly have provided more support, closer attention to resources may not 
have completely solved the problems facing the Thebans and their alliances. Even the well-
organized Athenians, who inserted financial details into many of their alliances, and the 
Spartans, who received great amounts of money from their wealthy allies, had fiscal problems 
during this period.   
There is one final problem that has not received enough attention in modern discussions 
of this topic: the Thebans’ failure to cultivate social connections with the new allies. Coming late 
to the practice of constructing extensive alliance networks, in many instances the Thebans lacked 
historical ties with the new allies in the first place. On the other hand, their obsession with 
matters of Realpolitik blinded them to recognizing the necessity of forming new relationships 
that would transcend and outlast the temporary objectives. The Athenian orator Isocrates, in a 
speech in 346, hints at this deficiency in the Theban alliance strategy:   
“But surely the matters concerning the Thebans have not escaped you. For having prevailed in the 
most splendid battle [i.e., at Leuctra] and from it possessing the greatest honor, because they did 
not use their success well, they are now managing no better than the defeated and unlucky. For no 
sooner had they conquered their foes than, more than everything else, they were disturbing the 
cities in the Peloponnese; they tried to enslave Thessaly; they were a threat to their Megarian 
neighbors; they robbed our city of a portion of its territory [i.e., Oropus]; they plundered Euboea; 
they sent triremes to Byzantium, in order to rule both land and sea [italics supplied].”80 
 
ἀλλὰ µὴν τὰ περὶ Θηβαίους οὐδὲ σὲ λέληθεν. καλλίστην γὰρ µάχην νικήσαντες, καὶ δόξαν ἐξ 
αὐτῆς µεγίστην λαβόντες, διὰ τὸ µὴ καλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς εὐτυχίαις οὐδὲν βέλτιον πράττουσι τῶν 
ἡττηθέντων καὶ δυστυχησάντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔφθασαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρατήσαντες, καὶ πάντων 
ἠνώχλουν µὲν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, Θετταλίαν δ᾽ ἐτόλµων καταδουλοῦσθαι, 
Μεγαρεῦσι δ᾽ ὁµόροις οὖσιν ἠπείλουν, τὴν δ᾽ ἡµετέραν πόλιν µέρος τι τῆς χώρας ἀπεστέρουν, 
Εὔβοιαν δ᾽ ἐπόρθουν, εἰς Βυζάντιον δὲ τριήρεις ἐξέπεµπον ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρξοντες.    
 
																																								 																				
 
80 Isoc. 5.53. 
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Despite some exaggeration in the closing lines, overall Isocrates makes much of the fact that 
although there was great potential in the Thebans’ military victories, they did not capitalize on 
them and create a more lasting legacy. He alludes to a reason for this with καὶ πάντων (“more 
than everything else”), a genitive of comparison, which can be taken to mean that the Thebans 
neglected things not associated with military affairs.81 Although Isocrates does not indicate what 
exactly they overlooked, one can easily see that the Thebans, unlike their Spartan and Athenian 
counterparts, neglected the interpersonal aspects of alliance management. For example, there is 
epigraphical evidence for a handful of proxeny decrees passed by the Boeotian League (not 
Thebes) during the 360s or soon after for a Carthaginian, a Byzantine, a Macedonian, and a 
Spartan exile (perhaps) – but none for citizens of the new allies.82 Nor is there mention in the 
ancient historians of personal relationships between the Theban leaders of this time and the new 
allies, such as those of Thrasybulus and Ismenias, and Agesilaus and Callistratus, to ensure the 
continued maintenance of the alliance. “It is a sign of Epaminondas’ political failure,” writes 
Simon Hornblower, “. . . that his Peloponnesian allies fought to reject Sparta rather than because 
of the positive attractions of Thebes.”83 In short, Theban alliances were less matters of creating 
bonds of community and rather more narrowly pragmatic accords, designed for temporary goals, 
and thus not stable and enduring.  
Predictably, then, the alliances were bound not to last long. After the Battle of Mantinea, 
the Mantinean-led faction of the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians made a joint 
																																								 																				
81 The Loeb translation renders it as “neglecting everything else.” 
 
82 Gerolymatos 1985, 307-309; Knoepfler 2005, 73-87; Mackil 2008, 157-194; Fossey 
2014, 3-4, 43-44. 
 
83 Hornblower 1983, 236. 
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alliance with the Athenians (A17). In the next year, Alexander of Pherae complicated matters by 
attacking Athenian allies and the Piraeus, which resulted in bringing the Athenians and 
Thessalians into an alliance (A18) and in nullifying the latter’s alliance with Thebes.84 The 
Thebans held on to their alliances with Argos, Messene, Tegea, and Megalopolis, and continued 
to campaign in Arcadia well into the next decade.85 Even the unequal alliance with Pherae 
continued under Tisiphonus, Alexander’s assassin and successor, until the Third Sacred War.86 
Finally, it was during that war that one after another of these remaining allies abandoned Thebes 
and joined Philip II of Macedon.87 It cannot be known for certain, but one might suspect that had 
the Thebans imitated their Spartan and Athenian predecessors more closely by enumerating 
leadership roles, developing formal administrative institutions, finding ways to increase their 
resources, and, most importantly, cultivating strong social relationships with the new allies, their 
one attempt at Greek hegemony may have lasted longer than it did. 
																																								 																				
 
84 Alexander’s attacks: [Dem.] 50.4-5; Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-2; Polyaenus Strat. 6.2; cf. 
Heskel 1997, 66-70.  
 
85 Diod. Sic. 15.94.1-3, 16.39.1-7. The inscribed copy of the Theban-Peloponnesian 
alliance was still standing in Megalopolis in 353 (Dem. 16.27). The Battle of Mantinea did not, 
therefore, bring an end to the Theban “hegemony” (Shrimpton 1971, 310-318; Kelly 1980, 65-
67; Dillery 1995, 17-38). 
 
86 RO 48; Diod. Sic. 16.35.1. Pherae after Alexander: Sprawski 2010, 181-188. 
 
87 Kelly 1980, 73-83 traces how Philip won over each Theban ally. 
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 Having explored the process of alliance formation in Part I and the principal case studies 
in Part II, this concluding chapter turns to the subject of the dissolution of alliances. The previous 
two chapters anticipated this with a multitude of examples of failed alliances. Spartan alliances 
failed because of confusion in translating the principles of Greek friendship into a cross-cultural 
context. Theban alliances failed because of the absence of any strong socio-cultural ties with the 
new allies. But, of course, the Athenians also had their share of unsuccessful and fleeting 
alliances. This concluding chapter returns to the Athenian context and seeks to uncover what a 
failed alliance may have meant to them. It first reexamines the approaches of modern scholarship 
to alliance dissolution before presenting alternative interpretations for this final stage of the 
alliance life-cycle. The Athenians, it is argued, did not construct alliances in the anticipation that 
they would dissolve quickly. Nor, if an ally violated the terms of the agreement, did they 
instantly purge the offender’s name from the rolls. In fact, even broken alliances remained intact 
in their commemorative stelai on the Acropolis. The chapter ends with a review of the major 
conclusions of this study as a whole and some final thoughts on their significance for the wider 
academic community.  
 
The End of Athenian Alliances 
 
All Athenian alliances in the fourth century came to an end. Some dissolved rather 
quickly. Others endured for decades. But all ended at some point. The questions this chapter 
seeks to answer are, after all of the positive work put into the creation and the maintenance of the 
alliances, how did the Athenians consider and how does one today interpet their abrogation? As 
might be expected from the discussion in Chapter I, modern scholarship views this topic through 
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the lens of Realism. The following passage from F.E. Adcock and D.J. Mosley’s Diplomacy in 
Ancient Greece summarizes the various explanations for the end of alliances from a Realist 
perspective.   
“Even where treaties were concluded for a limited term they regularly failed to last the full course 
for which they were designed. They and the perpetual treaties tended to lapse into obsolescence 
or to be superseded by fresh arrangements either made between the parties or dictated to them by 
an outside party. Some treaties were formally abrogated. The clearest method of signifying an 
unequivocal abrogation was to tear down the pillar on which it was inscribed.”1 
 
Besides the rather obvious explanation of a conquering power enforcing the dissolution of 
alliances, the authors make reference to three other explanations for the end of alliances: the 
balance of power (BOP), the failure of one ally (or both) to observe alliance obligations, and the 
nullification of an old alliance because of a conflict with a new one.  
As Chapter I explained, the BOP theory claims that two states create an alliance in order 
to obstruct the advance of a mutual enemy. Alliances, therefore, are negative agreements, 
defined by their opposition to a threat, and thus no longer necessary once the principal war aims 
are fulfilled. In this “mission accomplished” explanation, alliances are designed to have an end 
point. The social ties between the parties are insignificant in light of the more immediate military 
concerns. “Balance-of-power considerations,” Peter Hunt comments, “often required shifts of 
alignment even at the expense of treaty obligations and the friendships they often formalized.”2 
Although BOP has an obvious attraction for explaining interstate behavior, the Greeks did not 
recognize this structural influence, as Chapter I concluded, so it is not germane to a discussion of 
the reasons which the Greeks themselves held for discarding an alliance. 
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2 Hunt 2010, 162. 
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Hunt’s quote above alludes to the second explanation, the failure to observe alliance 
obligations. Realist proponents hold that the self-centered nature of the polis hindered the 
prospect of enduring cooperation. It was expected that at some point one party would violate the 
terms of the agreement. Knowing this was a distinct possibility, allies distrusted one another. 
Even in the negotiations for an alliance, each would seek to insert specifically worded clauses 
that might permit later non-observance. “The anti-deceit clauses we find in Greek treaties,” 
writes Edward Wheeler on the frequent appearance of ἀδόλως (without guile) in alliance oaths, 
“were occasioned by real and immediate concern about deception and especially sophistic 
interpretation.”3 Sarah Bolmarcich responds that this does not harmonize with the traditional 
respect for sacred oaths. She argues that the appearance of ἀδόλως does not indicate an interest 
in establishing a loophole for noncompliance but expresses a flexibility in alliance treaties, “so 
that a city-state that found herself in circumstances that made it difficult to fulfill an oath would 
not find herself compelled to do so by an ally against her interest.”4 Either way – the noxious 
form of actively working against an ally’s interests or the innocuous form of failing to uphold 
one’s end of the bargain – these explanations indicate that any failure to observe alliance 
obligations led directly to their dissolution. This was not always the case, however. The Thebans 
withheld support for Athenian expeditions throughout the 370s and yet there was not a clean 
break between them for many years.5 In the 360s, the Athenians supported Messenian 
																																								 																				
3 Wheeler 1984, 269; reiterated in 2008, 57-84. Rhodes 2008, 24 thinks that “during the 
fourth century the Greeks clearly became very fond of inserting in treaties ambiguous clauses 
that they intended to interpret to their own advantage.” 
 
4 Bolmarchich 2007a, 27. 
 
5 The Athenians did not erase from the Aristotles Decree (IG II2 43) the names of the 
allies who seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy: Thebes seceded in 371 (line 79), the 
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independence yet their alliance with the Spartans remained on the books. To take an example 
from the Spartans, when they failed to protect their Achaean allies from the Acarnanians, the 
wronged did not cast off the alliance, rejoicing to have found a reason to discard it, but rather 
demanded that the Spartans uphold their alliance responsibilities, which they then did.6 In other 
words, it was not always the case that an infraction led to the immediate suspension of alliance 
ties.  
The third major explanation – that the proliferation of alliances led to a conflict of 
interests, which meant that the older alliances must be cast aside – is exaggerated. In fact, in 
most cases the Athenians avoided conflicting alliances. For example, new members of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy were required to destroy any stelai from previous alliances that 
might interfere with the new organization.7 The Athenians refused to ally with the Arcadians in 
366 (A16) unless there was a guarantee that it would not be at odds with their Spartan alliance 
(A13).8 Even if there was a new alliance that might appear to be in conflict with an old – e.g., the 
Athenians’ alliance with the four Peloponnesians in 362 (A17) after their Spartan alliance (A13) 
– they did not necessarily discard the old one.9 In 353, when ambassadors from Megalopolis 
came to Athens seeking an alliance against the Spartans, Demosthenes reminded them that it 
																																								 																				
Euboeans and Acarnanians in 370 (line 81; B line 10), the Chalcidians in 365 (line 80), 
Byzantium in 364 (line 83), and Corcyra in 361 (B line 1). 
 
6 Xen. Hell. 4.7.1. 
  
 7 IG II2 43, lines 30-34. 
 
 8 Adcock and Mosley 1975, 224-225 (followed by Bederman 2001, 180 n. 283) 
incorrectly calls this alliance “the signal example of such apparently conflicting obligations.”  
 
9 Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 236-240 discuss this phenomenon in Spartan alliances: 
“In Spartan eyes once a state was an ally of Sparta it would remain forever so.” 
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would mean the abrogation of any conflicting alliance: “They must take down the stelai for the 
alliance with the Thebans, if they are to be our resolute allies [δεῖ τὰς στήλας καθελεῖν αὐτοὺς 
τὰς πρὸς Θηβαίους, εἴπερ ἡµέτεροι βεβαίως ἔσονται σύµµαχοι].”10 The Megalopolitans, 
however, were unwilling to do this, and the Athenians were no more willing to discard their 
alliance with the Spartans to help them. Then there is the case of the Athenian-Thessalian 
alliance (A18). In 368, the Athenians had allied with Alexander of Pherae, traditional enemy of 
the Thessalian League, and supported him in his conflict with the Thessalians and their Theban 
allies. In 364, however, the Thebans overcame Alexander and made him an ally of Thebes (T7). 
The tyrant repudiated his alliance with the Athenians; yet, in Athens, the alliance stele remained 
standing on the Acropolis. Not until three years later, during negotiations for an alliance with the 
Thessalians (A18), would they destroy it in compliance with the wishes of their new allies. But 
this is not an example of “directly contrary or apparently incompatible” alliances.11 Alexander 
had already abandoned the alliance; it was only the stele that remained to be destroyed.    
These examples of stele destruction have led scholars to assume that this was done 
routinely as a damnatio memoriae. Rosalind Thomas calls it “the widespread practice of 
obliterating documents.” P. J. Rhodes characterizes it as a “standard practice.”12 But these 
pronouncements are made on the basis of only a few instances. It was not as prevalent a practice 
as they claim. Just as the Athenians were hesitant to declare the end of an alliance agreement, so 
																																								 																				
 
10 Dem. 16.27. 
 
11 Adcock and Mosley 1975, 224. 
 
12 Thomas 1989, 51-52; Rhodes 2001, 138; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975, 223; Steiner 
1994, 71; Hagemajer Allen 2002, 226. 
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they were reluctant to destroy the stelai. Against the communis opinio, Sarah Bolmarcich has 
recently suggested that “only under very specific circumstances was a treaty-stela removed or 
altered.” She begins her article with the famous example of the stele which commemorated the 
alliance of Athens, Elis, Argos, and Mantinea in 420. Even though the alliance was designated to 
last for 100 years, it only lasted a short time, but the stele continued to stand at Olympia five 
centuries later when Pausanias visited the site.13 Proceeding through the few examples in the 
fourth century of the obliteration of a stele or just the erasure of a name from a stele, she 
concludes that these are only extraordinary cases and that the Athenian impulse was rather 
towards their preservation, even of those for lapsed alliances. Furthermore, the fact that so many 
stelai have survived in their original location (i.e., the Acropolis) suggests that this is indeed the 
case.14  
As Chapter II made clear, the stone documents, sacred objects, placed under the watchful 
eyes of the gods, possessed a strong religious and symbolic character. Even when it was decided 
to destroy the one for the alliance with Alexander of Pherae, it was the religious authorities, the 
Treasurers of Athena (ταµίαι τῆς θεο͂), who were assigned that responsibility.15 But while the 
stones stood, the Athenians continued to imagine that the alliances, even those that had been 
violated, also persisted. Demosthenes confirms this in his speech for the preservation of honors 
awarded to the Spartocid ruler Leucon. He claims that the Athenian relationship with the Black 
Sea rulers would last as long as the stele which recorded those honors also stood.16 It seems that 
																																								 																				
13 Paus. 5.12.8; Bolmarcich 2007b, 477; cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 236-240. 
 
14 Liddel 2003, 79-93.  
 
 15 IG II2 116, lines 39-40. 
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the notions of the Athenians designing terminal alliances and then casually disregarding their 
stone records needs to be revised. 
Of course, alliances did lapse after a mission was accomplished or fail to endure because 
of a breach of the alliance terms. But the socio-cultural perspective of this study suggests that the 
end of alliances may not always have been so expected or so dismal. Indeed, it would be odd for 
the Athenians to have expended so much energy constructing their alliances if they intended 
them to end in short order. The language employed in the treaties and the rituals performed after 
the negotiations work against the theory that alliances were designed to end. No Athenian 
alliance in the fourth century had a specific time limit; nearly all were designated to last forever. 
The ones with dynasts continued, at least in theory, with their descendants. If, during the 
negotiations for an alliance, there was any sense that it might not endure as is, that future 
circumstances might have a negative impact on its persistence, the Greeks did not have an escape 
clause (clausula rebus sic stantibus); instead, they could include a provision for future 
amendment (A1, A2, A3, A17, and A20). Moreover, this study demonstrated that there were 
closer ties between the allies than just the temporary military affairs, which made it possible, 
though not inevitable, that their relationships could endure through future contingencies.  
The religious rituals which accompanied the alliance negotiations, too, indicate that the 
signatories hoped for an enduring alliance. These ceremonies generated positive and negative 
emotions. Chapter II showed how the language of the oaths provided metaphors of unity and the 
performative aspects of the rituals activated a sense of solidarity. They also drew attention to the 
role of the gods and impressed upon the participants the weighty solemnity of the agreements. 
																																								 																				
16 Dem. 20.37: “to those wishing to speak evil against the city, they are a sign that they 
speak truth [αὗται γὰρ οὑτωσὶ τοῖς βουλοµένοις κατὰ τῆς πόλεως βλασφηµεῖν τεκµήριον ὡς 
ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν ἑστήξουσιν].” 
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“The ritual sacrifice, the libations, the curse, the invoking of divine witnesses,” writes Andrew 
Bayliss on the role of religious ceremonies in interstate treaties, “was all clearly designed to 
generate not only trust, but also fear of the gods who had the power to punish those who broke 
their oaths.”17 The oaths, with both blessings for faithful observance and curses for non-
observance, animated the commitment to a lasting alliance. The annual commemorative festivals, 
moreover, kept the alliance alive in the minds of all the participants. To contemporary Athenians, 
therefore, there was a hope that alliances, seen in social and religious in addition to political and 
military terms, would not end.  
Nor did the Athenians accept the end of an alliance so easily when it actually happened. 
As mentioned above, they might hold on to an alliance even after the terms had been violated. 
Sometimes, however, two poleis chose to renew their vows, as it were. The Athenian-Boeotian 
alliance (A1) endured through the pressures of the Corinthian War and, according to Lysias, 
continued beyond the dissolution of the Boeotian League at the end of the war. It came to an end 
only when an Athenian attempted to orchestrate a revolution in Thebes, which “deprived us of 
that alliance [τῆς συµµαχίας ἡµᾶς ταύτης ἀπεστέρησεν].”18 Nevertheless, the alliance stele 
continued to stand on the Acropolis. In 378, the two parties renewed their alliance relationship 
(A12) and the Thebans became a part of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377. Even though 
the Thebans eventually seceded from the Confederacy, the stele for the bilateral alliance 
remained standing and their names were not erased from the Aristotles Decree. Finally, in 339, 
when faced by the mutual threat posed by Philip, the two overlooked their past grievances, 
																																								 																				
 
17 In Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 167; cf. Bolmarchich 2007a, 26-38; Low 2007, 118-
126; Hunt 2010, 188-189. 
 
18 Lys. 26.23. 
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recalled their past collaboration, and reunited in yet another alliance (A23). The Athenians and 
the Eretrians also had a checkered history in the fourth century, but each time they renewed 
friendly relations they also renewed their alliances (A3 and A22, for example). 
At other times, alliances may have simply lapsed over time without any breach of the 
agreement, but the parties still decided periodically to renew their relationship. The Chians, for 
example, allied with Thrasybulus in the 390-389 campaign and renewed their alliance in 384 
(A8), in 378, and in 377, as a part of the push towards Confederacy.19 The Mytileneans made 
alliances with the Athenians in 389 (A7), in 378, and in 377.20 The Byzantines (A10) and 
Methymnaeans (A11), too, made alliances with the Athenians in the 380s before reaffirming 
them under the umbrella of the Confederacy.21 Sometimes when renewing an alliance an ally 
might bring others to form a joint alliance. The Mantineans (Arcadians) made a defensive 
alliance with the Athenians in 366 (A16) and then a larger alliance in 362 which included three 
other Peloponnesian groups (A17). They also renewed their alliance with the Athenians in 342 as 
a part of the anti-Philip coalition. The Athenians clearly did not consider their alliance 
relationships to be terminal.  
While one should not be misled into thinking that alliance relationships were ideal, the 
examples presented in this conclusion remind that the alliance process was not such a negative 
and uninspiring ordeal as modern scholars assert. The Athenians constructed their alliances on 
																																								 																				
 
19 Diod. Sic. 14.94.3 (390-389); IG II2 35 (378); 43, line 79 (377). 
 
20 IG II2 40 (378); 43, line 80 (377). 
 
21 IG II2 43, lines 81 (Methymna) and 83 (Byzantium). 
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the basis of historical interactions and socio-cultural elements. When they finally negotiated the 
actual treaty, they did so in the hopes that the arrangements would endure. Many of the alliances 
continued beyond the military objectives for which they were directed. On a number of 
occasions one party violated the terms of the agreement. Others simply lapsed over time. 
Nevertheless, the Athenians continued to act as though the alliances were still active.  They often 
renewed the relationships and erected yet another stele on the Acropolis for it. And even after the 
classical period came to an end and the Athenian alliance network was irrevocably severed, the 
stelai continued to stand in commemoration of those alliances.  
 
Project Summary  
 
This study began with the confident yet unconventional declaration that the practice of 
constructing formal interstate alliances in the fourth-century Greek world was a social activity. 
Chapter I explored how this topic is generally approached today in modern scholarship. Rather 
than a positive process that created shared goals, ideas, even identities, most scholars view 
alliances through the interpretive lens of Realism and BOP. This model, however, conceived in 
the early modern European context and then enhanced in the twentieth century, fails to find 
substantiation in the ancient Greek record. Other scholars today pose alternative theories, such as 
Liberalism and Constructivism, but, again, these paradigms would be foreign to the ancient 
Greeks. This study, therefore, sought to uncover the principles of alliance activity from the 
historical record, uncovering how the ancient Greeks themselves might have interpreted their 
interstate alliances. The brief philological overview of alliance terminology demonstrated that 
they considered their alliances, albeit ostensibly politico-military accords, to be socially defined. 
Although the first alliances in the historical record were labelled friendship (φιλότης, φιλία) or 
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oath (ὅρκος), by the fourth century, nearly every alliance was a συµµαχία; nevertheless, the non-
political and non-military features remained, embedded, giving a much deeper sense of the 
alliance as a social activity.  
Chapter II outlined the general procedures of the alliance process: the proposal, the 
negotiation and the articulation of the alliance conditions, and the public display of the 
agreements. The legislative activity necessary to authorize alliances incorporated the 
participation of the whole community, not just one political faction, and made it a communal 
effort. In addition to bringing the whole polis together, since this was an interstate activity, it also 
brought two poleis together into a closer union. The joint performance of religious ceremonies, 
moreover, transformed the ostensibly political activity into a much more solemn occasion. The 
chapter concluded with the practice of inscribing the words of the alliance treaty on stone and 
erecting them for all to see at prominent, sacred locations. Through the legislative, religious, and 
military activities, the two parties strengthened old ties and developed new ones to advance their 
alliance relationship. 
Part II transitioned away from the theoretical and procedural aspects to specific case 
studies. Chapter III examined Athenian alliances. The first part, concerning alliances from the 
first one with the Boeotians in 395 (A1) to those which formed the nucleus of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, made the case that these alliances were not tools of Athenian imperialism 
but rather manifestations of deep socio-cultural ties between the Athenians and their allies. The 
interstate alliances sprang from social, religious, and economic connections on an interpersonal 
level. The second part of this chapter, however, traced both a proliferation of Athenian alliances 
and a gradual decline in their effectiveness. A little less than a decade after the creation of the 
Confederacy, the Athenians shocked the Greek world by making an alliance with the Spartans. 
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But then a little less than a decade after that, they entered into new alliances with their 
Peloponnesian rivals. From the mid-350s to the last alliance in 339, Athenian foreign policy 
became increasingly defined by opposition to Philip II of Macedon. While he proved a 
formidable foe, the Athenians overextended their diplomatic reach, until their whole alliance 
edifice collapsed with their defeat at Chaeronea and their inclusion into Philip’s League of 
Corinth. Yet, even in these final years, the Athenians followed the same pattern as before in 
resting their formal alliances on their historical relationships and interpersonal interactions with 
their allies.  
Chapter IV demonstrated that these practices existed just as much, if not more, in fourth-
century Sparta. Kings Agesilaus and Archidamus framed their alliances with Greeks and with 
non-Greeks according to the principles of reciprocity inherent in interpersonal friendships. Their 
alliances with other Greeks operated rather smoothly because everyone understood the guiding 
principles. Through the exchange of money and manpower, the alliances had the potential to 
advance the military objectives of the allies as well as the political objectives of the Spartans in 
the Peloponnesus. The alliances with non-Greeks, on the other hand, were utter failures, lasting 
no more than a few months, but this chapter argued that this was because of cross-cultural 
misunderstandings about friendship and reciprocity. Whether successes or failures, the Spartans, 
like the Athenians, saw their alliances in socio-cultural terms. 
Chapter V also covered failed alliances, those under Theban direction from 371 to 362, 
which stand as counterexamples to Chapter IV. Unlike the Spartan experiences, Theban alliances 
failed because there was no attempt to cultivate socio-cultural ties with the new allies. Although 
modern scholars are right to stress the problems extending from the absensce of clearly defined 
leadership roles and well-established administrative institutions to support the hegemonic 
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endeavor, this chapter posed the additional problem of the lack of social connections between the 
Thebans and their allies. Their obsession with temporary politico-military objectives blinded 
them to the need for forming relationships that would persist beyond the immediate campaigns. 
The negative example of Theban alliances, therefore, reinforces the importance of the socio-
cultural elements in fourth-century alliances; without them, the alliances were even more likely 
to dissolve.  
 
Significance of the Work for the Academic Community 
 
 In the closing lines of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, an implicit 
critique of Karl Marx’s approach to history by tracing the potential religious influences on the 
development of modern economic practices, Max Weber wrote,  
“it cannot, of course, be our purpose to replace a one-sided ‘materialist’ causal interpretation of 
culture and history with an equally one-sided spiritual one. Both are equally possible, but neither 
will serve historical truth if they claim to be the conclusion of the investigation rather than merely 
the preliminary work for it.”22 
 
This dissertation has followed this Weberian prescription for its own methodological approach to 
interstate alliances in the fourth-century Greek world. Although it consistently viewed the 
alliances through a socio-cultural lens, it did not seek to substitute a completely socialized 
account in place of the traditional Realist model. The latter has great value for understanding 
international behavior – indeed, its staying power as the dominant IR model attests to that – but it 
is incomplete; it needs to devote more attention to the non-political and non-military 
determinants. This dissertation showed how this can be done for the fourth-century Greek world 
and promotes its application to other historical contexts. 
																																								 																				
22 Reprinted in Weber 2002, 122.  
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In focusing its attention on the socio-cultural features, this study revealed a more 
optimistic perspective of interstate alliances. The current theoretical IR models cast a negative 
shadow over the whole alliance life-cycle, from the anxious proposal from one state to the 
reluctant acceptance by another to the calamitous dissolution of the compact. This scenario 
derives from the “one-sided ‘Realist (or BOP)’ causal interpretation” which views alliances, 
defined by pragmatism and self-interest, only in political and military terms and takes no thought 
for ideological or moral considerations in their development. The perspective of this project, 
however, challenged this power politics only narrative and broadened the interpretive horizon to 
include the social, religious, moral, and otherwise non-political features that gave the alliances 
their deep meaning. There was no intention to deny that political and military concerns existed in 
the formation of alliances, but it showed that the socio-cultural determinants were just as potent, 
if not more so. As political institutions the Greek poleis had a great interest in the conduct of 
political activity; yet, the chapters in this work showed how important it is to recognize that the 
ancient Greeks did not disassociate these activities from those in the social, cultural, or religious 
spheres. Ancient Greek IR was a very personal affair with formal alliances springing up out of 
interpersonal relationships, shared ideas, the observance of moral norms, and historical contacts, 
which, in fact, were what defined and reified the political and military decisions. The 
conventional models make a hermeneutical mistake by ignoring these socio-cultural aspects. 
This project, therefore, adds a fresh perspective and has the potential to generate further 
discussion on the nature of interstate relations in antiquity.  
This perspective is unique for interstate alliances in the fourth century, but it is not, of 
course, unique in academia at large. For some time now there have been scholars who have 
followed a parallel path from those in the Realist camp. They have engaged with the literary and 
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anthropological turns in academia – with their questioning of the relationship between language 
and reality, and their emphasis on the gap between modern and primitive – and have sought to 
reexamine the historical record in its own context. Those with this scholarly bent have already 
made great advances in elucidating the conceptual framework within which the Greek poleis 
interacted with one other. Surprisingly, however, there has not yet been a study from this 
perspective that is specifically directed at classical Greek alliances. As mentioned in Chapter I, 
for these scholars the larger theoretical issues of IR take precedence over the details of alliance 
formation. This project fills that void and hopes to raise awareness of the importance of alliance 
studies for this strand of scholarship. 
Finally, being an interdisciplinary endeavor, this study encourages historians, classicists, 
and IR scholars to collaborate more directly in their research. Although it attempted to uncover 
contemporary perceptions in the primary literary and epigraphic record and eschewed the strict 
imposition of anachronistic models, its conclusions still engaged with the current debates in the 
various disciplines. It is important for scholars in the three disciplines to engage more closely 
with one another’s work in order to recognize the biases and assumptions that have crept into 
these studies and have become axiomatic. “Most Classicists,” J.E. Lendon admits in what can 
equally apply to historians, “are happily oblivious to this [i.e., IR] theoretical work, but we are 
all unaware realists by upbringing, taught to view relations between states in terms of power and 
security.”23 At the same time, IR scholars, looking for supporting evidence for their generalized 
theoretical models but also lacking a full understanding of the historical context, often impose 
logical but anachronistic interpretations onto the ancient world. A closer engagement with each 
other’s work – a scholarly alliance, if you will – can only be constructive. 
																																								 																				
23 Lendon 2002, 376. 
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Appendix A 
Athenian, Spartan, and Theban Alliances (403-338) 
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No. Allies Date                Source(s) 
A
thens 
A1 Boeotia 395 ü ü              IG II² 14; Xen. Hell. 3.5.7-
16 
A2 Locris 395 ü ü              IG II² 15 
A3 Eretria 394 ü ü ü             IG II² 16 
A4 Seuthes  390                IG II2 21; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; 
Diod. Sic. 14.94.2 
A5 Amadocus 390                IG II2 22; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; 
Diod. Sic. 14.94.2 
A6 Thasos 390    ü            IG II² 24; Dem. 20.59 
A7 Mytilene 389    ü ü     ü      Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; Diod. 
Sic. 14.94.3-4 
A8 Chios 384 ü               IG II2 34 
A9 Olynthus 383                IG II2 36; Xen. Hell. 5.2.15 
A10 Byzantium 380s ü               IG II2 41 
A11 Methymna 380s                IG II2 42 
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No. Allies Date                Source(s) 
A
thens 
A12 Thebes 378                IG II2 40; Plut. Pel. 14.1. 
A13 Sparta 369     ü           Xen. Hell. 7.1.1-14 
A14 Alexander  
of Pherae 
368      ü          IG II² 116, lines 39-40; 
Dem. 23.120; Diod. Sic. 
15.71.3; Plut. Pel. 31.4; 
Mor. 193d 
A15 Dionysius I  
of Syracuse 
368 ü      ü ü        IG II2 105 
A16 Arcadian 
League 
366 ü               Xen. Hel. 7.4.2-3, 6 
A17 Arcadia, 
Achaea,  
Elis, Phlius 
362 ü ü   ü    ü ü      IG II2 112 
A18 Thessalian 
League 
361 
 
ü        ü  ü ü    IG II2 116 
A19 Thracian kings 357 ü   ü         ü   IG II2 126; Dem. 23.170-
178 
A20 Northern 
kings 
356 ü ü         ü     IG II2 127; Diod. 16.22.3 
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No. Allies Date                Source(s) 
A
thens 
A21 Phocis 355                Dem. 19.61-62; Aeschin. 
3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; 
Paus. 3.10.3 
A22 Eretria 341 ü   ü   ü  ü       IG II2 230 
A23 Thebes 339     ü           Dem. 18.160-251; Aeschin. 
3.142-143; Hyp. Against 
Diondas 137r/136v; Philoch. 
FGrH 328 F56b; Theopomp. 
FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic. 
16.84-85; Plut. Dem. 18 
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No. Allies Date                Source(s) 
Sparta 
S1 Dionysius I  
of Syracuse 
403      ü          Diod. Sic. 13.81.2, 
14.10.2-3, 70.3 
S2 Spithridates 395                Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; 
Ages. 3.2-3 
S3 Otys 395                Xen. Hell. 4.1.3; Ages. 
3.3-4 
S4 Acarnanians 389               ü Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1; 
Ages. 2.20 
S5 Amyntas III  
of Macedon 
382                Isoc. 4.126; Diod. Sic. 
15.19.3 
S6 Olynthus 379               ü Xen. Hell. 5.3.26 
S7 Ariobarzanes 366      ü          Xen. Ages. 2.25-26 
S8 Tachos 361     ü ü          Xen. Ages. 2.28-31; 
Diod. Sic. 15.92-93; 
Plut. Ages. 36-40 
S9 Phocis 356      ü          Theopomp. FGrH 115 
F 312; Diod. Sic. 
16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3 
S10 Tarentum 346      ü          Diod. Sic. 16.62.4 
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No. Allies Date                Source(s) 
T
hebes 
T1 Central and 
Northern  
Greeks 
370 ü          ü     Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; 
Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 
15.62.4 
T2 Arcadia, Elis, 
Argos 
370 ü        ü ü ü     Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. 
Sic. 15.62.3; Paus. 
8.6.2, 9.14.4 
T3 Sicyon/Pellene 369         ü ü      Xen. Hell. 7.2.2-3.3.2; 
Diod. 15.69.1 
T4 Alexander II  
of Macedon 
369          ü    ü  Diod. Sic. 15.67.4; 
Plut. Pel. 26.4  
T5 Ptolemy Alorus  
of Macedon 
368              ü ü Plut. Pel. 27.3 
T6 Achaean 
League 
366         ü ü     ü Xen. Hell. 7.1.41-42; 
Diod. Sic. 15.75.2 
T7 Alexander of 
Pherae 
364               ü Diod. Sic. 15.80.6; 
Plut. Pel. 35.1-2 
	252	
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Interstate Alliances in SdA (403-338) 
 
συνθήκη καὶ συµµαχία 
231  Amyntas III of Macedon and Chalcidian League (393?) 
307  Grabus the Illyrian and the Chalcidian League (357) 
311  Athens and Locris (356?) 
340  Athens and Eretria (341) 
 
συνθήκη 
233  Thebes and Alexander II of Macedon (369) 
253  Sparta and Olynthus (379) 
255  Athens and Thebes (377) 
271  Thebes and Phocis (370) 
 
φιλία καὶ συµµαχία 
238  Athens and Odrysian king (390) 
328  Athens and Mytilene (346) 
333  Philip II of Macedon and Artaxerxes III (343?) 
 
εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία  
281  Boeotians and Alexander of Pherae (367) 
 
φιλία 
298  Athens and Philip II of Macedon (359) 
 
συµµαχία 
217  Sparta and Elis (400) 
221  Sparta and Egyptian King Nepherites I (396) 
223  Athens and Boeotians (395) 
224  Athens and Locris (395) 
225  Corinthian (anti-Spartan) alliance (395) 
229  Athens and Eretria (394) 
230  Italiote League (393) 
234  Athens and Evagoras of Cyprus (390) 
236  Athens and Egyptian King Acoris (389) 
237  Egyptian King Acoris, Evagoras of Cyprus, and Pisidians (390?) 
243  Sparta and Thebes (386) 
244  Sparta and Corinth (386) 
248  Athens and Chios (384) 
249  Sparta and Acanthus, Apollonia, and Amytnas III of Macedon (383) 
250  Athens and Olynthus (383) 
254  Athens and Thebes (379) 
256  Athens and Byzantium (378) 
257  Decree of Aristoteles (377) 
258  Athens and Methymna (377) 
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259  Athens and Chalcis (377) 
262  Athens and Corcyra, Acarnanians, and Cephallenia (375) 
263  Athens and Corcyra (375) 
264  Athens and Amyntas III of Macedon (375/373) 
267  Athens and Cephallenia (372?) 
273  Boeotians and Arcadian League (370) 
274  Athens and Sparta (369) 
275  Boeotians and Alexander II of Macedon (369) 
276  Athens and Alexander of Pherae (368) 
277  Thebes and Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (368) 
280  Athens and Dionysius I of Syracuse (367) 
283  Boeotians and Achaeans (367) 
284  Athens and the Arcadian League (366) 
288  Boeotians and Alexander of Pherae (363) 
290  Athens and the Arcadians, Achaeans, Elis, and Phlius (362) 
291  Mantinea and Sparta (362) 
293  Athens and the Thessalian League (361) 
298  Athens and Philip II of Macedon (359) 
300  Philip II of Macedon and Potidaea (359) 
303  Athens and Berisades, Amadocus and Cersobleptes (357) 
304  Athens and Euboeans (357) 
305  Social War (anti-Athens) alliance (357) 
308  Philip II of Macedon and Chalcidian League (357) 
309  Athens and Thracians, Paeonians, Illyrians (356) 
310  Athens and Phocis (356) 
312  Athens and Neapolis (355) 
315  Philip II and the Thessalian League (353) 
318  Philip II of Macedon and Byzantium (352) 
323  Athens and Olynthus (349) 
327  Philip II of Macedon and Boeotians (347?) 
332  Athens and Megara (343) 
337  Athens and Peloponnesian states (342) 
339  Athens and Chalcis (341) 
345  Athens and Thebes (339) 
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